# 1ac

### 1ac reconciliation

#### Contention 1 is RECONCILIATION:

#### Consensus is *impossible* within Cuban politics – a *diverse* variety of factions are stuck in a state of *memory-war*, each seeking to *universalize* political preferences through the construction of competing historical narratives to *deny legitimacy* to opposing opinions and *assign blame* for historical tragedy – this process *antagonizes* disagreements and guarantees *perpetual conflict*

#### We need to foster a more *forgiving* method for advocacy – facilitate *engagement* rather than *isolation* – in which all interested parties can realize their ability to *affect change* and *be changed* through open discussion and debate

Rojas 7 (Rafael Rojas, 2011-2012 Princeton Global Scholar, teaches at the Center for Economic Research and Teaching (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas/CIDE), Mexico City, former visiting professor at Princeton and Columbia, “Chapter 15: Diaspora and Memory in Cuban Literature,” translated by John Miller and Fernando Feliu-Moggi, in Cuba: Idea of a Nation Displaced, ed. Andrea O’Reilly Herrera, SUNY Press, 2007, pp.237-250, Project MUSE)

The Italian philosopher Mauricio Ferraris dedicated a complete treatise to showing the close relationship between memory and mourning in Saint Augustine,¶ Montaigne, Rousseau, and Heidegger. Memory, according to Ferraris, and more¶ specifically autobiographical and historical writing, is generally associated with a¶ moment of loss, of the decline of a certain identity.1 The reconstruction of the¶ symbolic memory of any country—after a civil war that split in two the cultural¶ imaginary of the community, or in the wake of an authoritarian government that¶ exerted excessive control over the national historic narrative—is also part of the¶ mourning process, marking the end of the former regime.¶ In the case of Cuba, this reconstruction began in 1992, when the reform¶ of the Constitution attempted to adapt the mechanisms for symbolic legitimation of the Cuban regime to the conditions of the post Cold War. In the¶ pages that follow, I propose a journey through the principal topics of this postcommunist reconstruction of Cuba’s historical memory through contemporary¶ literature produced both on the island and in the Diaspora. At the conclusion¶ of that journey, as will be seen, is the notion that in spite of certain indications¶ of the emergence of a narrative of national reconciliation, the principal actors¶ of Cuban culture are still in a state of memory-war, a struggle for historic¶ legitimacy that derives from exclusive and irreconcilable narratives of a common past.¶ The entanglements of Cuban memory originate with each groups resistance¶ to recognize the others historical legitimacy. This binary tension bears, to some¶ extent, the traces of a symbolic projection of enmity, of a civil war narrative fully¶ incorporated into the politics of memory exercised by the national subjects. In¶ the Cuban case, the discursive obstacles placed by certain identities on national¶ reconciliation set the stage for a perpetual conflict , similar to that described by¶ Jean Amery, in which every attempt to go beyond resentment and guilt—beyond¶ the affirming monologue of the victim and the expiatory mentality of the executioner—appear condemned to failure.2¶ FORGIVENESS AND FORGETTING¶ Like most Hispanic-American literature, Cuban literature has not produced¶ many confessions, memoirs, and autobiographies.3 For that reason, the emergence of this genre in the most recent writing of Cuban exiles without the support of a national or continental tradition is astonishing. Not only has a large¶ portion of Cuban diasporic writers written autobiographical poems, novels, stories, or essays (Lorenzo Garcia Vega, Manuel Diaz Martinez, Carlos Victoria,¶ Jesus Diaz, Zoe Valdes, Vicente Echerri, Uva de Aragon, Daina Chaviano,¶ Matias Montes Huidobro, Yanitzia Caneti, and Jose Manuel Prieto, among others), but in the last two decades of the twentieth century a complete corpus of¶ memoirs of the Cuban intellectual was formed: Retrato de familia con Fidel¶ (1981), Carlos Franqui; La mala memoria (1989), Heberto Padilla; Antes que¶ anochezca (1992), Reinaldo Arenas; Mea Cuba (1993), Guillermo Cabrera¶ Infante; Next Year in Cuba (1995), Gustavo Perez Firmat; Informe contra mi¶ mismo (1996), Eliseo Alberto;^ la sombra del mar (1998), Juan Abreu; Lloversobre¶ mojado (1998), Lisandro Otero; Revive, historia (1999), Cesar Leante; and Dulces guerreros cubanos (1999), Norberto Fuentes. The intensity of this discourse in¶ the Diaspora of the 1990s relates, of course, to the reclaiming of a subjectivity¶ inhibited by strong collective pressures, or with that detachment of the / from a¶ collective, totalitarian We, and the reconstruction of personal identity experienced¶ in every exile.4¶ In these memoirs, the rhetorical emphasis, anchored in prosopopœi, always¶ directs the evocation toward a moral objective: accusation (Franqui and Cabrera¶ Infante), revenge (Padilla, Arenas, and Abreu), confession (Alberto and Leante),¶ apology or justification (Otero and Fuentes), and identity (Perez Firmat). All the¶ memoirs are interspersed with those five perspectives; that is, all are accusatory,¶ vengeful, confessional, justificatory, and seek to define identity. In Franqui, memory is a pretext to denounce, step by step, the rapid Stalinization of the revolutionary government of the 1960s; and in Abreu, it is a spiritual compensation for¶ the persecutions that he suffered together with Reinaldo Arenas in the Havana¶ of the 1970s. For Alberto, it is primarily a matter of exorcising an unbearable¶ complicity, whereas for Fuentes, it is the excuse for a terrifying and captivating¶ epic. In the case of Perez Firmat, it represents the first Cuban-American presence.’ Each moral recovery of the past produces a struggle between the instinct¶ of evading and that of confronting responsibilities for past associations with the¶ Castro regime.¶ It is clear that the two intellectuals who had the deepest involvement in the¶ revolutionary government, Lisandro Otero and Norberto Fuentes, are the most¶ elusive. Otero, who in the gray decades was one of the most influential intellectuals in the cultural policies of the country, blames history, the whirlwind, the collectivity fostered by a period of “ardent romanticism,” “patriotic passion,” and¶ “utopian idealism” that converted him “much in line with the times” into an¶ “Orthodox,” an “intransigent” and even a “fanatic."6 Fuentes, the author closest¶ to the real center of power, State Security, describes like some latter-day Dante¶ the political hell of Castroism, but makes the executioners into melancholic,¶ ingenuous heroes. In 460 pages, he only manages to acknowledge (in the third¶ person) that “the author also was on the side of those who filled the jails, and that¶ he helped manufacture the same pincers that, in fact, he later found around his¶ own neck.”7 At the other extreme is the acknowledgment of responsibility. Consider, for example, the passage in which Padilla mentions Koestler and laments¶ his “complicity with an authoritarian regime that his deepest convictions¶ rejected”; the page where Eliseo Alberto confesses to having drafted reports¶ about his own family for State Security; the remorse of Cesar Leante for having¶ “engulfed himself in a myth which exonerated real atrocities”; or the painful and¶ witty contrition of Guillermo Cabrera Infante in Mea Cuba: “The guilt is great¶ and experienced: for having left my land to become an outcast, while at the same¶ time leaving behind those who were traveling on the same ship, which I helped¶ to launch without knowing that it was for the worse.”8¶ Autobiographies written by some of the greatest writers of the twentieth¶ century, such as The Tongue Set Free or The Torch in My Ear by Elias Canetti,¶ Speak, Memory by Vladimir Nabokov, and Italo Calvino’s Hermit in Paris, depict¶ the lives of those committed to literature and capable of assimilating strong political passions without developing a sickly morality, a pathos, in their transcription¶ of the personal experience of history. For those masters, the true mystery resides¶ in the “symbolic halo,” which, according to Joseph Conrad, emanates from every¶ work of art. The lives of Cuban intellectuals, on the other hand, reveal the¶ unsheltered individual, shaken by Time, History, Fate, or its most oppressive¶ variant, the Revolution, which condemns them to an irreversible, premature¶ aging. A copious litany of aphorisms cursing Fate can be extracted from the¶ memoirs of these Greek-like beings: “History is slavery” (Cabrera Infante); “History is that rat that each night climbs the stairs” (Heberto Padilla); “History is¶ that river of turbulent waters that annihilates us, dragging everything along with¶ a deafening roar” (Reinaldo Arenas); “History is a cat that always lands on its¶ feet” (Eliseo Alberto).9 There is just as much melancholy in the pride that Lisandro Otero feels upon evoking his participation in the narration of the epic as lies,¶ as in the shame of the voluntary accomplice who torments Cesar Leante. Even¶ Gustavo Perez Firmat, an author who fully developed in exile, establishes the¶ Castro revolution as the foundational event of his Cuban-American imaginary.10¶ The perception that literature performs a kind of magic state against history,¶ and that it will protect the individual from the outside world is not exactly beneficial for all cultures. In the case of Cuba, that reification of letters—which¶ extends from Heredia to Casal, Marti' to Lezama, and Villaverde to Cabrera¶ Infante—arises from a nihilist heritage, developed over two centuries of political¶ frustration. Today the ridiculous nature of certain aristocratic poses in the ruins¶ of some city is only equivalent to the cynicism with which many intellectuals¶ adhere to the worst policies within and outside of the island. Before gravitating once more toward the idea of literature as a mythic refuge against History, it is better to search for redemption in Geography. Writing as the construction of specific places (the Havana of Cabrera Infante; the homoerotic beach of Arenas; the Miami of Perez Firmat) at least offer the possibility of a community ruled by the pleasure principle. In these literary spaces, History reveals its disconcerting domesticity and dries up its fountain of infernal myths.¶ The Diaspora has reinforced this tragic imaginary of history through the discourse of the illegitimacy of the Revolution. For decades, the Cuban opposition, in and outside the island, assumed that the Castro regime was illegitimate because it had¶ sprung forth from a popular revolution, whose leadership was never checked by the electoral norms of a representative democracy. This discourse regarding the illegitimacy of the Cuban regime was always reinforced by the fact that nationalist and liberal politicians such as Jose Miro Cardona, Manuel Antonio de Varona, Manuel Ray Rivero, and Manuel Artime Buesa assumed positions of leadership in exile. (Several had been members of the first revolutionary government because of their rejection of the socialist radicalization of the process and broke with Fidel Castro between 1960 and 1961.) In the first historiography of exile, often written by intellectuals who initially sympathized with the revolutionary movement (such as Jorge Manach, Carlos Marquez Sterling, Herminio Porte Vila, Mario Llerena o Levi Marrero), the main topic was the betrayed revolution. These authors reiterated the notion that the revolutionary project that prompted the fall of Fulgencio Batista in 1959 was based on a social-democratic consensus that was abandoned by Fidel Castro and the radical wing of the 26th of July Movement, in alliance with the Communists, once ¶ they took power.11 The theme of the betrayed revolution coalesced in the political anticommunist culture of the Cuban opposition and facilitated the alliance of the exiles with the government of the United States during the Cold War. The nationalism and violence of this first wave of exiles prompted them to band together for political and military activities aimed at overthrowing an illegitimate regime that subordinated the island to Soviet Imperialism. The alliance between the Cuban exiles and the U.S. government was always justified by a nationalist rhetoric and a mentality similar to that which, from the perspective of the government of Fidel Castro, sustained the need for a defensive pact with the Soviet Union.12¶ Along with this mirrored nationalism, which in a parallel manner defined the identity of the revolution and the exile, there emerged, on both sides of the conflict, a discourse of national victimization that was very similar on both sides. According to the government of Fidel Castro, the island was a victim of the United States and of the Cuban bourgeoisie (previously of Havana and now relocated in Miami), which had to be defended against. According to the exile movement, Cuba was, in reality, the victim of Fidel Castro, the Soviet Union, and international communism, and had to be rescued and protected. While the Castro government quantified the damages of counterrevolutionary terrorism, the¶ exile movement bore witness to the balance of repression: executions, imprison-¶ ment, torture, forced labor, marginalization, and exodus. A good portion of the¶ symbolic patrimony of exile has been constructed on the certainty that the Cas-¶ tro regime is extremely oppressive. This certainty has been documented through¶ a voluminous corpus of testimonies and memoirs, which requires a comparison¶ with official archives, and a public or juridical resolution.13¶ Another example of the perceived illegitimacy of the regime that was set in¶ the memory of the exiles was the notion of the revolutionary moment as a¶ calamity or an accident of Cuban history that should be denied or overcome in¶ order to take up, once again, the proper trajectory of the republican tradition.¶ This instinct to turn its back on the present of the island gave the political lan-¶ guage of emigration the illusory tone that restoring the past was a possibility. To¶ a large extent the positions towards change and restoration, so exploited by the¶ Castro government in its constant discrediting of the political opposition, origi-¶ nated in those first years.14 The idealization of the republican past and the abuses¶ of the revolutionary present were to the exiles the opposite of the government’s exaltation of the socialist today and its reviling of the republican yesterday. The war of memory on both shores has been based, for decades, on this symbolic¶ struggle over two periods in Cuban history, the Republic and the Revolution, and¶ two spaces in national life: the island and exile. The symbolic battle between¶ these two communities that seek mutual nullification frequently turns to those¶ “abuses of memory” of which Tzvetan Todorov speaks.15¶ Prompted by this national discourse of tragedy and victimization, the theme¶ of guilt also emerges in the memory of the exile. The handling of the question¶ oscillates from universal formulas of distribution of responsibility, as seen first in¶ Todos somos culpables (1993) by Guillermo de Zendegui—who had been an impor-¶ tant cultural official during the Batista regime—and the absolute personalization of¶ blame in the figure of Fidel Castro that closes Reinaldo Arenas’ Antes que anochezca¶ (1992). In any case, it is important to note that each migratory wave arrives in exile¶ with its own record of grievances and its own particular location of guilt. Thus, for¶ example, the memoirs of intellectuals who emigrated in the first two decades after¶ having taken part in the revolution (such as those of Carlos Franqui, Guillermo¶ Cabrera Infante, Nivaria Tejera, or Cesar Leante) show a frustration with the polit-¶ ical regime and with the person of Fidel Castro. Since the authors themselves had¶ been socialists, their frustration is not focused on a “revolution betrayed” by Marx-¶ ism-Leninism, as the first generation of exiles had done in their writing. Rather,¶ the principal motive that caused their breach with the regime was the “Staliniza-¶ tion” or the “Sovietization” of Cuban socialism, which until then had been¶ “autochthonous.” This turn could be verified by the shift in positions that went¶ from the “Revolutionary Offensive” of 1967, to the support of the Soviet invasion¶ of Czechoslovakia in 1968, to the imprisonment and “self-criticism” of poet¶ Heberto Padilla, and the National Congress of Education and Culture in 1971. The Mariel generation, on the other hand, introduced into the memory of¶ exiles one of the most bitter and painful stories in the history of Cuban culture,¶ as represented in testimonies such as Arenas’ Antes que anochezca (1993) or A la¶ sombra del mar (1998) by Juan Abreu, and in the poetic narrative or fiction of¶ other authors, such as Carlos Victoria, Guillermo Rosales, and Nestor Diaz de¶ Villegas. The wounds of Mariel have more to do with a rejection of every form¶ of theoretically “moral” authoritarianism than with political disenchantment with¶ the Castro regime. Because this generation was not only the victim of political¶ and social repression on the island but also subject to discrimination and distrust¶ by the traditional exile community, its memoirs are strongly marked by a type of¶ pain that is reluctant to approach any type of reconciliation. At the end of Antes¶ que anochezca, Arenas remembered that while he was in New York, each time he¶ felt nostalgia for Cuba or for Old Havana his “outraged memory, which was more¶ powerful than any nostalgia,”17 intervened. The testimonial rage of Mariel is, in¶ the words of Juan Abreu, the “beautiful rebelliousness” of a “generation decimated, humiliated and reviled by the Cuban dictatorship.”18¶ A good approach to discern the contrast between the testimonial angst of¶ Mariel and other less anger-filled considerations of the Cuba of the 1970s may¶ be a parallel reading of two memoirs written by Latin American journalists—La¶ Habana en un espejo (Havana through A Mirror, 2004) by the Mexican author¶ Alma Guillermoprieto, and Finding Manana: Memoir of A Cuban Exodus (2005)¶ by Cuban Mirta Ojito, a Mariel emigre.19 The first describes the Havana scene¶ after the unsuccessful Ten-Million-Tons Harvest and during the Sovietification¶ process, from the perspective of a New York ballet dancer who studies under¶ Martha Graham, Merce Cunningham, and Twyla Tharp, and rejects the precariousness of socialism but still feels passionately about a small island rebelling¶ against the United States and Western capitalism. The second, from inside Cuba,¶ narrates the suffering caused by marginalization and by the hatred against the¶ families that, after two decades of doubts and uncertainties, dare to abandon the¶ “revolutionary utopia” and get on a boat in search of the American dream.¶ In contrast with the bitterness that characterizes the memoirs of the Mariel¶ generation, the Cuban diasporics of the 1990s reached exile with a vision that¶ was more reconciled with its revolutionary past. Many intellectuals of this migratory wave, such as Manuel Diaz Martinez, Jesus Diaz, Zoe Valdes, Daina Chaviano, and Eliseo Alberto, have written personal testimonials of their break with¶ the regime, where beats a less traumatic, more contemplative experience of the¶ revolution, including a recognition of its important cultural legacy." In the most¶ emblematic memoir of that wave of the Diaspora, Informe contra mi mismo (1996)¶ by Eliseo Alberto, there is a constant call for the recovery of the revolutionary¶ culture of the 1960s and 1970s, and an obsessive attempt at reconciling that heritage with its opposite, the culture of the exile.21 A sentence from that text clearly¶ transmits the integrative will of those two memories: “the sterile bipolarity of¶ judgment has preserved too many memories, which is like wasting a lot of fertile¶ memory, because the recollections are no more than moments that we have forgotten to forget, out of mere forgetfulness.""¶ Proof of the lack of common ground between the memoirs of Mariel and the¶ Diaspora of the 1990s is the critique of Juan Abreu, which appears in the initial¶ pages of A la sombra del mar and comments upon Eliseo Alberto’s Informe contra¶ mi mismo. Abreu states:¶ The book of Eliseo Alberto appears to me useful and necessary, but the insistence of the author in legitimizing certain aspects of the dictatorship of Fidel¶ Castro is a form of self-justification of himself and of his class. The author cannot or does not wish to grasp that we were all victims, they and we, but not all¶ of us were guilty. He does not manage to comprehend that the best form of¶ rewriting the past is by being that which we were not allowed to be: free, totally¶ and painfully free. And such liberty does not allow for camouflage, nor self-pity,¶ nor a clean slate for that disastrous period in the history of our country.13¶ Similar reproaches to writers and artists from the island run through the book of¶ memoirs Mi vida saxual by musician Paquito D’Rivera, as well as the essay “Contra la doble memoria” by Enrico Mario Santi, a dismantling of Lisandro Otero’s¶ autobiography, Llover sobre mojado,24¶ These texts of “difficult forgiveness,” as Paul Ricoeur would call them, are¶ characteristic of remembering victims and part of the debate about the responsibility of the intellectual in an authoritarian or totalitarian order that, in the last few years, has begun to be articulated on the island and in the Diaspora. In recent¶ Cuban narrative, there are two important novels that, through stories of denunciation and reconciliation, approach the subject of the responsibility of the intellectual under totalitarianism: Las palabrasperdidas by Jesus Diaz and La novela de¶ mi vida by Leonardo Padura.25 Two works that address the same subject are¶ Jacobo Machover’s La memoria frente alpoder and the essay “Cuba y los intelectuales” by Enrico Mario Santi. These latter two authors insist that any political¶ reconciliation in the Cuban intellectual camp should start with the public admission of their moral responsibility and collaboration in the construction of a totalitarism that restricted freedom of expression.26 As Ricoeur points out, the difficulty of requesting and granting forgiveness in societies that have endured dictatorships and civil wars is related to the strong implication of political guilt.27¶ In the last decade, the old topic of the “intellectual and the revolution” has been notably displaced by more complex notions of how to assume ideological commitment and public criticism, which do not follow the traditional correlation between civil society and the state.2\* Several Cuban writers living on the island¶ (such as Ambrosio Fornet, Leonardo Padura, Arturo Arango, Rafael Hernandez,¶ and Desiderio Navarro) have approached the subject in an oblique manner, through the disregard for the role of the intellectual as a subject fully incorporated into the ideological state apparatus, rather than through his role as “critical consciousness” in civil society.” These authors articulate a new discourse about intellectual autonomy, inscribed in a Gramscian concept of civil society that questions the symbolic link between intellectuals and the revolution and highlights the separation between public criticism and state ideology.¶ Besides the memoirs of the Mariel generation and of the Diaspora of the¶ 1990s, in the last two decades autobiographical literature has been published by¶ Cuban-American authors—children, for the most part, of the first exile generation—who introduce a new look at the past. Such works as Exiled Memories: A¶ Cuban Childhood (1990) by Pablo Medina; Next Year in Cuba: A Cubano's Coming-of-Age in America (1995) by Gustavo Perez Firmat; Cuba on My Mind: Journeys to a Severed Nation (2000) by Roman de la Campa; ReMembering Cuba:¶ Legacy of Diaspora (2001) by Andrea O’Reilly Herrera; and Waiting for Snow in¶ Havana: Confessions of a Cuban Boy (2003) by Carlos Eire establish a symbolic¶ relationship with the revolution as event, and with the exodus to the United¶ States, different from those of the first exile, Mariel, and the Diaspora of the¶ 1990s.30 Here, the evocation of the Republic, associated with childhood, lacks the¶ idealization of the first exile generation, while at the same time, the authors’¶ judgment of the revolution is a harsh revelation of the period’s violence and pillaging. It is interesting to note that in this generation, in contrast with the historic exile and Mariel, but like the Diaspora of the 1990s, the theme of return¶ occupies a significant place, whether it is ultimately rejected (Perez Firmat), perceived critically (Medina), or anticipated (Roman de la Campa).¶ Several Cuban-American scholars, including Eliana Rivero, Adriana Mendez Rodenas, Isabel Alvarez Borland, Lourdes Gil, Andrea O’Reilly Herrera, and¶ Madeline Camara, have theorized over the concept of diaspora as a viable strategy for the articulation of the Cuban cultural experience in the United States. For¶ example, in one of the first books devoted to the theme, Alvarez Borland speaks¶ of a “Cuban-American literature of exile” narrating the nation as “loss.” Conversely, essayist Eliana Rivero has eloquently expressed her rejection of an exilic¶ notion in her critical work Discursos de la diaspora-. “I have never liked the word¶ ‘exile.’ I find its emotional impact too excluding, like a reference to a former¶ sports champ or an ex-spouse. That is, to define ourselves by what has ceased to¶ be, by what no longer works, by what is missing” (17).¶ The Cuban-American generation also has contributed to the memory of exile¶ in the form of academic historiography. Studies of the Cuban revolution and¶ Cuban socialism produced by Cuban Americans in the academy since the 1970s¶ have contributed to the abandonment of the topic of the illegitimacy of the revolution. In critical works such as Cuba: Order and Revolution (1978) by Jorge L.¶ Dominguez; The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course and Legacy (1993) by Marifeli¶ Perez-Stable; On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture (1999) by Louis¶ A. Perez Jr.; and Cuba and the Politics of Passion (2000) by Damian J. Fernandez, the¶ “Cuban Revolution” appears as a social process in Cuba’s past, not as a current form¶ of government, and, therefore, its legitimacy is not political but, rather, historic.51¶ This historiographic body of work, although it circulates predominantly in North¶ American academic settings, helps to expand the memory of the exile community and favors national reconciliation within the intellectual milieu.¶ The notion of the illegitimacy of the Cuban regime, however, has persisted in the memory of organized exile, in spite of its present rejection of violence and terrorism as political means. The change in the political sociability of immigrants¶ experienced since the mid-1980s, which today reports a virtual absence of armed¶ opposition groups, has not been fully absorbed into the cultural imaginary of¶ exile. The notion that the political system of Cuba should be transformed from¶ the inside by its own actors and institutions has gained ground in the dissident¶ movement and in the diaspora population, especially since 1992. However, the¶ dominant Cuban-American political groups continue to support a subversive¶ strategy, comprised of both punitive diplomatic and commercial pressures by the¶ government of the United States and the destabilization of the regime through¶ civil disobedience and social dissent. In fact, there seems to be increased disagreement between the agenda of the “loyal opposition” (constitutional, quiet,¶ and gradual), and the project of “rapid transition” proposed by Cuban-American¶ congressional representatives, many exile organizations, and the government of¶ the United States¶ THE NARRATIVE OF RECONCILIATION¶ In a novel that received much popular acclaim in Spain, Javier Cercas told the¶ story of the novelist Rafael Sanchez Mazas, ideologue and founder of Falangism,¶ and of soldier Antonio Miralles, a veteran of the Fifth Regiment, who fought¶ under Lister, later enlisted in the French Foreign Legion, and finally joined¶ de Gaulle in the Second World War. Starting with an investigation regarding the¶ possibility that Miralles could have been the young republican soldier who pardoned the life of his enemy (the writer Sanchez Mazas) in the hills of Catalonia¶ in early 1939, Cercas wrote more like an historian than a novelist, depicting a¶ civil war without winners or losers, without heroes or traitors, and populated only¶ with decent, responsible people who morally transcend the political conflicts they¶ are involved in.¶ In one passage of the novel, Cercas recalls a statement by Andres Trapiello¶ expressing how the Spanish Republicans had lost the war on the field but had won¶ it in literature.” Both themes—the biography of rivals (the Hero and the Traitor¶ as interchangeable figures in a civil war), and the familiar theme of arms and letters (embodied in the intellectual Sanchez Mazas and the warrior Miralles)—¶ seem to me applicable to the Cuban revolution. And not just to this recent period¶ of the history of the Caribbean, but to any other in the modern history of Latin¶ America, such as the Mexican or Nicaraguan revolutions. Sombras nada mas, the¶ last novel by Sergio Ramirez, for example, also attempts to construct a story about¶ a civil war, the 1979 revolution in Nicaragua, in which the Sandinistas and¶ Somozistas—the character Alirio Martinica is a former private secretary of Anastasio Somoza, who the FSLN puts on trial—are treated without rigid moral¶ asymmetries or politically ennobling arguments.”¶ The first difficulty presented by the Cuban case to this new narrative is that¶ the revolution of Fidel Castro is still not perceived as a civil war, in which the rivals fight with the same legitimacy or lack thereof. In fact, for the first two years¶ of the war (1957-1959), legitimacy was defined in negative terms: the government of Batista was a dictatorship imposed by a coup, while the revolution was a popular, armed movement against that defacto regime. After 1 January 1959, the¶ government of Fidel Castro began to be perceived as illegitimate in the democratic sectors of the revolutionary camp because of its refusal to convene promised¶ elections, and, from 1961 on, for its alliance with the USSR and its turn toward¶ Communism, which were never a part of the original program of the revolution.¶ Between 1959 and 1967, the armed opposition against the revolutionary government, acting in the mountains of Escambray and in the principal cities of the¶ island, was basically formed by former revolutionary combatants who continued¶ to be faithful to the Moncada Project.¶ This opposition, articulated nationally by organizations such as the Movement of Revolutionary Recovery and the Revolutionary Movement of the People, and which had its setting of maximum confrontation in the spring of 1961¶ with the landing of Brigade 2506 on Playa Giron, play, in the historic and the literary narrative of the revolution, the role of enemy and of traitor—a role that¶ these “counterrevolutionaries,” “bandits,” and “mercenaries” (Manuel Artime,¶ Tony Varona, Jose Miro Cardona, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, and Huber Matos)¶ share the space of exile and dissidence with the adversaries of the old regime, the¶ Batistianos and the bourgeoisie, and the rivals of today. Political opposition both¶ on and outside the island has for years recognized the legitimacy of the regime,¶ advocated for peaceful change, and proposed the reform—not destruction—of¶ the system. Despite this, the government of Fidel Castro continues to see itself¶ as a revolution at eternal war with a counterrevolution that must be annihilated.¶ The effect of this polarization in the system of symbolic legitimization of the¶ Cuban government has informed the literary treatment of the civil war over the¶ past forty years. The authors who wrote novels or short stories about the insurrection against Batista (Guillermo Cabrera Infante, Lisandro Otero, Jaime Sarusky,¶ Edmundo Desnoes, Noel Navarro, Jose Soler Puig, Humberto Arenal, Cesar¶ Leante, and Hilda Perera, among others), who were collaborators or sympathizers¶ of the revolutionary movement, described the revolutionaries as having an excess of¶ virtues and the Batistianos an excess of vices. In most cases, their disciples, the¶ young writers who focused on the struggle against the armed opposition in the¶ 1960s and 1970s, which was categorized as the “struggle against bandits” (David¶ Buzzi, Norberto Fuentes, Jesus Diaz, Eduardo Heras Leon, Osvaldo Navarro,¶ Hugo Chinea, and Raul Gonzalez Cascorro) portrayed the rebels of Escambray as abominable beings, a cross between horse thieves and political bosses, devoid of¶ political ideals, and totally submissive to the interests of the United States.¶ A canonical text of this narrative, Los pasos eti la hierba (Footsteps in the¶ Grass) by Eduardo Heras Leon, describes the broad moral spectrum of the rev-¶ olutionary camp. The “milicianos” in those stories arc subjects both complex and¶ vulnerable in their resolved commitment: there were the “slow” ones, the “cow-¶ ards,” the “doubting,” “the middle class” and the “thieves.” Nevertheless, the¶ enemy camp—that of the “counterrevolutionaries” and “bandits”—appears as a¶ spectral presence, invisible, unnamed, stripped of any historic subjectivity. In the¶ story that gives the book its title, the face of the enemy is scarcely delineated:¶ “Those are the rebels!” a character screams, and the other responds, “But,¶ where?”34 Another short story, significantly titled “No se nos pierda la memoria,”¶ contains a beautiful phrase that refers to the “weaker” ones on the revolutionary¶ band and could well designate the phantasmal camp of the losers: “the memory¶ of the weak ones is slowly lost in the dead letters of an archived file.”'5¶ The moments of greatest understanding of the humanity of the enemy, in¶ works such as Los anos duros by Jesus Diaz, Condenados de Condado by Norberto¶ Fuentcs, or El caballero de Mayaguara by Osvaldo Navarro, for example, arc¶ inscribed within an atmosphere of political tension in which the discovery of true¶ dignity in the adversary underlines the heat of the struggle. Since the best Cuban¶ narrators supported the revolution, particularly in the decade between 1957 and¶ 1967, it is difficult to find a solid narrative of exile that defends the defeated,¶ except in cases such as Andres Rivero Collados Enterrado vivo (1960) or Sal-¶ vador Diaz Vers6n’s Ya el mundo oscurece (1961).’■ The great Cuban narrative of¶ exile is that which is associated with authors who were already established before¶ the triumph of the revolution, such as Lino Novas Calvo, or Carlos Montenegro,¶ or with the writers who broke with the regime early on, such as Guillermo Cabr-¶ era Infante and Severo Sarduy, or in later decades, as Reinaldo Arenas. In this¶ sense, in Cuba (as opposed to Spain) one can state that the revolutionaries won¶ both the political and the literary war.¶ The publication in recent years of several books written by Cuban authors liv-¶ ing outside of the island suggests a new historical narrative in which the two bands¶ of the civil war begin to be assimilated in their reason and madness, their violence¶ and legitimacy. Such is the case, for example, with Como llego la noche (2002), the¶ memoir of Huber Matos, one of the commanders of the revolution who was jailed¶ by the government of Fidel Castro because of a request to resign in protest of the¶ communist turn that the revolution took at the end of 1959. Matos, a victim of¶ the revolution who spent twenty years incarcerated and then another twenty in¶ exile, writes an autobiography without rancor, in which two-thirds of the text is¶ dedicated to reconstructing the anti-Batista period between 1957 and 1959, and¶ the first year of the triumphant revolution, and only one-third is devoted to nar-¶ rate the trials of imprisonment. Despite the pain that permeates his writing, his¶ memory is still capable of defending the justice of the revolutionary idea:¶ Our national independence was not the work of politicians. They prepared the¶ way, but it is the revolutionaries who make history advance, changing the struc-¶ tures of socicty. In reality, the revolutionary is a politician committed seriously¶ to liberty, justice, and the interests of the people, in the manner of Sim6n Boli-¶ var, Benito Juarez, and Jose Marti.'7¶ Another memoir written by a revolutionary intellectual, Espero la noche para¶ sonarte, Revolution (2002) by Nivaria Tejera, in addition to sharing the same noc-¶ turnal metaphor of the failure of utopia, maintains a similar tone of reconcilia-¶ tion with an idealized past, which, like a mirror, reflects lost political illusions.¶ Tejera, in contrast to Matos, is interested in evoking the moment of disenchant-¶ ment, the very instant of the spiritual metamorphosis, rather than in recovering¶ the nobility of the original commitment to the revolution. Her search is not dic-¶ tated by a mere desire to break with the revolutionary past but by a determina-¶ tion to understand and even recover the moral fabric of the transformation. In an¶ admirable passage, Tejera demonstrates her eagerness to capture with the great-¶ est clarity that moment of transformation that allows her to reconcile with the¶ two halves of her biography—the revolutionary half and the exile half:¶ Terrible anguish to abandon a revolution, its well-profiled dogmas, and to climb¶ without tottering the barrier walls of its standards of conduct, of its slogans,¶ constantly renewed in the expectation of who knows what unknown goal.¶ Always a wavering, well-calculated goal: today against some, tomorrow against¶ some others. Sharp line of fire, this goal which, a priori and in fragrantly made¶ all of us into irremediable targets. Sooner or later it condemned us. Behind that¶ train, whose path drew me eloser to an inextricable exile that would put an end¶ to the desperate proposition of fleeing which had obsessed me day after day,¶ there remained, lagging behind in its terrifying despotism, moldy, spongy, float-¶ ing like a landscape in the dead leaves, an ideal revolution.’8¶ Another author, Uva dc Aragon, in an exercise of fiction that is rather close¶ to that which Javier Cercas calls “a real story,” reconstructs the memoirs of the¶ twin sisters Menchu and Lauri, separated for forty years by the revolution and¶ exile. The novel, impeccably titled Memoria del silencioy narrates the parallel¶ lives of these sisters by turning to their diaries—that is, by means of two auto-¶ biographical talcs that juxtapose different historical gazes of the same events:¶ the dictatorship of Batista, the triumph of the revolution, the Bay of Pigs, the¶ Missile Crisis, the Vietnam and Angola wars, the exodus of Mariel, the fall of¶ Communism, and the depression of the 1990s. These sisters, who have dia-¶ logued in the silence of their memories, believed that their lives could have¶ been interchangeable. Lauri, who lives in Miami, thus states: “Menchu is the¶ mirror of that which I was not and could have been.”3' Nevertheless, when the¶ two sisters meet, first in Havana and then in Miami, their personalities affirm¶ themselves and at the same time yield mutually in a perfect rite of reconciliation. In this way, the sister from Havana reclaims the dignity of her decision to remain in Cuba: Well. What do you want me to tell you? That I should not have fallen in love with Lazaro because he was a Marxist, that all the hours I spent in literacy campaigns, that all the cane I cut, that the schools I designed, that the only place to which I traveled, the Soviet Union, that all the poverty I have suffered, and that all the sacrifices we have made are worth nothing ... that my life is worth nothing, that the lives of twelve million on the island are worth nothing, that we should bow our head before exile? To which the sister from Miami replies: We have lived nearly forty years sighing for Cuba, filling our houses with photos from Cuba, with pictures of the flame trees of Cuba, writing poetry about Cuba, composing songs about Cuba, speaking to the children about Cuba, denying that this country was swallowing us up, thinking about Cuba day and night, keeping up with news from Cuba, founding a Cuba House, feeling like foreigners everywhere, and now you are saying that not even in Cuba are we going to have the right to an opinion!' This collision of two "worthy" actors, enmeshed in a conflict of great moral costs, is also depicted in the novel No siempre gana la muerte, by the North American writer David Landau. This work recounts the story of Mariano Jose Nunez Hidalgo, alias Rodrigo, a young Cuban who, after participating in the clandestine movement against the dictatorship of Batista, joins the opposition to the revolutionary government in 1960. The youth is hired by the CIA to assassinate Castro but fails. He is consequently jailed in La Cabana prison for more than twenty years. The interesting element of the tale is that as he recalls his mission, the character insists upon underscoring his observations by emphasizing the role of the United States in the history of Cuba, as if he were weighing the ambivalence of aspiring to a nationalist political goal through imperialist methods.41 As in Huber Matos's memoir, the discourse of the victim approaches serenity and the suspension of rancor: "I have come to agree with Goethe that the way of cleaning the world is that each person sweeps the front of his own house ... in jail, in war, in all that I have done, I have had the privilege of seeing what the human condition has to offer."42 A similar approach to this "vision of the vanquished" appears in a recent novel by Osvaldo Navarro, H~os de Saturn a. The biography of the imaginary commandant of the revolution Eustaquio de la Pena, who lost power after the triumph of 1959, permits Navarro to introduce a complex, nuanced perspective of the Cuban civil war. At the end of the novel, Navarro describes how the core of the rebels, who took arms against the government of Fidel Castro in the mountains of Escambray, came from the very rebel army that had fought against the dictatorship of Batista in that central region of the island, and that was now opposed to¶ the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime. The accusations of “comevacas"¶ (shit-eaters) and “bandits” against those disaffected soldiers, according to Navarro,¶ sought to disqualify the armed opposition, which did nothing more than continue¶ the revolutionary “sociability” generated by the anti-Batista movement.45 The¶ fierce rivals appear here as actors who share the discourse and the practices of one¶ and the same political culture.¶ This new historical narrative, which we have briefly reviewed, stands in¶ marked contrast to the official story of Cuban contemporary history, which is¶ based on the certainty that the revolution lives a “continuous past.” As Avishai¶ Margalit points out in The Ethics of Memory, the symbolic actualization of the¶ conflicts of the past allows authoritarian powers to legitimatize themselves by¶ appealing to the situation of perpetual war against a transhistoric enemy.44 The¶ predominance of this narrative in the intellectual camp has prompted the gathering of moral testimonies, appropriate to those subjects enmeshed in civil wars,¶ who try to glimpse at a scenario for reconciliation. This politics of memory establishes a dialectic between forgiveness and forgetting in which, generally, the¶ actors give up emotional segments of their identity in exchange for being recognized, fully, as legitimate subjects of history.

#### Advocating the removal of restrictions on travel is *necessary* to facilitate this *method* of political *reconciliation* – we *cannot* and *should not try* to *prevent* transnational coalitions from engaging one another in public fora

Lopez-Levy 10 (Arturo Lopez-Levy, lecturer and doctoral candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies of the University of Denver, M.A. International Affairs, Columbia University, M.A. Economics, Carleton University, “Reflections on National Reconciliation,” June 2010, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/cuba/cuban-triangle/lopezlevy0610.pdf>)

The beginning of a new millennium in Cuba and its Diaspora has generated a favorable ¶ climate for reducing conflicts among different sectors of the Cuban nation. In the ¶ international arena, Latin America is tired of witnessing the illegal and counterproductive ¶ embargo against Cuba that has gone on for nearly five decades. In terms of Cuban ¶ society, the new generations on the island and abroad feel that the policies of ideological ¶ confrontation are incapable of achieving their most elemental aspirations. Pacifying ¶ social relations and reducing the polarizing role of ideological rifts are aspirations of the ¶ nation’s majority. ¶ In recent decades, Cuba and its Diaspora have reached the levels of education, ¶ urbanization, and life expectancy of developed countries. Cuba’s economy is in ¶ shambles but it is no longer anyone’s sugar bowl and today is mostly dependent on ¶ services, remittances, and tourism. The current population is more educated and urban, ¶ has a longer life expectancy and a higher average age than all its predecessors. ¶ In addition, the geographical dispersion of the Cuban population has increased. Everyday ¶ more Cuban families have at least some members who live outside of Cuba, principally ¶ in the United States. In the 21st century, the Cuban nation is not limited to the island’s ¶ geographical location. More than 10% of the Cuban population lives outside the country. ¶ In contrast to the 1960’s, the majority of immigrants maintain stable relations with ¶ society on the island. Since the dialogue of 1978, families have restored ties of affection ¶ between Cubans of different political views. Many civil society institutions, particularly ¶ religious communities, have generated a favorable consensus for building bridges ¶ between various groups of Cubans, regardless of their political or religious preferences, ¶ their race, sexual orientation, or place of residence. ¶ The “values of self-expression” described by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel as a ¶ prelude for democratic development have emerged in Cuba. It is not surprising given that ¶ those values are associated with the advanced indices of human development that Cuba ¶ has achieved. As these political science scholars demonstrate, such values (participation ¶ in society and politics, support for gender and racial equality, and tolerance for religions, ¶ foreigners, homosexuals and other groups) do not determine, but are strongly correlated ¶ with the demand for and consolidation of democratic systems.¶ That tendency toward tolerance permeates all dimensions of Cuban life, although a bit ¶ delayed among the political elites. The diversity of social identities and civil participation ¶ on the island in terms of religion, education, and employment is notable. Given the ¶ single-party character of the system, the political diversity is not expressed with equal ¶ clarity, but it is palpable in the percentage of so-called spoiled ballots (9.88 % of blank or ¶ invalid votes), and the people who decided not to vote in the elections of the People’s ¶ Power (5.31%) and in the opinions expressed stemming from the official calls for ¶ discussions regarding social improvements. ¶ In the diaspora, the nature of the migratory wave of 1994 and after has also augmented ¶ social and political pluralism. The idea of a wealthy, white, monolithically right-wing ¶ Cuban émigré community is simply a stereotype. Even in regards to relations with Cuba, ¶ surveys reveal that the majority supports a policy of dialogue toward the island and the ¶ end of the travel ban for U.S citizens. ¶ The characteristics of the Cuban nation described above demands a new type of Cuban ¶ politics less attached to the conflicts of the last century. The year 1959 is increasingly ¶ irrelevant as a historic marker in the life experience of Cubans. Most Cubans reached ¶ adulthood much later. The antagonism of the 1960’s between the Revolution and the ¶ counterrevolution, the polarization between those pro-Castro and anti-Castro does not ¶ reflect the complexity of views in Cuba or in Miami. It is not that the pro-Castro and anti-Castro dispute is irrelevant, but the obstinacy and staunch loyalty in both groups are ¶ giving way to flexible attitudes that judge the Cuban Revolution according to the specific ¶ issue at hand and their particular experiences. ¶ The intransigent have the clock, but the new generations have the time. The Cold War is ¶ over. Although Cuban nationalism is super alive, the manifestations that characterized it ¶ are less and less dichotomous. Within Cuba and the diaspora a wide range of opinions are ¶ expressed regarding the optimum political, economic, and cultural organization for the ¶ country. In the best spirit of Martí, an important sector of the “new pines” on the island ¶ and abroad respect, but do not want to revisit, the battles of their parents and ¶ grandparents. The acknowledgement of a conflictive history does not imply being ¶ hostage to it. Most young Cubans believe that it is vital to learn from history in order to ¶ know where their nation came from, but they also understand that the dreams of the ¶ future are more important than the divisions of the past. ¶ National reconciliation as a process ¶ The concept of national reconciliation varies substantially from country to country since ¶ the conflicting groups and the issues to be resolved are different. From the current ¶ specific situation of Cuba, three features of reconciliation are: ¶ 1) National reconciliation is a process, not a report or an event [that] implies building ¶ links between different sectors of Cuba’s social fabric that have been separated by ¶ multiple injustices (from the massacre in 1912 of several thousands of the ¶ members of the party for the advancement of colored people and the slavery of¶ black Cubans, to the nationalization of property without adequate compensation ¶ in the 1960’s). Just as the offenses did not happen all in one day, it is reasonable ¶ to expect the solution to span generations. ¶ 2) In the short term, the reconciliation is more a process of managing conflicts than ¶ of solving them. In Cuba today, the differences of discourse, historical narratives ¶ and reproaches are too enormous to be resolved with the stroke of a pen. In the ¶ fluid context of a society in transition, it is better to think of dialogue as a search ¶ for ways to manage differences and thus avoid confrontations. ¶ 3) The final objective of national reconciliation is to bring Cuba into line with the ¶ indivisible and interdependent set of universal human rights. The model of the ¶ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), including its six ¶ complementary accords (the two accords of 1966 regarding civil and political ¶ rights and economic, social and cultural rights; the conventions against torture and ¶ racial discrimination and conventions on the rights of women and of children) is ¶ not the only solution to the question of how governments should treat their ¶ citizens. There are other systems such as absolute monarchy, the dictatorship of ¶ the proletariat and neoliberal states. However, none of these other solutions enjoy ¶ the legitimacy of international law and the consensus of the people of the world ¶ like the Universal Declaration does. ¶ Walls, bridges, and wet blankets ¶ Three types of actors are distinguishable according to their role in the reconciliation of a ¶ nation: walls, bridges and spoilers. The walls are political, social, and cultural structures ¶ that separate and turn sectors of the Cuban society against one another. The bridges are ¶ social spaces where common interests of Cubans who have different politics, religion, ¶ race, gender, sexual preference, and geographical residence intersect. The spoilers are ¶ those actors who are attached to the structures of hostility. The process of national ¶ reconciliation is summarized as toppling walls, building bridges and neutralizing wet ¶ blankets. ¶ Faced with these three types of actors, ways to move conflicts from escalation to ¶ negotiation must be sought, anticipating the traps and boycotts of the spoilers in order to ¶ respond to them from the agenda of reconciliation without reacting in accordance with ¶ theirs. In this sense, it is useful to identify protocol around best practices. For example, to ¶ be national, the reconciliation has to be sovereign (that is, it cannot be based on the ¶ Helms-Burton law). Simultaneously, the reconciliation would benefit from the norms of ¶ international human rights, given that these are seen as legitimate by the international ¶ community and are not elaborated ad-hoc for whatever conflict of the moment and to ¶ benefit a particular group. ¶ What To Do? ¶ National reconciliation is not restricted to political elites; it is a process open to the entire ¶ citizenry. For collective action, one task for promoters of reconciliation is [to develop] ¶ mechanisms for information exchange and mobilization of initiatives. Participation on a ¶ practical level depends on one’s particular situation. As a Cuban living in the United ¶ States, I discuss here four specific areas. ¶ Travel limitation is the main wall ¶ In order to build bridges, the walls have to be destroyed first. Today the travel restrictions ¶ imposed in Cuba and the United States make up the Gordian knot that sustains the US ¶ embargo against Cuba, limiting interactions between Cubans. Each step toward ¶ normalization of travel rights, to and from Cuba, multiplies the opportunities for ¶ reconciliation and has a depolarizing effect on political differences. ¶ The issue of travel freedom is ripe for resolving. A consensus exists on the optimum ¶ standard: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return ¶ to his country” (Article 13 of the UDHR). In addition, most people in Cuba and the US ¶ advocate normalizing travel as a non-political issue. Political will is the only thing ¶ lacking for the elimination of the exit permit, in Cuba’s case, and the travel ban in the ¶ US. The first recommendation for facilitating more opportunities for engagement is to ¶ focus ourselves like laser beams on undermining travel restrictions in both countries.

#### Reconciliation does NOT mean an *end* to disagreement NOR an endorsement of any particular *outcome* – but rather an ongoing *process* which employs *social inclusion* to redirect political conflict toward non-violent *means* – this is vital to *break the cycle* of *perpetual violence*

Pérez-Stable, et al 3 (Marifeli Pérez-Stable, Professor of Sociology, Florida International University, Coordinator, Task Force on Memory, Truth, and Justice, Latin American and Caribbean Center, FIU, “Cuban National Reconciliation,” 3-24-2003, pp.33-70, http://memoria.fiu.edu/memoria/documents/Book\_English.pdf)

Until the late 1970s, the breach between Cubans on the island and in¶ exile seemed insurmountable. Not so today. Cubans on both sides of¶ the Florida Straits have not only established political links, but have also¶ woven a rich network of communication and contacts: e.g., family¶ reunification visits, new migration waves, religious encounters, remittances, and cultural, academic, and professional exchanges. A growing¶ number of diaspora Cubans are at the frontline of constructive engagement with the Cuban people. Without doubt, an insuperable political¶ breach exists between Havana and most Cubans living abroad, and it¶ will continue as long as the government insists on an unconditional and¶ indistinct loyalty to Cuba, the authorities, and the maximum leader.¶ Since 1959, however, another breach has widened–that between official¶ Cuba and ordinary Cubans, which is also irreparable unless the government manifests a different political will.¶ This overview is a broad outline of the progressive political polarization in Cuba before 1959 and its subsequent worsening by the revolution’s intolerance of any form of political pluralism. It is an effort to¶ understand the Cuban past from the framework of a common civic life,¶ independently of whether there is agreement or disagreement with every¶ particular set forth. The ethical basis of Cuban National Reconciliation¶ is respect for human rights and, therefore, the rejection of the idea that¶ the end–laudable as it may be–justifies the means. The signatories of this¶ report unconditionally support the statement made by Oswaldo Payá¶ Sardiñas–initiator of the Varela Project–upon receiving the European¶ Parliament’s Sakharov Award for Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. ¶ Experience teaches us that violence begets more violence and¶ that when political change is brought about by such means,¶ new forms of oppression and injustice arise. It is our wish that¶ violence and force should never be used as ways of overcoming¶ crises or toppling unjust governments. This time we shall bring¶ about change by means of this civic movement which is already¶ opening a new chapter in Cuba’s history, in which dialogue,¶ democratic involvement, and solidarity will prevail. In such a¶ way we shall foster genuine peace. ¶ Cuban national reconciliation demands that a critical mass of citizens [must]¶ fully embrace a political ethic capable of promoting a democratic civic¶ life–open to dialogue and respectful of pluralism–in Cuba and among¶ all Cubans. In a letter sent to the task force from Havana, MROM leaders Manuel Cuesta Morúa and Fernando Sánchez López underscore the¶ role of Cuban elites in national reconciliation:¶ Our elites bear the greatest responsibility for bringing about¶ reconciliation. Government elites block it by insisting on themselves as the only legitimate interpreters of common good, in¶ spite of so much evidence to the contrary on the streets and in¶ Cuban homes. Desperately seeking another Cuba, some emerg¶ ing elites outside official circles put forward political agendas¶ that would entail a reinvention of Cubans as a people; others¶ look for civilized means of communication among–past, present, and future–understanding that the nation would disappear¶ if we insisted in reenacting our sorrows. ¶ Cubans must find civilized means of communication, which is¶ why we understand national reconciliation as an inward effort¶ to rebuild the balance and harmony lost through the use of different forms of violence, inequalities, injustices, and relations of¶ domination through history.45¶ A costly legacy of polarization and absolute partisan ends has nearly¶ overwhelmed the Cuban nation; only an exigent consensus on human¶ rights and democracy can save it. That is the gist of the dialogue that all¶ Cubans should heartily welcome. The Experiences of Other Countries¶ Under this heading we sketch some experiences of democratic transitions regarding past human rights violations: Spain; Argentina, Chile,¶ and Uruguay in the Southern Cone; South Africa; El Salvador, and¶ Guatemala in Central America; and Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria,¶ Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Germany in Eastern Europe. Each case¶ has its own profile of lives lost, and in each case the new democratic¶ regimes followed specific policies to deal with these violations. Cuban¶ National Reconciliation is not trying to determine whether Cuba has suffered greater or lesser human losses than other countries. The goal,¶ instead, is to analyze how all of these losses–in Cuba and the other countries we considered–occurred when an overriding logic of absolute partisan ends opened the way for the use of violence as a means to exclude¶ dissenters. When an end is brandished to justify assaults against the life,¶ physical integrity, and freedoms of opponents, its nature is debased,¶ however praiseworthy the end might seem or even if a majority supports¶ it. What Cuba has in common with these other countries is that its government exalted absolute partisan ends that admitted no dissent. The¶ result has been an accumulation of victims and violations–in greater or¶ lesser numbers and intensity compared with other countries–that share¶ the same origin: having dismissed an ethic based on human rights,¶ which is the only means conducive to a peaceful coexistence among all¶ citizens.¶ The political conditions of each transition conditioned the ways in¶ which the new democratic governments approached the past. Perhaps¶ the most important factor has been the way the transition took place:¶ whether through negotiations or a sharp rupture with the preceding¶ authoritarian regime. Since the 1970s, most transitions have been negotiated and, therefore, democratization happened from the gradual disassembling of authoritarian institutions. Transitions are more likely to initiate a profound political restructuring when the democratic opposition¶ is strong and the dictatorial regime discredited. Their main challenge is¶ the establishment of the rule of law, with pluralism and dialogue serving¶ as cornerstones of civic life. To get there, a polity engages in negotiations and pacts, issues a new constitution or amends the extant one,¶ holds free elections, strengthens civil society, and nurtures a new–or¶ renewed–confidence of citizens in themselves and in the political system. In all cases, new democracies should resort to means that attest to¶ their inclusiveness, and facing up to a legacy of human rights violations¶ has constituted one of those means. Deterring future violations, identifying and sanctioning the principal violators, and restoring the victims’¶ and/or their families’ dignity, are all central considerations during a¶ democratic transition. Though these processes–restoring silenced or¶ absent memories and establishing the truth–should be national mandates, it must also be said that in this 21st century the search for justice¶ is also an international concern. The following questions are of special¶ importance in any process of recovering memory, truth, and justice:¶ • Was the violence overt or covert?¶ • At what moment of the dictatorship did it happen?¶ • What is the weight of the dictatorship’s repressive institutions¶ during the transition?¶ • What are the possibilities for identifying those responsible for¶ the repression?¶ • Who are the parties interested in unveiling the violations?¶ What actions are they taking in that regard?¶ A number of different mechanisms can be used in addressing a legacy¶ of gross violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law. In each country, the precise manner of addressing the past¶ will be different, and the reach, specific mandate, and character of the¶ various initiatives that may be employed will also differ. Although the¶ mechanisms and methodologies for achieving truth, justice, and reconciliation must be adopted according to each country’s circumstances and¶ conditions, the practices summarized here are witness to the emergence¶ of moral and legal principles that, in effect, govern what must be done¶ in addressing the legacy of past abuses. ¶ With an interest in revealing the full truth about a painful and often¶ controversial aspect of a nation’s history, many countries have created a¶ “truth commission,” an official, temporary body with a mandate to¶ investigate a pattern of abuses that took place over many years. These¶ commissions generally operate for one to two years, finalizing their work¶ with a public report that summarizes their findings and presents recommendations to prevent such abuses in the future. Many of these commissions have held public hearings to allow victims and other witnesses¶ to tell their story publicly, as well as taking individual testimony from¶ sometimes thousands of victims and investigating some of these cases in¶ depth. In addition to official truth commissions, nongovernmental¶ organizations have also made important contributions in collecting¶ information from victims and publishing reports about the truth, especially where the government resists a formal truth commission. Truth¶ commissions have generated debates concerning the search for justice¶ because they may appear to admit impunity. Argentina, Chile, Uruguay,¶ El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa are examples of countries that¶ established these truth commissions. ¶ A different kind of truth can emerge through the release of files kept¶ by intelligence services of a repressive state, especially where the state¶ closely tracked the actions of activists or dissidents over years. This¶ release of files has taken place in some countries of Eastern Europe.¶ There are, however, problems in using these files, as their veracity was¶ often compromised at the time they were kept.¶ There is often an important need to reform the state institutions that¶ allowed or facilitated the abuses that took place. These may include the¶ judiciary, the police, the armed forces, and other institutions, and such¶ reforms will typically take many years to implement fully. One important consideration is whether the individuals responsible for abuses in¶ the past should be removed from their posts, in order to prevent further¶ abuses and to generally strengthen those same institutions. A system of¶ individual review of the human rights record of persons accused of abuses, which also recommends or facilitates their removal, is generally¶ referred to as “vetting.”¶ A different and more problematic approach to removing abusive officials is through a system of “lustration,” as seen in some countries in¶ Eastern Europe. This generally consists of removing individuals from¶ state employ based not on each person’s own individual record, but on¶ past affiliation with a particular political party or state institution. There¶ have been significant due process and other problems in the lustration¶ policies as implemented in a number of countries. ¶ An important issue that must be given close consideration in any transition is how to respond to the needs of the victims of past violence.¶ Many countries have attempted to implement reparations for victims,¶ including financial awards to individuals and symbolic reparations such¶ as the construction of memorials. Such policies are critically important,¶ although they often raise very difficult questions, especially in the¶ attempt to provide financial reparations, as to sources of funds, how to¶ identify the appropriate recipients, and how to fairly quantify the harm¶ that has been done to thousands or tens of thousands of victims.¶ Finally, all of these countries have confronted the difficult question of¶ whether, and in what manner, to hold persons responsible in court for¶ past abuses. Even where there has been no amnesty granted for such acts,¶ many countries confront the problem of a weak or overly politicized¶ judiciary, and the fact that large numbers of people are accused of serious abuses, which makes it impossible to have a generalized prosecution¶ system. Political conditions and pressures at the moment of transition¶ have sometimes resulted in amnesty for some or all past abusers. In¶ today’s international context, however, amnesty for certain serious¶ crimes is generally considered unacceptable and contrary to principles of¶ international law, and some amnesties for human rights crimes have¶ been overturned in domestic and international courts. The cases of¶ South Africa and Guatemala described below are great improvements¶ over the general and unconditional amnesties seen elsewhere in earlier¶ years.¶ What follows is a précis of the experiences in other countries.¶ Spain¶ The Spanish case is remarkable in at least two ways. First is the universally acknowledged success of its transition. After Francisco Franco’s¶ death in 1975, the new political class–integrated by the democratic¶ opposition and Francoist reformers–and Spanish society managed a relatively peaceful passage to democracy. Still, there were more than 400¶ reported deaths as a result of political violence by the intransigent right¶ and the radical left, casualties inflicted by ETA being particularly significant. By the early 1980s, Spanish democracy was well on its way. From¶ the outset, King Juan Carlos I manifested a strong willingness for dialogue and a disposition to be inclusive, which he made plainly evident¶ when he rose in defense of democracy to foil a coup attempt in 1981.¶ Subsequently, the 1982 electoral victory of the Spanish Socialist¶ Workers’ Party brought to power a new generation representing political renovation and modernization. The consolidation of democracy was¶ followed by an impressive economic boom. Doubtlessly, full integration¶ to Europe also contributed to strengthening democracy in Spain.¶ The Spanish transition is also remarkable for the agreement reached¶ by parliamentary elites not to use the past for political ends. They likewise agreed that no one would be held accountable for human rights and¶ to implement a “let bygones be bygones” sort of policy. There was fear¶ that uncovering the past might reenact old conflicts that could lead to a¶ new civil war. No one wanted a repeat of the Civil War of 1936-1939.¶ The consensus that both sides had committed atrocities during the war¶ and that the period of Franco’s harshest repression had taken place three¶ decades earlier contributed to the decision not to account for human¶ rights violations. Even before Franco’s death, regime reformers and most¶ of the opposition (in Spain and in exile) had agreed on a single goal for¶ Spain: a peaceful transition to democracy.¶ Post-1975 negotiations were conducted with Francoist civil and military institutions intact. Between 1976 and 1978, political prisoners¶ were set free, the Communist Party acquired legal status, legitimate elections were carried out, and a new Constitution–approved by referendum–was enacted. Tied to the negotiations was a mutual and reciprocal¶ amnesty, which prevented the quest for justice and stymied political discussion regarding past atrocities. The transition’s insistence on consensus and national reconciliation emphasized the future, not the past.¶ Notwithstanding, sectors of Spanish society did not endorse the amnesia about the past: historians, for example, researched the Civil War and¶ the Franco regime with almost complete freedom (with the exception of¶ some military files still kept closed and of others that have disappeared)¶ and published books on the subject. Political debate regarding the past,¶ however, was not revived until recently. Notably, an exhibition, several¶ books, and television and radio programs on the subjects of the civil war,¶ the exiles, and Franco’s regime appeared almost simultaneously in the¶ fall of 2002. On November 20, 2002, the Spanish Parliament issued an¶ unprecedented condemnation of the thirty-year dictatorship and¶ extended moral recognition to the victims of the Civil War; it also made¶ a commitment to fund the exhumation of the corpses still in common¶ graves, both from the war and from Franco’s early years in power. The¶ parliament also acknowledged the costs imposed on those who were¶ forced into exile during the dictatorship.¶ Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay¶ Argentina¶ The model for truth commissions since the early 1980s originated in¶ the Southern Cone. Argentina began the transition with a commitment¶ to pursue truth and justice fully. Raúl Alfonsín became president after¶ the military junta’s defeat in the Falklands War in 1982; the military,¶ thus, was doubly discredited: by the war and by the heinous repression¶ it had sponsored since 1976.46 In 1983, Alfonsín created the National¶ Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP). After nine months, the¶ commission published Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine National¶ Commission on the Disappeared, which confirmed the disappearance of¶ 8,963 people as well as the existence of 340 secret detention and torture¶ centers. Since CONADEP did not publicly name repressors, some civilian organizations published a list of 1,351 individuals mentioned as¶ such in testimonies presented to CONADEP. Courts declared unconstitutional the amnesty the military had granted themselves before leaving power. A presidential decree instructed the prosecution of militaryjunta members (1976-1983) and of some guerrilla leaders. At Alfonsín’s¶ behest, Congress passed a law reforming the military code of justice: if¶ the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces did not prosecute accused¶ military personnel within six months, the civilian justice system would¶ bring them to trial. The law tried to limit prosecution to the higher¶ ranking officers, but it stressed the need to administer justice where particularly “atrocious and heinous” acts had been committed. By the end¶ of 1986, several junta members and other high-ranking officers had¶ been prosecuted and sentenced, and it seemed as if these “trials of the¶ century” would complete the cycle of justice. ¶ However, that was not the case. Between 1985 and 1988, a series of¶ events intensified the demands for justice, led the military to take action¶ against these demands, and forced Alfonsín’s government to back down.¶ After military pressures and threats (including four failed rebellions),¶ two laws were passed: Final Point and Due Obedience. The former¶ established a 60-day term to register accusations against officers, and the¶ latter limited responsibility to top leadership. Civil society, nonetheless,¶ insisted on justice, and the judicial system responded by increasing the¶ number of officers who could be prosecuted. Ten high-ranking officers¶ sentenced in the mid-1980s, including five military-junta members,¶ served up to seven years, until President Carlos Menem pardoned them¶ in 1990. Some of them, along with many other repressors from that¶ period, were retried in the late 1990s for the kidnapping of their victims’¶ children. Also, lower courts declared the laws of Final Point and Due¶ Obedience unconstitutional (as of January 2003, the Supreme Court¶ had yet to issue a final ruling). More than thirty officers, including former president Jorge R. Videla, are still detained. Argentine justice has¶ accepted the obligation to investigate repression during the military juntas, and since 1995 several “truth trials” have been held, although the¶ investigations carry no penal consequences for the accused. Some of¶ these trials have produced important revelations regarding the fate and¶ whereabouts of some disappeared persons and the functioning of the¶ repressive apparatus. Outside Argentina, there are pending judicial proceedings against Argentine officers for their actions during the dictatorship.¶ Chile¶ From the outset, Chile’s transition was constrained by the legal system¶ put in place by Augusto Pinochet’s régime and the legitimacy that the¶ general and the military retained among certain sectors of the population. The Constitution of 1980 offered the military guarantees, even¶ after they lost the plebiscite (1988) and the elections (1989) by 45%.¶ Though the Coalition of Parties for Democracy won at the polls,¶ Patricio Aylwin’s government was circumscribed by legislation that bolstered the Right’s power. In 1978, an amnesty absolved the army and¶ state security of all responsibility for actions taken between 1973 and¶ 1978.47 Notwithstanding, the president created a truth commission to¶ investigate political acts of violence that may have resulted in deaths or¶ disappearances.48 Out of 3,000 cases, the commission established the¶ regime’s responsibility for 2,025, the violent opposition for 90, and¶ could not classify the rest.49 In a solemn speech, Aylwin presented the¶ commission’s conclusion and, visibly moved, said the following: ¶ When so much suffering was inflicted by state agents, and the¶ duly appointed state organs did not or could not prevent it or¶ punish those responsible and neither did society take action to¶ avert it, it is the state and society as a whole who are the ones¶ responsible, be it for their actions or inactions. That is why–as¶ president of the republic–speaking on behalf of the entire¶ nation, I ask forgiveness from the families of the victims.¶ Subsequently, investigations on the whereabouts of the disappeared were¶ launched. Amnesty, military autonomy, and the Right’s control of the¶ judicial system still constituted powerful barriers. Despite a vibrant¶ human rights movement and strong democratic parties, the past got in¶ the way of Chilean democracy.¶ In the late 1990s, obstacles began to give way. On the one hand, the¶ judicial system started to lean toward human rights; many judges who¶ had overlooked their violation during the dictatorship had retired. On¶ the other, an international event rendered the issue of justice unavoidable. In 1998, a Spanish court initiated legal proceedings against¶ Pinochet and other officers for the deaths of 200 people during¶ Operation Condor.50 After the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón issued a¶ warrant for Pinochet’s arrest and requested his extradition to Spain, the¶ general was arrested in London, where he remained under house arrest¶ through the long proceedings. Moreover, English magistrates handed¶ several unprecedented decisions confirming the principle of universal¶ jurisdiction for massive violations of human rights. For age and health¶ reasons, Pinochet was eventually deported to Chile. His case was¶ brought before the Chilean Supreme Court, which revoked the immunity due him as a senator for life and prosecuted him for covering up¶ assassinations and disappearances committed by state security agents in¶ 1974. The Supreme Court eventually decided to stay the proceedings on¶ the grounds Pinochet suffered from “moderate dementia.” Likewise, the¶ court developed jurisprudence allowing the investigation of disappearances and their prosecution until the victims’ bodies are located or an¶ explanation given for their having disappeared. Special judges have been¶ appointed to investigate disappearances between 1973 and 1978, even¶ though covered by the amnesty law. After two decades, criminal investigations are still being conducted against military officers and members¶ of Pinochet’s secret police (DINA and CNI).¶ Uruguay¶ Julio María Sanguinetti’s election in 1985 signaled the return of¶ democracy to Uruguay. In 1984, the military and two out of the three¶ principal political parties–the Colorado and the Broad Front–negotiated the transition.51 The president was committed to what he called¶ “pacification”: repealing the State Security Act enacted by the military,¶ returning military courts to their pre-coup jurisdiction, granting¶ amnesty for most political prisoners, and the repatriation of exiles.52 In¶ Sanguinetti’s estimation, the National Pacification Act–which, in addition, contained measures to aid returning exiles, former political prisoners, and those who had been fired from civil-service jobs–closed the discussion of the past.¶ However, other expectations arose from civil society. Human rights¶ organizations and victims of the repression initiated legal proceedings¶ against officers in civilian courts. A jurisdictional struggle ensued¶ between military and civilian courts; the Supreme Court ruled in favor¶ of civilian jurisdiction, and the investigations of hundreds of cases of¶ human rights violations followed suit. In 1985, the congress created¶ two commissions to investigate human rights violations during the dictatorship, but their scope was limited. The commissions established that¶ there had been 164 disappearances and furnished the Supreme Court¶ with evidence implicating the security forces. Not long afterwards,¶ Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ) organized a commission to complete¶ what the parliamentary ones had not. In late 1986, the Uruguayan congress passed an Expiration Act declaring, “due to circumstances,” an end¶ to the state’s pursuit of justice for past repression–a sort of amnesty,¶ without terms or conditions. Victims’ families, human rights organizations, and opposition sectors immediately set to work in favor of a referendum to repeal the new law. On April 6, 1989, 53 percent of the¶ voters ratified the Expiration Act in a referendum. However, broad sectors of Uruguayan society still resent the silence, the impunity, and the¶ fact that not even the truth of what happened has been irrefutably established. In 2000, President Jorge Batlle created a Commission for Peace¶ and named the archbishop of Montevideo to head it; the commission¶ has received information about disappearances in Uruguay and other¶ countries, but has failed to obtain the collaboration of the military.¶ South Africa¶ To date, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995-¶ 1998) has been the most comprehensive and thorough. Between 1948¶ and 1994, apartheid–a vast system of discrimination and despotism¶ against most of the population for the material and cultural benefit of¶ Afrikaners and other whites–was bolstered by a powerful state apparatus¶ that committed atrocious crimes and sowed a widespread culture of terror. The legacy of apartheid, however, is not only manifest in the atrocities committed against black South Africans (and, to a lesser degree,¶ against Hindus), but also in the institutions and practices that exploited, silenced, and rendered the great majority destitute. Mitigating the¶ psychological, economic, and social injustices incurred during apartheid¶ is unquestionably more difficult than ascertaining the truth of what happened. The South African commission only investigated cases of¶ extreme violence and, therefore, overlooked apartheid’s routine humiliations and violations. ¶ Notwithstanding, South Africa’s transition materialized under relatively favorable conditions in the early 1990s: the dictatorial regime had¶ grown politically weaker and become an international pariah, the¶ African National Congress (ANC) drew on impressive moral and political recourses, an exhaustive network of organizations, a proven capacity to mobilize the citizenry, and the remarkable leadership of Nelson¶ Mandela. Parliament created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,¶ and nominations were put forward by the public. Mandela named the¶ commision’s seventeen members and designated Archbishop Desmond¶ Tutu as its president. Though no conditions had been specified, an¶ amnesty had been decided beforehand. Unlike other commissions,¶ South Africa’s had the power to grant amnesty, and it did in cases meeting three conditions: that the crimes in question took place between¶ May 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994, that these were politically motivated,¶ and that the accused reveal everything he or she knew about the actions¶ involved.¶ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission bore an extraordinary¶ burden: proving to the majority that the country was being founded¶ anew on the basis of the rule of law. Although during the 1990s, prominent apartheid figures were brought to trial, they were not always condemned and not all repressors were tried; reforming the judicial system¶ inherited from apartheid will take years. For two-and-a-half years, the¶ commission daily exposed the monstrousness of apartheid, and that was¶ its most important achievement. More than 21,000 victims and witnesses gave depositions; 2,000 hearings whereby the accused came face to¶ face with the victims or their families were broadcast live on radio and¶ television. The commission also considered accusations against ANC¶ members, Winnie Mandela’s case being the most famous. Although the¶ commission left many victims’ relatives dissatisfied, public opinion did¶ not express a preference for justice at any cost. As expected, the¶ Afrikaner community rejected the final report, and certain sectors¶ demanded an unconditional amnesty. But the government of the¶ African National Congress did not fully embrace the report either: after¶ long discussions, it made no commitment to implement its recommendations, nor did it accept criticism of some of the methods used in the¶ struggle against apartheid.53¶ Central America: El Salvador and Guatemala¶ In El Salvador and Guatemala, transitions followed the negotiations¶ that ended the wars between their respective governments and guerrilla¶ forces. The peace accords called for the establishment of truth commissions. In both countries, the state was highly militarized and closely¶ interlaced with socioeconomic élites; the repression and exclusion of a¶ majority of citizens had been standard practice. The transition, therefore, required a deep restructuring of the state and the security forces.¶ The cold war considerably aggravated the conflicts in El Salvador and¶ Guatemala: after the revolution triumphed in Nicaragua, the Ronald¶ Reagan administration allotted considerable funds to destabilize the¶ Sandinista government and to prevent other guerrilla victories in the¶ region; Cuba’s support for Managua and for the Farabundo Martí¶ National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador further complicated¶ the Central American crisis. The end of the cold war and the Sandinista¶ Front’s electoral defeat in 1990 contributed to the decline of armed conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala. ¶ El Salvador¶ The stagnation of the war between the Salvadoran government and¶ the FMLN hastened peace negotiations. In the late 1980s, the¶ Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)–representative of the civilian¶ elite–took the reins of power. By then, the international community had¶ begun to press for negotiations: the inefficiency and corruption of the¶ Salvadoran military command, together with deeds such as the assassination of the Jesuit priests and two of their collaborators, had eroded the¶ government’s international credibility. The FMLN, in turn, joined the¶ negotiations from a position of strength, for it had not been defeated on¶ the battlefield. In 1992, the United Nations paved the way for the peace¶ accord and their subsequent implementation, especially regarding the¶ truth commission. All Salvadoran parties agreed to a U.N.-administered commission of three foreigners. An ad hoc commission of three¶ Salvadorans was also named to examine the record of high-ranking military officers concerning human rights.54¶ The commission registered more than 22,000 grievances, most having¶ to do with extrajudicial deaths, disappearances, and torture. Through¶ the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), important information¶ about some of these violations was obtained.55 Over Salvadoran government objections and with the goal of exerting pressure on the judicial¶ system, the commission named more than 60 people (members of the¶ armed forces, the judiciary, civil service, and the FMLN) who appeared¶ implicated in cover ups or crimes during the conflict or who had failed¶ to comply with their duty to investigate and punish human rights violations. In March 1993, the commission issued a report, From Madness¶ to Hope, that provided evidence the armed forces and the paramilitary¶ had been responsible for more than 85 percent of the reported violations¶ and the FMLN for 5 percent; it was unable to assign responsibility for¶ the remaining 10 percent. The commission recommended immediate¶ dismissal for the officers named and a ban on holding public office for¶ 10 years for FMLN commanders accused of abuses. Even more important, the report advocated civilian control over the armed forces, as well¶ as comprehensive reform of the judiciary. ARENA and the military¶ expressed sharp criticism of From Madness to Hope, although U.N. and¶ U.S. pressure forced their accepting it. ¶ All the same, a few days after the report’s publication, the Salvadoran¶ government declared an amnesty. Months later, the ad hoc commission¶ concluded its review of 230 officers, and recommended transfer or¶ removal for more than 100, including all of the top commanders.¶ Although the Salvadoran government resisted, U.N. and U.S. pressures¶ forced it to follow the recommendation. The officers, however, were dismissed with military honors and their pensions kept intact. In a similar¶ fashion, the FMLN did not acknowledge any responsibility for abuses¶ and atrocities attributed to some of its members, neither did it accept¶ the recommendation that commanders involved in these crimes should¶ refrain from participating in politics. Most of the victims or their families never received any compensation, nor has a monument been built in¶ their memory, both actions having also been recommended by the commission. The transition in El Salvador was more a function of struggles¶ among the three main elite groups–ARENA, the military, and the¶ FMLN–as well as of international pressure; most human rights organizations did not have a say in the peace accords or their implementation.¶ Regarding the state’s demilitarization, some headway has been made as¶ the main repressive institutions were abolished and a National Civilian¶ Police created, drawing equally from the military and the FMLN. An¶ independent judiciary has yet to emerge. ¶ Guatemala¶ Negotiations in Guatemala were conducted on different bases from¶ those in El Salvador. In the mid-1980s, the army had practically¶ annulled the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) as a¶ military force, which meant the URNG lacked the negotiating power of¶ the FMLN. Unlike El Salvador, the socioeconomic elite was still subordinated to the military, and the Guatemalan army did not depend on¶ U.S. support. Moreover, the Civilian Defense Patrols (PAC), which¶ involved the population in counterinsurgency, had no counterpart in El¶ Salvador. At the same time, the Catholic church and human rights¶ organizations in Guatemala insisted on the search for the truth throughout the negotiations, and afterwards, on the application of the terms of¶ the accords; civil society has been a vibrant player in the processes of rescuing memory and making accusations. In Guatemala, the United¶ Nations also played an influential role.¶ As a result of the negotiations, the Historical Clarification¶ Commission (CEH) was created with the purpose of investigating the¶ truth concerning past crimes. Earlier, the Human Rights Office of the¶ Archdiocese of Guatemala had promoted and carried out the Recovery¶ of the Historical Memory Project (REMHI), which published the¶ Guatemala Never Again report and was an important source for the official CEH. Despite these efforts, the government and the URNG agreed¶ upon an amnesty that would not apply to those guilty of genocide, disappearances, torture, and other crimes for which there is no statute of¶ limitations. The Catholic church’s report claimed 80 percent of the violations had been committed by security forces and 9 per cent by the¶ URNG. In 1998, the CEH issued Guatemala: Memory of Silence, based¶ on the depositions of more than 8,000 people: it made a comprehensive¶ analysis of the conflict’s origins, offered irrefutable evidence of the genocide perpetrated against the Maya population, and concluded that violence had been the outcome of injustice and racism. Its recommendations included prosecuting those responsible for genocide, a wide-ranging restructuring of the military, and a far-reaching compensation program. Although there was no official contrition as in Chile, neither was¶ there categorical denial as in El Salvador; the president and the defense¶ minister acknowledged past “excesses,” and the URNG apologized for¶ their “mistakes.” Memory of Silence contained a sharp critique of U.S.¶ intervention in Guatemala since the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in¶ 1954 until the late 1980s. The Clinton administration declassified some¶ materials that proved useful to CEH; in 1999, the U.S. president set a¶ remarkable precedent by apologizing for U.S. interference in¶ Guatemalan conflicts. ¶ The military is still the main political force in Guatemala and, thus,¶ the steps taken to implement institutional and legal reforms have been¶ feeble. However, with the dismantling of the civilian counterinsurgency¶ patrols, progress has been made in the demilitarization of the population. The remarkable presence of civil society–with its own organizations and supported by the United Nations and nongovernmental¶ organizations (NGOs)–has been the most distinguishing aspect of¶ Guatemala’s transition. Recovering memory has been a powerful¶ weapon in the hands of popular sectors. On the one hand, the initiatives¶ to exhume corpses in clandestine cemeteries, identify the remains, present claims, and put up monuments to honor the victims have arisen¶ from civil society–from indigenous communities to the Catholic¶ church–with the result that the monstrousness of what happened can¶ never be denied. On the other hand, the very act of mobilizing for these¶ undertakings has raised the expectations of Mayan peasants regarding¶ their rights as citizens, which is promising–albeit not a guarantee–for¶ democracy. As in El Salvador, the elite’s willingness to fully abide by the¶ rule of law remains to be seen.¶ Eastern Europe ¶ Like Spain, the countries of Eastern Europe did not summon truth¶ commissions to deal with their past. In general, their transitions took¶ place with the consent of some elites from the old regimes, while¶ Communist parties–reformed or orthodox–have been part of the political landscape since 1990. In short, Eastern Europe has seen significant¶ continuity in its political class. Although at first public opinion favored¶ punishing those responsible for communism, policies varied and only¶ the former Czechoslovakia and Albania carried out extensive purges. A¶ series of factors accounts for this relative laxity. Most important, during¶ the 1970s, both elites and citizenry had gradually abandoned communist orthodoxy. When the regime changed, the outgoing elites were¶ favorably positioned, especially vis-à-vis the economy, to retain some¶ power and, in many instances, to regain it rather quickly after 1989.¶ Moreover, the late 1940s and 1950s had been the period of harshest¶ repression, which, by the 1980s, could be characterized as “low intensity.” Accountability, thus, was no easy matter. At the same time, members of the Communist party and their families represented some 30-40¶ percent of the population; many citizens had passively complied with¶ these regimes and, therefore, helped to preserve them. Finally, shortly¶ after the transitions, economic restructuring displaced issues related to¶ memory, truth, and justice as the public’s priority concern. The past,¶ however, has not been abandoned in Eastern Europe. On the contrary:¶ the issues of responsibility for human rights violations are returning¶ everywhere and are becoming more acute. Many citizens have not experienced closure with the past and are raising questions. More important,¶ the matter of past collaboration with communist regimes is commonly¶ used to discredit individuals in politics or with political aspirations:¶ they are frequently “outed.” There is an ongoing process of rescuing¶ memories, building monuments, and honoring the victims of communism. Simply put, the issue is not going away.¶ Broadly speaking, the experience concerning the communist past is as¶ follows:¶ • The former Czechoslovakia and Albania passed laws that rid¶ the state of thousands of officials and prevented individuals¶ closely connected with the old regime from participating in politics over a specified period.56 In both cases, opposition parties¶ gained power, although in Czechoslovakia lustration (“purification”) against former communist officials and collaborators has¶ been conducted according to relatively fair legal proceedings,¶ while in Albania–the region’s most repressive before 1989 and¶ characterized for its near-lack of legal tradition–such proceedings were governed primarily by the emerging elite’s political¶ interests.¶ • In Bulgaria and Romania, transitions were led by communist¶ elites, and the measures taken were symbolic. When Bulgarian¶ communists split into orthodox and reform factions, the latter¶ successfully blamed the former for repression and, thus, did not¶ suffer electoral consequences when the old regime’s harshness¶ was revealed. During the 1990s, reformed communists won¶ two national elections. In Romania, the Ceaucescus’ dramatic¶ execution did not signal rupture with communist elites. For¶ example, the new agency for security and intelligence recruited¶ 60 percent of its members from the former Securitate and,¶ shortly afterwards, announced files would remain closed for 40¶ years.¶ • In Poland and Hungary, transition was negotiated with communist elites. For that reason and due to the complex relationships among elites during the 1990s, the past received mostly¶ symbolic attention. In Poland, the Solidarity faction that had¶ not been part of the first post-communist government called for¶ justice to be done in 1991. Some groups hastily prepared lists¶ of collaborators and pressured for legislation. The law passed in¶ 1996 applies only to certain categories of former officials and¶ requires them to declare whether or not they had collaborated¶ with state security. If a special court determines an individual¶ has not been truthful, he or she is relieved from his or her functions. The law itself, the specified categories of collaboration,¶ and the trials, are a source of constant changes and disagreements. Though trials were few, two were quite significant:¶ General Jaruzelski’s, not for the 1981 coup d’état, but for the¶ repression against workers’ strikes in 1970; and that of a group¶ of officers accused of mistreating political prisoners between¶ 1945 and 1956. Trials continue into the present. ¶ • Similarly, the Hungarian parliament enacted a law to disqualify those who had collaborated with the political police in the¶ following ways: for having been members of the repression¶ brigades after the Soviet invasion in 1956, or for having¶ belonged to the political party linked with the Nazi occupation¶ during World War II. There has, however, been little political¶ will to follow through. The parliament also created a commission to elucidate the events of 1956, which determined that¶ some 1,000 people had lost their lives. Hungarian politics is still¶ polarized around the matter of what to do with those citizens¶ who joined the Communist party and collaborated with its¶ regime. ¶ • Reunification sets the German case apart from the rest of¶ Eastern Europe. East Germany was absorbed by West¶ Germany, the latter’s democratic institutions and economic¶ prosperity having no counterpart in the region. Communist¶ elites had no chance at all to negotiate. In reunited Germany,¶ communists had no influence on what to do about the past.¶ The German government allocated considerable resources to¶ investigate the history of the German Democratic Republic¶ (GDR). A parliamentary commission documented the GDR’s¶ functioning and declared it an illegitimate regime. By the late¶ 1990s, the public prosecutor’s office had investigated more than¶ 62,000 cases of alleged political crimes committed under the¶ GDR regime and had indicted more than 1,000, including former communist leader Eric Honecker and several border¶ guards. Finally, under the supervision of Joachim Gauck, a theologian and a dissident from the East, Stasi files were opened to¶ the public under strict procedures. In Germany, as well as in the¶ rest of Eastern Europe, the use of state-security files became a¶ delicate matter: the information in them was not always reliable and, in many cases, it was false.¶ Countries have employed multiple practices and methods to cope with¶ the serious question of what to do with the past. None has found a clear¶ answer, nor has the issue been completely settled anywhere. The countries reviewed present uneven results concerning the consolidation of¶ democracy and their approaches toward past human rights violations.¶ Everywhere, democracy’s greatest accomplishment has been to establish¶ a foundation of respect for the rights of citizens and a framework for¶ the peaceful airing and settling of political differences in the public¶ arena. All these experiences, therefore, contrast favorably and pristinely¶ with the dictatorships that preceded them. Political and civil rights are¶ indissolubly linked to the pursuit of all other rights¶ The Human Rights Issue in Cuba: ¶ Past and Present¶ The dictatorial nature of the Cuban government is now widely¶ acknowledged. On the island, the nonviolent character and the growing number of opposition and human rights groups–the power of the¶ powerless, in Václav Havel’s words–have brought the regime’s true character to light. The history of human rights violations, however, does not¶ have the same level of recognition and, in fact, remains, largely¶ unknown. The Cuban revolution’s vital role in the New Left movement¶ of the 1960s and the support it elicited from progressive and leftist intellectuals partly explains this lacuna. There are, however, other reasons.¶ In the 1960s, democracy was mainly confined to Western, developed¶ countries and, even there, some dictatorships survived in southern¶ Europe. In the Third World, right-wing dictatorships perpetrated horrific repression in the name of fighting communism, almost always with¶ open or tacit U.S. support. The profile of the international human rights¶ community that emerged after the Helsinki Final Act also had an¶ impact: until the 1980s, its activists tended to be left of center. In the¶ United States, the lobby on behalf of human rights arose in opposition¶ to, and in denunciation of, U.S. policies that subverted democratic governments and supported military regimes; due to U.S. hostility towards¶ Cuba, the situation on the island did not receive much attention.¶ Moreover, when the human rights international movement flourished¶ during the 1970s, the cruelest period of repression in Cuba until that¶ time was over. While during the 1960s the Cuban government silenced¶ the organized opposition through violence, long prison terms, and firing squads, repression by the 1970s more commonly, but not exclusively, took the form of intimidation, harassment, arbitrariness, and imprisonment. Finally, many exiles–the first to denounce the Cuban government–were not natural allies of the human rights activists: most sided¶ with the United States in the cold war, largely shared the anticommunist ideology of right-wing regimes and, therefore, overlooked violations¶ committed by these regimes. A double standard impregnated the¶ human rights issue in relation to Cuba: on the one hand, important sectors of the international community did not give Cuban victims the¶ same consideration as victims of right-wing dictatorships, the Soviet¶ Union, and Eastern Europe; on the other, many exiles did not condemn¶ right-wing dictatorships nor recognize their victims.57¶ A combination of factors has partly corrected the way the international community approaches human rights in Cuba: the absolutist character of the Cuban government, the expansion of an independent civil¶ society on the island, as well as the international consensus on democracy and human rights. Even so, the international community focuses¶ mostly on the current status of human rights on the island and demands¶ the Cuban government respect them. Cuban National Reconciliation¶ considers another aspect to be important: the human cost exacted by the¶ revolution, especially but not exclusively during the 1960s, and also, by¶ the violent opposition, albeit to a lesser extent. The 1960s was the¶ decade of civil conflict and tragic coexistence, and Cubans should shed¶ as much light as possible on those events then so that similar ones never¶ happen again in Cuba. ¶ All sides in the Cuban conflict have justified their actions, appealing¶ to a logic of absolute partisan ends. This report, however, embraces¶ respect for human rights–an ethics of means–as the unmovable cornerstone for civil coexistence. Even though current conditions in Cuba are¶ not ripe for clarifying the past, Cuban National Reconciliation recommends doing what is feasible: creating a framework for a discussion of¶ what happened in light of international agreements and norms on¶ human rights, including:¶ • The International Bill of Human Rights, which includes the¶ Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as well as the¶ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its¶ optional protocols. ¶ • The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,¶ the American Convention on Human Rights, and the InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. ¶ • The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,¶ or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which includes basic¶ principles for the treatment of convicts and protection against¶ forced disappearances. ¶ • The four conventions (1949) and the two protocols of Geneva¶ (1977), as well as UN and OAS agreements on humanitarian¶ international law, protection of civilians during wars, proper¶ treatment of war prisoners, the inapplicability of statute of lim¶ itations to war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as¶ the rights and duties of states in the event of civil conflicts. ¶ • The proscriptions of the International Labor Organization¶ (ILO) in relation to forced labor. ¶ • The United Nations has sponsored 12 multilateral conventions that classify as terrorism actions such as kidnapping of, or¶ attacks against, planes or ships, assaults against officials and¶ diplomats, taking hostages, and financing terrorism. ¶ International law provides an ethical and legal framework that does not¶ accept many of the arguments used to justify what happened in Cuba by¶ the Cuban government, by the violent opposition, or by the U.S. government. Looking forward to a democratic Cuba with the goal of a pluralistic quest for truth, we note the following, which is a compilation of¶ facts, issues, allegations, and questions that should be considered, investigated, and determined. The full range of what happened in Cuba has¶ yet to come to light.¶ Cuban Government Violations and Related Issues in Need of¶ Clarification58¶ • Massive violations of citizen rights and individual freedoms as¶ per the severe restrictions sanctioned by the constitution and¶ the criminal code. ¶ • Post-1959 extension and application of the death penalty to¶ politically motivated actions. How many people were brought¶ before firing squads?¶ • Imposition of sentences–including, especially in the 1960s,¶ the death penalty and unusually long prison terms–in trials that¶ did not and still do not abide by internationally established¶ standards of due process. ¶ • Determination of the number of political prisoners since¶ 1959. How many were or are condemned for acts of political¶ violence? How many were or are prisoners of conscience?¶ • Mistreatment of political and common prisoners. Deliberate¶ confinement in prisons far removed from their families.¶ Tortures–physical and psychological–and extrajudicial deaths¶ from 1959 until the present. Clarification of the situation at¶ the Isle of Pines prison (approximately 5,000 prisoners) which¶ was mined with live dynamite between January 1962 and¶ February 1963. Clarification of the situation at Boniato prison¶ (1976), when at least one person died and dozens were beaten¶ up.59¶ • Identification of the whereabouts of all those killed for political reasons and the return of their remains to their families.¶ Furnishing families with accurate information of how their¶ loved ones died. ¶ • Use and abuse of preventive arrest for political reasons. On the¶ eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the government arrested thousands.60 Current application of this policy against the organized¶ opposition and human rights activists.61¶ • Treatment given to prisoners of war: members of Brigade¶ 2506 in 1961 and the rebels in Escambray and other areas during the 1960s. Torture and extrajudicial killings. ¶ • Human rights violations of civilians living in war zones, particularly the forced relocation of peasants from Escambray to¶ newly created, far-removed “communities.” How many people¶ were relocated? How many “communities” were created? How¶ long did these exist? Where were they? ¶ • Forced labor as punishment for behavior considered improper by the state, such as political dissidence, religious beliefs, sexual preference, or inclination to delinquency, e.g., the Military¶ Units to Aid Production (UMAP), and for persons who had¶ applied to leave Cuba. How many people were sent to UMAP¶ or forced to work against their will? ¶ • Number of HIV positive people, or people already suffering¶ from AIDS, who were forcibly confined and isolated in special¶ clinics¶ • Establishing accurately the number of Cubans who died in¶ international missions, especially during the war in Angola.62¶ • How many people have died from being intercepted by¶ Cuban authorities as they attempted to leave the country on¶ rafts or boats? The deliberate sinking of the tugboat 13 de marzo¶ in July 1994 has been the most notorious in recent times.¶ Forty-one people, including ten minors, lost their lives.¶ • The shootdown of two civilian aircrafts over international¶ waters on February 24, 1996. ¶ • Were agents of the Cuban government involved in some of¶ the violence perpetrated in exile communities?¶ Regarding some of these issues, the Cuban government has issued a¶ kind of oblique acknowledgement. Ramiro Valdés’ removal as interior¶ minister in 1968 could be partly attributed to the situation of political¶ prisoners.63 His successor, Sergio del Valle, implemented a so-called progressive plan that shortened sentences and gradually freed many political prisoners through a work program in construction, agriculture, and¶ other civilian activities. The plan’s mere implementation was an implicit recognition that political imprisonment under then-existing conditions could no longer be sustained.64 The progressive plan, however, did¶ not solve the situation of the prisoners who refused to participate in it¶ for reasons of conscience–they continued as plantados–and whom the¶ authorities treated with particular harshness.65 Regarding the peasant¶ population, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez recognized government policies¶ were not always “properly applied,” saying that “serious mistakes had¶ been made in relations with the peasantry,” and that “revolutionary¶ legality was not respected.”66 With respect to UMAP, a story in the party¶ newspaper, Granma, noted the following: ¶ Upon arrival of the first groups, which were no good, some officers did not have enough patience, nor did they have the¶ required experience and overreacted. That is why their cases¶ were submitted to a Consejo de Guerra (war council); some were¶ demoted, others dismissed from the armed forces.67¶ During a conference held in 2001 for the 40th anniversary of the Bay of¶ Pigs invasion, a Cuban government official acknowledged it had been a¶ “mistake” to transport dozens of war prisoners in an unventilated tractor trailer; nine men asphyxiated on the trip, which took several hours.68¶ Though welcomed, these readings and clarifications are but grains of¶ sand in what should be a wide and transparent sea, so neither this nor¶ any future government in Cuba ever acts that way again. Indeed, the¶ experiences of other countries highlight the significance of restoring¶ memory, unveiling the truth, and pursuing justice in order to identify¶ the guilty and determine their criminal and political responsibility. Due¶ process, and the presumption of innocence until proven otherwise in¶ properly conducted trials, should guide these processes, which should¶ never be construed as witch hunts. ¶ The Violent Opposition’s Abuses, Crimes, or Atrocities, and¶ Related Issues in Need of Clarification ¶ • The victimization of civilians and the assaults on civilian¶ installations by the urban internal resistance, the rebels in¶ Escambray and other areas, as well as from exiles, in their¶ actions against the government. Clarification of the cases of¶ teachers and peasants killed by the rebels in Escambray and¶ other areas, and of the civilian casualties that resulted from¶ intermittent attacks by exiles against Cuban coastal towns and¶ installations. ¶ • The treatment given to prisoners of war held by rebels in¶ Escambray and other areas. ¶ • The attacks against Cuban diplomatic missions and commercial offices abroad, including Cuba’s U.N. mission and Cubana¶ de Aviación offices in several countries. ¶ • The attacks against Cuban fishing or merchant-marine ships¶ in open sea. ¶ • The 1976 explosion of a Cubana de Aviación flight from¶ Barbados, which killed 73 people. ¶ • The assassination or kidnapping of Cuban diplomats in¶ Portugal, Argentina, Mexico, and the United States, as well as¶ the murder of a former minister in Salvador Allende’s government.¶ • The attacks in Miami against travel agencies and other businesses with Cuban links in the late 1970s and early 1980s,¶ against the businesses and homes of some supporters of a rapprochement with the Cuban government, and against individuals who opposed the traditional exile’s line, as well as against¶ sectors of the exile community who condemned the use of violence in U.S. soil.¶ • The assassination of persons in Miami, New Jersey, and¶ Puerto Rico who favored new tactics in the struggle against the¶ Cuban government, an openness with Havana and/or a new¶ U.S. policy towards Cuba, as well as against individuals who¶ were part of the traditional exile community.¶ During the 1960s, many actions against the Cuban government¶ involved the United States, in different ways and levels. The planning¶ and implementation of many more was done by Cubans and, therefore,¶ the responsibility for their consequences is also Cuban. It is crucial to¶ determine which human losses were caused by Cuban actions in the civil¶ confrontation and which resulted from U.S. initiatives. The revolutionary government had a genuine and autochthonous Cuban opposition¶ and the actions of that opposition, even its possible abuses, crimes, or¶ atrocities, have to be so attributed. In 1999, the Cuban government¶ filed a claim, “The People of Cuba vs. the Government of the United¶ States of America for Human Damages,” which does not acknowledge¶ the Cuban opposition as an autonomous actor.69 Under international¶ law, the violence perpetrated against Cuban government targets abroad,¶ and against those Cubans in exile who favored another policy towards¶ the island, or who simply did not support the use of violence in U.S. territory, can only be considered terrorism. ¶ Regarding the abuses that members of the armed opposition perpetrated in Cuba during the 1960s, many of those responsible are likely to¶ have already suffered consequences–they were brought before firing¶ squads or served long prison terms. In some cases of violence by exiles,¶ trials have been conducted and sentences dictated.70 Since Cuban¶ National Reconciliation places such an emphasis on traditional political¶ culture, it considers it important to note that recent developments¶ among exiles reveal a transformation already in progress. A person who¶ spent more than four years in jail for refusing to testify before a New¶ York grand jury convened to investigate Cuban exile violence expressed¶ the following about the changes he underwent while in confinement:¶ When I left prison, I made the commitment to myself and my¶ brethren in this struggle to disseminate a philosophy of nonviolent civic struggle, to work according to its ideas, not just as a¶ matter of strategy, but as a principle for living and struggling.71¶ Whatever his activities before being jailed, upon his release he steered¶ other young Cubans away from violence and toward peaceful means to¶ oppose Castro. Even so, it is impossible to underestimate the prejudicial effects that the violence perpetrated in exile, mainly in Miami, and¶ the warrior mentality that still prevails in some sectors, have had on freedom of expression in Cuban Miami’s public discourse. However, it is¶ also impossible to argue that Cuban Miami is the same in 2003 as it was¶ 15 or 20 years ago.72 A prominent member of the Cuban American¶ National Foundation noted the following about the climate that long¶ prevailed in Miami:¶ For too many years, many of us kept quiet when the motives of¶ our fellow citizens were questioned. To those who suffered¶ because of it, I ask for forgiveness for not having spoken out¶ more forcefully. From now on, I’ll refuse to play that game, and¶ will not diminish another person who fights for freedom.73¶ In turn, the president of Brothers to the Rescue president expressed his¶ approval of sending humanitarian aid to Cuba after hurricane Michelle¶ in November 2001:¶ The material value of our aid, given all that Cuba needs, would¶ not give Castro a single additional day in power. The benefit¶ Castro could draw from the aid sent by exiles carries no real¶ political cost to our cause. We only imagine it so.¶ Showing human solidarity does not imply weakness…If we give¶ generously, we will have achieved a great moral victory before¶ our people and the world, with a small material and insignificant cost as far as helping the regime is concerned. Yet, if we do¶ not provide our assistance, our fellow citizens would judge us¶ indolent, and, in the opinion of third parties, we would again¶ be acting intransigently in the face of a tragedy that should concern us all. We have fallen into this trap before.74¶ In February 2003, CANF’s president underscored the need for dialogue¶ among all Cubans in order to jointly find a solution to Cuba’s problems. ¶ Cuba and its destiny belong to all Cubans with the will to be¶ free, to take off existing chains, and to walk towards the light.¶ We need to walk down that road together, those who are in¶ Cuba and those abroad, young and old people, the intransigent¶ and the benevolent… Let’s not be afraid of talking to each¶ other, of a conversation among Cubans, of looking for the road¶ to peace, freedom, and progress together.75¶ Since the mid-1990s, progress has been made toward a more pluralistic,¶ open, and inclusive community, though more work is needed to arrive¶ at a truly civic conscience that values dialogue and an ethic of means in¶ the diaspora.¶ U.S. Government¶ Operation Mongoose has been widely documented.76 The CIA¶ mounted an extensive network of covert actions against strategic targets–military and civilian–with the purpose of overthrowing the Cuban¶ government. Many of the most serious actions against civilian facilities¶ in Cuba were initiated and financed by the U.S. government; most were¶ implemented by members of the Cuban opposition, not a few of whom¶ had been trained by the CIA. Even if direct U.S. participation was¶ minor, Washington’s responsibility for initiating and financing many¶ actions, as well as for training many individuals to carry them out, is¶ clear in the sources that have come to light through the Freedom of¶ Information Act. The U.S. government has already acknowledged a¶ series of significant events. ¶ • The CIA’s participation in attempts against Fidel Castro’s life.¶ In 1975, under the direction of Democratic Senator Frank Church, the¶ U.S. Senate Committee for Intelligence Affairs conducted extensive¶ hearings regarding possible CIA participation in plots to assassinate foreign leaders. The evidence submitted corroborated eight specific plans¶ to eliminate the Cuban leader between 1960 and 1965, though some¶ went no further than the planning stage; no other such attempts by the¶ U.S. government have been corroborated.77 Church wrote the following¶ in the preface to the report published by the Senate committee he¶ presided:¶ We regard the assassination plots as aberrations. The United¶ States must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are as¶ important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise¶ restraints that make men free; but each time we do so, each time¶ the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength¶ which makes us free, is lessened.78¶ In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed an executive order prohibiting¶ U.S. government agencies from resorting to assassination in the conduct¶ of foreign policy and the defense of national interests.¶ The official Cuban claim for human damages also alleges the following: ¶ • In 1981, the U.S. government introduced in Cuba the virus¶ that causes hemorrhagic dengue type 2; the epidemic took the¶ lives of 158 people, 101 of whom were children. ¶ The Cuban government’s accusation regarding the deliberate introduction of this virus should be duly investigated. Sectors of public opinion¶ on the island believe this allegation to be true, hence, a prestigious and¶ independent entity should determine its veracity or lack thereof. ¶ Once the transition begins, Cuban National Reconciliation believes the¶ U.S. government should fully cooperate with Cuban authorities and¶ civil society in order to elucidate as accurately as possible all the issues¶ relating to U.S. foreign policy towards the Cuban government since¶ 1959, especially those issues that had human costs. A democratic Cuba¶ deserves the same consideration given to El Salvador and Guatemala by¶ the Clinton administration for the sake of establishing the greatest transparency possible in the new relationship that Cuba and the United¶ States would then have to forge. Reconciliation cannot be dictated nor decreed. It is, on the contrary,¶ a long, multi-faceted process that can be duly consolidated only under¶ the rule of law. We strive for a necessary and sufficient level of reconciliation so that all Cubans–on the island and abroad–may live in peace,¶ that is to say, in a democracy with strong institutions supportive of¶ peaceful resolutions to political differences. A platform of reconciliation¶ recognizes the pluralism of Cuba as a nation, and that such diversity¶ nourishes its patrimony. So that all voices may be heard in the arena of¶ public discourse, Cubans must cling to a civic ethics that compels them¶ to listen and to dialogue; no group, sector, or person has a monopoly on¶ truth, and dialogue often changes people’s minds. Librado Linares¶ García, coordinator of the Cuban Reflection Movement, said as much¶ in a letter to the Task Force from Camajuaní, Villa Clara: ¶ Only a reasoned reconciliation, not vindictive…would ensure¶ the creation and consolidation of a new national project, as well¶ as the proper development of a pro-democracy movement that¶ becomes a true counter-power, could ensure that the actual¶ regime does not survive in the future. My position is clearly on¶ behalf of reconciliation. However, the way such reconciliation¶ is implemented will be determined by debate in the public¶ arena, and all actors should be there.79¶ Signs of a reinvigorated civic ethics can already be seen in Cuba: in independent civil society, in the flourishing of faith-based communities, in¶ independent intellectual expression, in the courage shown by those¶ imprisoned for reasons of conscience, in the integrity of those who have¶ raised human rights as the unquestionable bastion of their civic and¶ political life, imagining a democratic Cuba where the opposition would¶ never be harassed as it is today. ¶ Reconciliation requires an understanding of the polarization that tore¶ Cuba apart, as well as a recognition and a commitment by the great¶ majority of Cubans that it should never happen again. Upon reaching¶ such understanding, recognition, and commitment, Cubans will have¶ overcome the warrior mentality–a reflection of polarization–that still¶ marks their political rhetoric. There are, however, indications of change.¶ Unusual but notable was the use of the term “invaders” (instead of the¶ established “mercenaries”) by the Cuban media to refer to the five¶ Brigade 2506 veterans who attended a conference on the Bay of Pigs’¶ 40th anniversary. Recently, Miami has given multiple indications of¶ openness: e.g., the Cuban-community support of the Varela Project¶ even though its starting point is the Constitution of 1976; the establishment of a scholarship at Miami-Dade Community College in honor of¶ singer Elena Burke, who lived and died in Cuba; public opinion polls¶ that indicate more open and inclusive attitudes among South Florida¶ Cubans; and the civil debates on the embargo between two CubanAmerican candidates for a congressional seat in 2002. Manuel Cuesta¶ Morúa and Fernando Sánchez López–MROM promoters–also take note¶ of similar changes in Cuba:¶ Behind their harsh and absolute discourse, Cubans find reconciliation within their families, in religion, in culture, in a¶ healthy attempt to reach minorities, and in their informal, but¶ powerful claim to be recognized as individuals. Before these¶ facts, intolerance evaporates: and intolerance is the cultural fuel¶ of our historical machinery of violence…¶ To counter the negative consequences of violence–psychological, physical, or verbal–reconciliation should start with an ethical vindication and a practical moralization of the main instruments of politics: dialogue, negotiation, transactions, and¶ pacts…Dialogue at the social and political level and forgiveness¶ at the moral level constitute possibilities for a successful reconciliation.80¶ Payá’s message at the European Parliament is clear and conclusive:¶ Cuba’s civic combatant heroes–the ordinary people who have¶ signed the Varela Project– carry no weapons. Not a single hand¶ is armed. We walk with both arms outstretched, offering our¶ hands to all Cubans as brothers and sisters, and to all peoples of¶ the world. The first victory we can claim is that our hearts are¶ free of hatred. Hence we say to those who persecute us and who¶ try to dominate us: “You are my brother. I do not hate you, but¶ you are not going to dominate me by fear. I do not wish to¶ impose my truth, nor do I wish you to impose yours on me. We¶ are going to seek the truth together.” This is the liberation we¶ are proclaiming.¶ There are still those who perpetuate the myth that there is conflict between the exercise of political and civil rights and a society’s ability to achieve social justice and development. They are¶ not mutually exclusive. The absence of any civil and political¶ rights in Cuba has had serious consequences, such as inequality, the poverty of the majority and privileges of a minority, and¶ the deterioration of certain services, even though these were¶ conceived as a positive system to benefit the people.¶ Even though the path imposed by official Cuba is not the way, within its ranks there are a good many people doubly capable–for their talents and because they will use that talent to ease the transition to¶ democracy and national reconciliation. There were, and there are,¶ Cubans of good will, of personal and professional integrity, on both¶ sides. In a recently published article, Dagoberto Valdés Hernández–a¶ lay Catholic from Pinar del Río and editor of Revista Vitral– provides a¶ sharp analysis that should be embraced by all honest Cubans, wherever¶ they may physically or politically be, because a future in peace cannot be¶ built on the basis of the present.¶ Something is moving in Cuba. More and more often, we see¶ political paralysis as the patrimony of the power structure, and¶ we note that initiatives of all types characterize the incipient¶ civil society, and the simple citizens who choose to remain here¶ and to open up different spaces for participation.¶ We should look beyond our day-to-day-survival and, for a¶ moment, consider how far we have come. Hiding what moves,¶ so that those who have managed to move a bit are discouraged,¶ is the first trick paralysis plays. Franco, the Spanish dictator,¶ used to say: “Whoever moves will not come out in the photograph.” That is to say, whoever moves disappears, does not¶ exist, does not count. ¶ We should look ahead. This is the way I look at things, and I¶ share it with the purpose of contributing an opinion that not¶ only looks ahead, but also and above all, that helps raise the selfesteem of those citizens who seriously assumed their responsibility as protagonists (which means “first in agony”), that is to¶ say, that helps those who have opted for sacrifice, for serving¶ others, giving much of themselves, sacrificing their families and¶ safety for the nation all Cubans constitute.81¶ Cuban National Reconciliation considers helpful to delimit four main¶ aspects of a reconciliation process. ¶ • Reconciliation of Every Cuban with Himself or Herself¶ There are enough reasons–on one side or the other–for the¶ wounds and pain accumulated for all that has happened since¶ 1959. No one has a right to ask victims to forgive and reconcile with oppressors. All Cubans, however, have the right to¶ expect a social context that allows them to leave their children¶ and grandchildren a Cuban homeland that is strongly protected by institutions and rights and, therefore, has banished political violence. Rancor and vengeance cannot set the guidelines¶ for their national reunion. Restoring silenced or absent memories, unveiling truths, and seeking justice may be helpful so that¶ each individual–victims and oppressors, Cubans on one side or¶ the other–may make peace with himself or herself and with the¶ past, so that all can look forward with only one weapon in¶ hand: a civic conscience of citizen rights and responsibilities. ¶ • Family Reconciliation¶ Within families, reconciliation has advanced the most. It started in the late 1970s with family reunification travel and has¶ continued ever more deeply and irreversibly. During the 1990s,¶ family links increased due to the frequency of travel–the numbers of people who went to Cuba and the numbers of Cubans¶ from the island who visited their relatives in the diaspora–as¶ well as the remittances from the diaspora to their families in¶ Cuba. In spite of the political context, Cuban families have¶ practically left politics behind as a reason of discord and separation.¶ • Reconciliation in the Diaspora¶ During the 1970s, the emerging pluralism–regarding the¶ embargo, the use of violence as the principal means of opposition, and the opening towards the Cuban government–shattered the consensus that had characterized the exile community. These issues generated intense polemics that–suffused with¶ a warrior mentality on all sides–did not constitute a dialogue.¶ Though Cuban Miami today has left political violence behind,¶ civic life in the diaspora still requires care and attention.¶ Cubans abroad–especially in Miami–have the responsibility to¶ make their discourse ever more civic, open, tolerant, and inclusive. Reconciliation in the diaspora is within reach and requires¶ all political currents to make an effort to express their differences in such a way as to leave the warrior mentality behind.¶ Only then will a true dialogue begin. If it happens, this reconciliation would demonstrate the ability of Cubans in the diaspora–who are also part of Cuba and have rights and duties¶ regarding democratization and reconciliation–to coexist civilly. ¶ • Political Reconciliation¶ In the longer run lies a reconciliation based on a new pact¶ agreed upon among political actors and with Cuban society,¶ which will raise an ethics of means–respect for human rights–as¶ the basic, unmovable cornerstone of politics. For this pact to¶ come to life in Cuban society, it will have to be sustained by a¶ civic conscience regarding duties and rights of the citizenry.¶ Then, the public arena will be protected by a state founded¶ upon an ethics that upholds the rights of citizens to dissent,¶ using their own and autonomous means, without fearing¶ reprisals. Only then will there be room for all. When that happens, we will be able to say that Cubans are living in peace. ¶ Because it will be a long process, reconciliation will take place one step¶ at a time. As the poet Antonio Machado said: “Wayfarer, there is no¶ path, you make the path as you go.” However, we end this report with¶ the hope that, some day, a promising and memorable ceremony of¶ national reconciliation will be celebrated. The Escambray Mountains¶ would be a good place for a solemn act to honor the memory of all¶ Cubans who have fallen victim to political violence since 1959. There,¶ Cubans could unveil a monument engraved with the names of each and¶ every one of those dead, from one side and the other. Veterans of the¶ civil conflict from both sides would participate in the ceremony, which¶ would truly be a moment of harmony. In Trinidad, at the foot of the¶ Escambray Mountains, the museum that now documents “The¶ Struggle Against Bandits” would be modified: it would integrate memories from all sides so that it would offer an all-encompassing history of¶ what by then may be called a civil war.¶ Should these things come to pass, Cuba would be on the right path,¶ perhaps once and for all. With that new vision for the Cuban nation in¶ our minds and in our hearts, we offer readers the report, Cuban National¶ Reconciliation.

#### Our method is supported by robust *empirical* and *interdisciplinary* research – promoting *forgiveness* through *reconciliation* is vital to *sustain* peacebuilding through *non-violent conflict* – resolves *episodic* AND *structural* violence

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Throughout the world, we continue to see violent outbreaks between individuals and groups. For many years, psychologists committed to peace viewed violence through the narrow lens of the Cold War struggle for world dominance between the United States and the Soviet Union. At that time, the prevention of nuclear war was the preeminent concern for those who called themselves peace psychologists. Since the end of the Cold War , we have seen the growth of violence cycles in many places including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Israel, Northern Ireland, and Rwanda, where individual and collective traumas and feelings of victimization have laid the groundwork for future episodes of mass violence, sometimes even across generations, carried by collective memories of grievances and the like (Roe, 2007 ). These cycles of violence have challenged us to develop a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the causes, consequences, and prevention of violence between individuals and groups. Among the lessons we have learned is that in order to prevent future episodes of violence, it is important to intervene with forgiveness and reconciliation processes when the opportunity arises, and often this means during the aftermath of a violent¶ episode. Clearly, in deeply divided societies, negotiated settlements are not likely to sustain peace unless groups in conflict are brought in contact and engage in a reconciliation process that acknowledges past pain and begins to envision an interdependent future (Lederach, 1997). This book offers fresh views of forgiveness and reconciliation from around the world. Although there is a wealth of psychological and behavioral science research on war, aggression, hostility, and prejudice, topics such as forgiveness and reconciliation have been largely overlooked until the past quarter-century. This emerging body of literature suggests that the topics should be more seriously considered, if we intend to address and ultimately solve the most devastating of human problems. (See McCullough, 2008; McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000; Worthington, 2005a, for comprehensive reviews of recent research.) Applying our knowledge of forgiveness to peace efforts in real-world situations has only just begun. Most of the literature on forgiveness discusses it at an individual, family, or micro-level. Although this type of analysis is helpful, the lessons gleaned from such work need to be extended and applied to the macro-level. Several chapters in this book “go global” by expanding the concepts, principles, experiences, and processes of forgiveness and reconciliation from the micro-level to interethnic, intranational, and/or international levels. Accordingly, several chapters in this text incorporate material and applied work devoted to forgiveness and reconciliation on a large scale (Green, Chapter 16; Kalayjian, Chapter 15; Tint, Chapter 17). In order to understand how the principles of forgiveness can contribute to peace, we must first acknowledge the factors that affect both systemic and episodic violence and peace-building. Where Does Forgiveness Fit? Systemic Violence and Peace-Building In order to understand the complex interplay of factors that contribute to war and to the possibility that forgiveness and reconciliation could inhibit war, we must first conceptualize the systemic processes involved (Massey & Abu-Baker, Chapter 2). A compelling schema for conceptualizing the systemic processes is presented by Christie (2006). Christie explains that there are both episodic and structural violence and episodic and structural peace-building. The systemic approach links the intermittent instances of episodic violence, which involve direct harm to victims, with the non-intermittent harm committed indirectly to victims that results in (and may also result from) unjust social arrangements (i.e., structural violence). Thus, if one segment of a society continually receives the “short end of the stick,” that is, always gets less of its proportionate share of the goods and services, then that constitutes a force of violence that feeds the probability of, and occasionally creates, a violent episode. In contrast, episodic peace-building is comprised of actions taken to manage existing or potential conflict, and this is linked with structural peace-building, that is, those factors, processes, policies, and agreements that move a society toward socially just arrangements. The potential to use this model to analyze the relative distribution of goods and resources, such as oil, water, transportation, access to medical care, and education, as well as desired intra- and interpersonal states and transactions, such as forgiveness, reconciliation, restitution, and commitment to non-transgression in the future, is great. This potential is either explicitly or implicitly incorporated into every chapter in this book. When Christie’s (2006) fourfold model is further explored, its scope and implications become clearer. For example, although peaceful and violent actions are performed by individuals, they seldom act independent of complex historic, familial, ethnic, cultural, and religious contexts. Therefore, by understanding the complex interactions between these and other elements of the process, we may be [is] able to better manage the process and reduce the probability of conflict. ¶ Factors that contribute to peace-building can be either negative or positive (Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008). Negative peace-building is comprised of interventions that manage conflicts (i.e., the perception of incompatible goals) effectively so that violent episodes do not occur. Generally, the purpose of negative peace-building is to reduce tensions between individuals or groups. In contrast, positive peace-building refers to efforts to reduce structural violence, a proactive process that promotes more egalitarian social arrangements as well as individual and collective narratives that support the sustainable satisfaction of basic needs for all people. Positive and negative peace-building can be used together when individuals and groups pursue the socially just ends by nonviolent means. As several chapters illustrate, procedures to enhance forgiveness and/or reconciliation can be applied after a conflict has occurred (negatively and reactively, e.g., Nwoye, Chapter 8) or to promote peace consciousness (positively and proactively, e.g., Gal-Ed, Chapter 7). Issues and Themes in This Book Ideally, all sides of a conflict would agree on how to work toward peace and would share a common understanding of the role of forgiveness and reconciliation. However, there is rarely such an agreement or understanding. Fortunately, many chapters in this book suggest ideas that could serve as points of discussion. Such points could be areas where common understanding and agreement are possible. They are expressed as issues and themes that are addressed across levels of analysis, geographic regions, historic factors, and personal and political beliefs. Some of the items are best understood as issues because there is little agreement about them. It is in the interest of peace to understand such issues and the different opinions that surround them. Other items should be thought of as themes because their central ideas weave throughout many chapters and help knit the material together. Five Implicit and Recurring Themes Basic survival reactions confront ethical and religious teachings. A number of authors document conflict between feelings of revenge and hostility and the desire to forgive (Giddo, Chapter 12; Nwoye, Chapter 8; Paloutzian, Chapter 5; Yacoubian, Chapter 14). A look into our ancestral past helps us understand why we are not predisposed to forgive. When humans first emerged, attacking or defending against one’s predator(s) was essential for survival. Those who were able to anticipate an attack and strike first were more likely to live and reproduce than those who were not. In addition, those who were best able to defend themselves or defeat their enemies were likewise more able to survive and propagate. Such survival responses are biologically wired into our systems and are therefore phylogenetically old (Dunbar & Barrett, 2007; Kirkpatrick, 2005; McCullough, 2008). As humans developed social arrangements in which to live, insults, theft, and gestures that precede bodily harm and other transgressions came to signal an offense (Dunbar & Barrett, 2007). Therefore, it is not surprising that our first “gut” reaction to such an offense is to counter-offend (Giddo, Chapter 12; Paloutzian, Chapter 5). However, cultural evolution led to a social system that includes processes to inhibit our tendency to counter-offend (Dunbar & Barrett, 2007; Kirkpatrick, 2005; McNamara, 2006). The paradox that persists today is that while people’s initial reaction to an offense may be one of counter-aggression, cultural and religious teachings of forgiveness preach the exact opposite (Ducommun-Nagy, Chapter 3; Farhadian & Emmons, Chapter 4; McCullough, 2008). The complexities that emerge from such opposing tendencies can make it difficult to define forgiveness. Grappling with what forgiveness means. Those who promote forgiveness often begin by explaining what it is not (Borris, 2006). They indicate that forgiving does not mean that you have to like your offender, deny your feelings, forget the crime, excuse the offense, or refuse compensation. Approached this way, a definition of forgiveness is elusive. However, chapters in this book convey some of its core aspects. It is not sufficient to state only what forgiveness is not. Doing so leaves key distinctions unclear. If we wish to help promote positive peace (Christie et al., 2008), then we also need to state what forgiveness is. There are several critical dimensions along which forgiveness and non-forgiveness vary, and some of these dimensions are identified in this book. Also, although forgiveness and reconciliation are not synonymous, both concepts are highlighted and often commingled in this book. The authors employ several definitions of forgiveness as well as reconciliation in their chapters. Thus, we as readers are advised to be alert to instances in which these concepts are clearly distinct or separately identifiable and where they seem to overlap or be combined. Forgiveness as a multidimensional process. Among the most basic issues with which we are faced is whether forgiveness is a category or a dimension. Occasionally, the terminology is used in a way that suggests that the author considers it something that a victim can either accept or reject. However, the authors in this book suggest a more sophisticated understanding: the psychological process of forgiveness falls along a continuum that ranges from high levels of forgiveness to high levels of non-forgiveness. Also, because forgiving is multidimensional (Worthington, 2005b), it is more often partial than total and is a process rather than an event. This process may include many small steps instead of one large step and may be implemented or received with hesitance rather than certitude (Massey, Chapter 6). Forgiveness feelings, attitudes, and behaviors. Part of the underlying notions of forgiveness as a process is connected to whether it is viewed as being primarily attitudinal or behavioral. Attitudes are internal psychological predispositions to think, feel, and act toward the attitude object in a certain way. For example, if a person has a pro-military defense attitude, then he or she is more likely to evaluate the military of his or her country in a positive way and favor political candidates who would increase the military budget. If a person has an anti-military defense attitude, then he or she is more likely to evaluate the military in a negative way and favor political candidates who would decrease the military budget. Attitudes cannot be directly observed but must be inferred. In contrast, behavior is publicly observable and concrete. One either joins the military or does not join the military; one either performs an act of kindness toward their perpetrator or does not perform an act of kindness toward their perpetrator. The distinction between forgiving attitudinally versus behaviorally is important for at least two reasons. First, people have to decide what their goals are when confronted with the question of what their response to the perpetrator will be. Is the victim’s goal to think or feel differently toward the perpetrator than before or act in positive ways toward the perpetrator even though harmed by them or both? If both, are those responses to be arranged in a particular sequence? Second, various authors refer to forgiveness as attitudinal or as behavioral (Enright, 2001). Because of this, victims may find that the concept of forgiveness is presented with more than one meaning. Although both meanings of forgiveness are relevant for different circumstances, such considerations may seem confusing, especially for individuals who have recently been victimized. Intrapersonal and interpersonal forgiveness. The above-discussed distinction is intimately related to the difference between intrapersonal forgiveness versus interpersonal forgiveness. Intrapersonal forgiveness refers to when an individual gives up feelings of hatred and revenge toward his or her perpetrator. Instead, the individual feels more positive emotions, even though he or she may never come to “like” the perpetrator. The contributions of Kalayjian (Chapter 15), Cohen (Chapter 9), and Gal-Ed (Chapter 7) focus on intrapersonal forgiveness. In this sense, it is possible to forgive without ever communicating with the perpetrator or without performing any forgiving act. This type of forgiveness is suggested if contact or communication with the perpetrator is impossible for any reason (e.g., Brown, Almeida, Dharapuram, Choudry, Dressner, & Hernández, Chapter 13). In any case, with intrapersonal forgiveness, the process is about one’s own feelings and sense of well-being. It has little to do with the perpetrator in the sense of interaction or communication (Borris, 2006). Forgiveness at the intrapersonal level may leave the door open to self-deception. It is possible for a victim to believe that he or she has forgiven, even though he or she has not. One way to determine whether a victim has sincerely forgiven is to explore it at the interpersonal level. For example, this could be by initiating some kind of meaningful contact, whether direct or indirect, with the perpetrator or the perpetrator surrogates, if the offender is not available. The contributions by Rutayisire on Rwanda (Chapter 11), Giddo on Darfur (Chapter 12), Yacoubian on Armenia (Chapter 14), Green on international relations (Chapter 16), LaMar on black forgiveness in America (Chapter 10), Tint on dialogue processes as a live contact procedure for communication among opposing sides (Chapter 17), and Paloutzian (Chapter 5) focus on forgiveness at the interpersonal level. Their preference is for forgiveness that includes communication with the perpetrator(s) in combination with some sort of action. Five Prototypical Issues A number of issues are addressed in one or more chapters of this book. Together with the themes identified above, they convey the complexity and far reach of the concept of forgiveness and the myriad real-world factors that must be considered in its application. We list some issues below so that you can be cognizant of them as you read this book. Can forgiveness be conditional? One issue pertains to whether forgiveness is conditional or unconditional. Should forgiveness be conditional? Does it make sense to say to an offender, “I will forgive you, IF …?” Instead of reflecting an internal state of forgiveness, should the victim partake in some sort of deal-making or bargaining? If genuine forgiveness means that it must be given completely and independent of whether the forgiver receives anything in return, can we realistically expect that of people (Ducommun-Nagy, Chapter 3; Massey, Chapter 6)? Giddo (Chapter 12) and Paloutzian (Chapter 5) suggest that some degree of forgiveness may be possible if certain conditions are met. Is forgiveness realistic across generations? Some circumstances require forgiveness of events that occurred in the distant past. In such cases, the initial trauma may have been experienced by individuals who have long since passed and the trauma has been transmitted through generations to their offspring. Such is the case with descendents of survivors of the Ottoman Turkish Genocide of the Armenians (Yacoubian, Chapter 14), the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews (Tint, Chapter 17), and the India–Pakistan conflict in the aftermath of British rule (Brown, Almeida, Dharapuram, Choudry, Dressner, & Hernandez, Chapter 13). Trans-generational transmission of trauma has also been relevant to lifers in prison (Cohen, Chapter 9). The authors of those chapters address the unique issues involved in forgiving those who have caused the mass traumas of their past. Is forgiveness culturally and procedurally specific? Not all cultures view forgiveness and related issues in the same light. The emphasis in Western countries is on the individual victim and those resources he or she can muster to forgive, initiate communication with the offender, and so forth. In contrast, in other cultures the emphasis is on group processes to promote forgiveness. For example, Nwoye (Chapter 8) presents an African approach in which the group or larger social entity plays a major role in arranging forgiveness procedures. The group, which includes the perpetrator, victim, and other relevant parties such as parents or authorities, follows a formal procedure that does not leave the question of how to proceed solely up to the victim. The procedures may even include carefully controlled public shaming of the offender. Other unique procedures may also include artistic expression (Gal-Ed, Chapter 7). What is the role of ethnic identity? Many circumstances in which there is a need for forgiveness involve the ethnic identity of opposing sides. For example, Giddo (Chapter 12) refers to the Islamic soldiers of the government wreaking havoc on the indigenous ethnic Darfurians. Similarly, Rutayisire’s Chapter 11 highlights the tribal separation of the Tutsi and Hutu that is at the heart of their genocide. Finally, self-evident ethnic–national divisions have been central to the conflicts between India and Pakistan (Brown, Almeida, Dharapuram, Choudry, Dressner, & Hernandez, Chapter 13), Armenia and Turkey (Yacoubian, Chapter 14), and Nazi Germany and the Jews (Tint, Chapter 17). Are victims or perpetrators entitled to anything? The question of whether victims are entitled to reparations is addressed in several chapters of this volume. For example, Ducommun-Nagy (Chapter 3) discusses the many variations of the entitlement issue within the context of the ethics of forgiveness. She addresses matters such as whether a victim’s entitlement should be met by the perpetrator, the state, or others and what perpetrators may or may not be entitled to. Giddo’s (Chapter 12) section about how to promote peace in Darfur is replete with statements that the Darfurians should receive various reparations, replenishments, and reassurances of future safety, before forgiveness can occur. Conclusion and Looking Ahead We know that there is no panacea and that promoting and establishing lasting peace is not easy. However, we are confident that proactive, positive peace efforts are worth their costs and that expanding human consciousness about forgiveness and reconciliation processes is greatly needed. Forgiveness is not an idealized or fantasy state in which all will be well if we just forgive. On the contrary, there may be significant physical, psychological, or social costs associated with forgiveness, and in some cases they may be too great. For example, even though we are motivated to forgive by our ideals, actually doing so could cause more internal conflict with ourselves , external conflict with our group, or physical risk than we can bear. In such instances, an alternative nonviolent path must be found. The authors share the UNESCO premise that “wars begin in the minds of men [and women].” However, peace can also begin in the minds of men and womyn. We hope these authors’ writings promote positive peace.

#### We must *prioritize* analysis of the ways in which our *methods* of *advocacy* affect public decision-making – the most *impactful* forms of violence are *obscured* by cognitive biases in information processing and dissemination

Nixon 10 (Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pp 1-14)

When Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocated thai the bank develop a scheme to export rich nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa, he did so in the calm voice of global managerial reasoning.' Such a scheme. Summers elaborated, would help correct an inefficient global imbalance in toxicity. Underlying his plan is an overlooked but crucial subsidiary benefit that he outlined: offloading rich-nation toxins onto the world's poorest continent would help ease the growing pressure from rich-nation environmentalists who were campaigning against garbage dumps and industrial effluent thai they condemned as health threats and found aesthetically offensive. Summers thus rationalized his poison-redistribution ethic as offering a double gain: it would benefit the United States and Europe economically, while helping appease the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists. Summers' arguments assumed a direct link between aesthetically unsightly waste and Africa as an out-of-sighl continent, a place remote from green activists' terrain of concern. In Summers' win win scenario for the global North, the African recipients ot his plan were triply discounted: discounted as political agents, discounted as long-term casualties of what 1 call in this book "slow violence," and discounted as cultures possessing environmental practices and concerns of their own. I begin with Summers' extraordinary proposal because it captures the strategic and representational challenges posed by slow violence as it impacts the environments and the environ-mentalism of the poor.¶ Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink—politically, imaginatively, and theoretically what 1 call "slow violence." By slow violence 1 mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath s of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory.¶Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and. in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.¶ Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Palling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats arc all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations. In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?¶ This book's second, related focus concerns the environ mentalism of the poor, for it is those people lacking resources who are the principal casualties of slow violence. Their unseen poverty is compounded hy the invisibility of the slow violence that permeates so many of their lives. Our media bias toward spectacular violence exacerbates the vulnerability of ecosystems treated as disposable by turbo-capitalism while simultaneously exacerbating the vulnerability of those whom Kevin Bale, in another context, has called "disposable people."2 It is against such conjoined ecological and human disposability that we have witnessed a resurgent environmentalist!! of the poor, particularly (though not exclusively) across the so-called global South. So a central issue that emerges is strategic: if the neoliberal era has intensified assaults on resources, it has also intensified resistance, whether through isolated site-specific struggles or through activism that has reached across national boundaries in an effort to build translocal alliances.¶ "The poor" is a compendious category subject to almost infinite local variation as well as to fracture along fault lines of ethnicity, gender, race, class, region, religion, and generation. Confronted with the militarization of both commerce and development, impoverished communities are often assailed by coercion and bribery that test their cohesive resilience. How much control will, say, a poor hardwood forest community have over the mix of subsistence and market strategies it deploys in attempts at adaptive survival? How will that community negotiate competing definitions of its own poverty and long-term wealth when the guns, the bulldozers, and the moneymen arrive? Such communities typically have to patch together threadbare improvised alliances against vastly superior military, corporate, and media forces. As such, impoverished resource rebels can seldom afford to be single-issue activists: their green commitments are seamed through with other economic and cultural causes as they experience environmental threat not as a planetary abstraction but as a set of inhabited risks, some imminent, others obscurely long term.¶ The status of environmental activism among the poor in the global South has shifted significantly in recent years. Where green or environmental discourses were once frequently regarded with skepticism as neocolo-nial. Western impositions inimical to the resource priorities of the poor in the global South, such attitudes have been tempered by the gathering visibility and credibility of environmental justice movements that have pushed back against an antihuman environmenialism that too often sought (under the banner of universalism) to impose green agendas dominated by rich nations and Western NGOs. Among those who inhabit the front lines of the global resource wars, suspicions that environmentaUsm is another guise of what Andrew Ross calls "planetary management" have not. of course, been wholly allayed.1 But those suspicions have eased somewhat as the spectrum of what counts as environmenialism has broadened. Western activists are now more prone to recognize, engage, and learn from resource insurrections among the global poor that might previously have been discounted as not properly environmental.' Indeed, 1 believe that the fate of environ mentalism—and more decisively, the character of the biosphere itself—will be shaped significantly in decades to come by the tension between what Ramachandra Guha and Joan Martinez-Alier have called "full-stomach' and "empty-belly" environmenialism.'¶ The challenge of visibility that links slow violence to the environmen-talism of the poor connects directly to this hook's third circulating concern—the complex, often vexed figure of the environmental writer-activist. In the chapters that follow 1 address not just literary but more broadly rhetorical and visual challenges posed by slow violence; however, 1 place particular emphasis on combative writers who have deployed their imaginative agility and worldly ardor to help amplify the media marginalized causes of the environmentally dispossessed. I have sought to stress those places where writers and social movements, often in complicated tandem, have stralcgized against attritional disasters that afflict embattled communities. The writers I engage arc geographically wide ranging—from various parts of the African continent, from the Middle East. India, the Caribbean, the United States, and Britain—and work across a variety of forms. Figures like Wangari Maathai. Arundhati Roy. lndra Sinha. Ken Saro-Wiwa, Abdulrah-man Munif. Njabulo Ndebcle, Nadine Gordimer, Jamaica Kincaid, Rachel Carson, and June Jordan are alive to the inhabited impact of corrosive transnational forces, including petro-imperialism. the megadam industry, outsourced toxicity, neocolonial tourism, antihuman conservation practices, corporate and environmental deregulation, and the militarization of commerce, forces that disproportionately jeopardize the livelihoods, prospects, and memory banks of the global poor. Among the writers 1 consider, some have testified in relative isolation, some have helped instigate movements for environmental justice, and yet others, in aligning themselves with preexisting movements, have given imaginative definition to the issues at stake while enhancing the public visibility of the cause.¶ Relations between movements and writers are often fraught and fric-tional. not least because such movements themselves are susceptible to fracture from both external and internal pressures.\* That said, the writers I consider are enraged by injustices they wish to see redressed, injustices they believe they can help expose, silences they can help dismantle through testimonial protest, rhetorical inventiveness, and counterhistories in the face of formidable odds. Most are restless, versatile writers ready to pit their energies against what Edward Said called "the normalized quiet of unseen power."" This normalized quiet is of particular pertinence to the hushed havoc and injurious invisibility that trail slow violence.¶ In this book, I have sought to address our inattention to calamities that are slow and long lasting, calamities that patiently dispense their devastation while remaining outside our flickering attention spans—and outside the purview of a spectacle-driven corporate media. The insidious workings of slow violence derive largely from the unequal attention given to spectacular and unspectacular time. In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow violence is deficient in the recognizable special effects that fill movie theaters and boost ratings on TV. Chemical and radiological violence, for example, is driven inward, somatized into cellular dramas of mutation that—particularly in the bodies of the poor—remain largely unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, mutagenic theater is slow paced and open ended, eluding the tidy closure, the containment, imposed by the visual orthodoxies of victory and defeat.¶ Let me ground this point by referring, in conjunction, to Rachel Carson's Silenl Spring and Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth. In 1962 Silent Spring jolted a broad international public into an awareness of the protracted, cryptic, and indiscriminate casualties inflicted by dichlorodiphenyltrichlo-roethane (DDT). Yet. just one year earlier, Fanon. in the opening pages of Wretched of the Earth, had comfortably invoked DDT as an affirmative metaphor for anticolonial violence: he called for a DDT-filled spray gun to be wielded as a weapon against the "parasites" spread bv the colonials' Christian church." Fanon's drama of decolonization is, of course, studded with the overt weaponry whereby subjugation is maintained {"by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons") or overthrown ("by the searing bullets and bloodstained knives") after "a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists."' Yet his temporal vision of violence—and of what Aime Cesaire called "the rendezvous of victory"—was uncomplicated by the concerns thai an as-yet inchoate environmental justice movement (catalyzed in part by Silent Spring) would raise about lopsided risks that permeate the land long term, blurring the clean lines between defeat and victory, between colonial dispossession and official national self determination.11 We can ccr lainly read Fanon, in his concern with land as property and as fount of native dignity, retrospectively with an environmental eye. But our theories of violence today must be informed by a science unavailable to Fanon, a science that addresses environmentally embedded violence that is often difficult to source, oppose, and once set in motion, to reverse.¶ Attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space arc marked above all by displacements temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and underestimate, in advance and in retrospect, the human and environmental costs. Such displacements smooth the way for amnesia, as places are rendered irretrievable to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate media. Places like the Marshall Islands, subjected between 1948 and 1958 to sixty-seven American atmospheric nuclear "tests," the largest of them equal in force to 1.000 I liroshima-sizcd bombs. In 1950 the Atomic Energy Commission declared the Marshall Islands "by far the most contaminated place in the world," a condition that would compromise independence in the long term, despite the islands' formal ascent in 1979 into the ranks of self-governing nations." The island republic was still in pan governed by an irradiated past: well into the 1980s its history of nuclear colonialism, long forgotten by the colonizers, was still delivering into the world "jellyfish babies"—headless, eyeless, limbless human infants who would live for just a few hours.11¶ If, as Said notes, struggles over geography are never reducible to armed struggle but have a profound symbolic and narrative component as well, and if, as Michael Watts insists, we must attend to the "violent geographies of fast capitalism." we need to supplement both these injunctions with a deeper understanding of the slow violence of delayed effects that structures so many of our most consequential forgetting\*." Violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen—and deeply considered—as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources, but also over time. Wc need to bear in mind Faulkner's dictum that "the past is never dead. It's not even past." His words resonate with particular force across landscapes permeated by slow violence, landscapes of temporal overspill that elude rhetorical cleanup operations with their sanitary beginnings and endings.1'1¶ Kwamc Anthony Appiah famously asked. "Is the 'Post-' in "PostcoloniaF the 'Post-' in 'Postmodern'?" As environmentalists wc might ask similarly searching questions of the "post" in postindustrial, post Cold War, and post-conflict." For if the past of slow violence isnevcrpast. so too the post is never fully post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental elements wc inhabit and in our very bodies, which cpidcmiologically and ecologically are never our simple contemporaries.'" Something similar applies to so-called postconflict societies whose leaders may annually commemorate, as marked on the calendar, the official cessation of hostilities, while ongoing intcrgcncrational slow violence (inflicted by, say. uncxplodcd landmines or carcinogens from an arms dump) may continue hostilities by other means.¶ Ours is an age of onrushing turbo-capitalism, wherein the present feels more abbreviated than it used to—at least for the world's privileged classes who live surrounded by technological time-savers that often compound the sensation of not having enough lime. Consequently, one of the most pressing challenges of our age is how to adjust our rapidly eroding attention spans to the slow erosions of environmental justice. If, under ncoliberalism, the gult between enclaved rich and outcast poor has become ever more pronounced, ours is also an era of enclaved time wherein for many speed has become a sell justifying, propulsive ethic that renders uneventful" violence (to those who live remote from its attritional lethality) a weak claimant on our time. The attosecond pace of our age, with its restless technologies of infinite promise and infinite disappointment, prompts us to keep flicking and clicking distractedly in an insatiable and often insensate — quest for quicker sensation.¶ The oxymoronic notion of slow violence poses a number of challenges; scientific, legal, political, and representational. In the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, both the causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting in turn makes it far more difficult to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress. Casualties from slow violence are moreover, out of sync not only with our narrative and media expectations but also with the swift seasons of electoral change. Politicians routinely adopt a "last in, first out" stance toward environmental issues, admitting them when limes are flush, dumping them as soon as times get tight. Because preventative or remedial environmental legislation typically targets slow violence, it cannot deliver dependable electoral cycle results, even though those results may ultimately be life saving. Relative to bankable pocket-book actions—there'll be a tax rebate check in the mail next August—environmental payouts seem to lurk on a distant horizon. Many politicians—and indeed many voters—routinely treat environmental action as critical yet not urgent. And so generation after generation of two- or four-year cycle politicians add to the pileup of deferrable actions deferred. With rare exceptions, in the domain of slow violence "yes, but not now, not yet" becomes the modus operandi.¶ How can leaders be goaded to avert catastrophe when the political rewards of their actions will not accrue to them but will be reaped on someone else's watch decades, even centuries, from now? How can environmental activists and storytellers work to counter the potent political, corporate, and even scientific forces invested in immediate self-interest, procrastination, and dissembling? We see such dissembling at work, for instance, in the afterword to Michael Crichton's 2004 environmental conspiracy novel, Slate of Fear, wherein he argued that we needed twenty more years of daia gaihcringon climate change before any policy decisions could be ventured.1\* Although the National Academy of Sciences had assured former president George W. Bush that humans were indeed causing the earth to warm. Bush shopped around for views that accorded with his own skepticism and found them in a private meeting with Crichton, whom he described as "an expert scientist.\*'¶ To address the challenges of slow violence is to confront the dilemma Rachel Carson faced almost half a century ago as she sought to dramatize what she eloquently called "death by indirection."'" Carson's subjects were biomagnification and toxic drift, forms of oblique, slow-acting violence that, like climate change, pose formidable imaginative difficulties for writers and activists alike. In struggling to give shape to amorphous menace, both Carson and reviewers of 5ilcn( Spring resorted to a narrative vocabulary: one reviewer portrayed the book as exposing "the new, unplottcd and mysterious dangers wc insist upon creating all around us,"" while Carson herself wrote of "a shadow that is no less ominous because it is formless and obscure."10 To confront slow violence requires, then, that we plot and give figurative shape to formless threats whose fatal repercussions are dispersed across space and time. The representational challenges are acute, requiring creative ways of drawing public attention to catastrophic acts that are low in instant spectacle but high in long-term effects. To intervene representation-ally entails devising iconic symbols that embody amorphous calamities as well as narrative forms that infuse those symbols with dramatic urgency.¶ Seven years after Rachel Carson turned our attention to ihe lethal mechanisms of "death by indirection," Johan Gaining, the influential Norwegian mathematician and sociologist, coined the term "indirect or structural violence."'' Gakung's theory of structural violence is pertinent here because some of his concerns overlap with the concerns that animate this book, while others help throw inio relief the rather different features I have soughi to highlight by introducing the term "slow violence." Structural violence, forGaltung, stands in opposition to the more familiar personal violence thai dominates our conceptions of what counts as violence per sc." Galtung was concerned, as I am, with widening the field of what constitutes violence. He soughi to foreground ihe vast structures thai can give rise to acts of personal violence and constitute forms of violence in and of themselves. Such structural violence may range from the unequal morbidity that results from a commodificd health care system, to racism itself. What I share with Gal-tung's line of thought is a concern with social justice, hidden agency, and certain forms of violence that are imperceptible.¶ In these terms, for example, we can recognize that the structural violence embodied by a neoliberal order of austerity measures, structural adjustment, rampant deregulation, corporate megamergers, and a widening gulf between rich and poor is a form of covert violence in its own right that is often a catalyst for more recognizably overt violence. For an expressly environmental example of structural violence, one might cite Wangari Maathai's insistence that the systemic burdens of national debt to the IMF and World Bank borne by many so-called developing nations constitute a major impediment to environmental sustainability.JI So. too, feminist earth scientist Jill Schneiderman, one of our finest thinkers about environmental time, has written about the way in which environmental degradation may "masquerade as inevitable."14¶ For all the continuing pertinence of the theory of structural violent t and for all the modifications the theory has undergone, the notion bears the impress of its genesis during the high era of structuralist thinking that tended toward a static determinism. We see this, for example, in Gakung's insistence that "structural violence is silent, it does not show—its is essentially static, it is the tranquil waters."1\* In contrast to the static connotations of structural violence, I have sought, through the notion of slow violence, to foreground questions of time, movement, and change, however gradual. The explicitly temporal emphasis of slow violence allows us to keep front and center the representational challenges and imaginative dilemmas posed not just by imperceptible violence but by imperceptible change whereby vio lence is decoupled from its original causes by the workings of time. Time becomes an actor in complicated ways, not least because the temporal tern plates of our spectacle-driven, 24/7 media life have shifted massively since Galtung first advanced his theory of structural violence some forty years ago. To talk about slow violence, then, is to engage directly with our contemporary politics of speed.¶ Simply put. structural violence is a theory that entails rethinking different notions of causation and agency with respect to violent effects. Slow violence, by contrast, might well include forms of structural violence, but has a wider descriptive range in calling attention, not simply to questions of agency, but to broader, more complex descriptive categories of violence enacted slowly over time. The shift in the relationship between human agency and time is most dramatically evident in our enhanced understanding of the accelerated changes occurring at two scalar extremes—in the life-sustaining circuits of planetary biophysics and in the wired brain's neural circuitry. The idea of structural violence predated both sophisticated contemporary ice-core sampling methods and the emergence of cyber technology. My concept of slow violence thus seeks to respond both to recent, radical changes in our geological perception and our changing technological experiences of time.¶ Let me address the geological aspect first. In 2000, Paul Crutzen. the Nobel Prize-winning atmospheric chemist, introduced the term "the Anthropo-cene Age" (which he dated to James Watt's invention of the steam engine). Through the notion of "the Anthropocene Age." Crutzen sought to theorize an unprecedented epochal effect: the massive impact by the human species, from the industrial era onward, on our planet's life systems, an impact that, as his term suggests, is geomorphic, equal in force and in long-term implications to a major geological event.\* Crutzen's attempt to capture the epochal scale of human activity's impact on the planet was followed by Will Steffen's elaboration, in conjunction with Crutzen and John McNeill, of what they dubbed the Great Acceleration, a second stage of the Anthropocene Age that they dated to the mid-twentieth century. Writing in 2007. Steffen ct al. noted how "nearly three-quarters of the anthropogenically driven rise in COt concentration has occurred since 1950 (from about 310 to 380 ppm), and about half of the total rise (48 ppm) has occurred in just the last 30 years."-7 The Australian environmental historian Libby Robin has put the case succinctly: "We have recently entered a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene. There is now considerable evidence that humanity has altered the biophysical systems of Earth, not just the carbon cycle . . . but also the nitrogen cycle and ultimately the atmosphere and climate of the whole globe."" What, then, are the consequences for our experience of time of this newfound recognition thai we have inadvertently, through our unprecedented biophysical species power, inaugurated an Anthropocene Age and are now engaged in (and subject to) the hurtling changes of the Great Acceleration?¶ Over the past two decades, this high-speed planetary modification has been accompanied (at least for those increasing billions who have access to the Internet) by rapid modifications to the human cortex. It is difficult, but necessary, to consider simultaneously a geologically-paced plasticity, however relatively rapid, and the plasticity of brain circuits reprogrammed by a digital world that threatens to "info-whelm" us into a state of perpetual distraction. If an awareness of the Great Acceleration is (to put it mildly) unevenly distributed, the experience of accelerated connectivity (and the paradoxical disconnects that can accompany it) is increasingly widespread. In an age of degraded attention spans it becomes doubly difficult yet increasingly urgent that we focus on the toll exacted, over time, by the slow violence of ecological degradation. We live, writes Cory Doctorow, in an era when the electronic screen has become an "ecosystem of interruption technologies.''" Or as former Microsoft executive Linda Stone puts it, we now live in an age of "continuous partial attention.?" Fast is faster than it used to be, and story units have become concomitantly shorter. In this cultural milieu of digitally speeded up time, and foreshortened narrative, the intergenerational aftermath becomes a harder sell. So to render slow violence visible entails, among other things, redefining speed: we see such efforts in talk of accelerated species loss, rapid climate change, and in attempts to recast "glacial"-once a dead metaphor for "slow-as a rousing, iconic image of unacceptably fast loss. Efforts to make forms of slow violence more urgently visible suffered a setback in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, which reinforced a spectacular, immediately sensational, and instantly hyper-visible image of what constitutes a violent threat. The fiery spectacle of the collapsing towers was burned into the national psyche as the definitive image of violence, setting back by years attempts to rally public sentiment against climate change, a threat that is incremental, exponential, and far less sensationally visible. Condoleezza Rice's strategic fantasy of a mushroom cloud looming over America if the United States failed to invade Iraq gave further visual definition to cataclysmic violence as something explosive and instantaneous, a recognizably cinematic, immediately sensational, pyrotechnic event. The representational bias against slow violence has, furthermore, a critically dangerous impact on what counts as a casualty in the first place. Casualties of slow violence-human and environmental-are the casualties most likely not to be seen, not to be counted. Casualties of slow violence become light-weight, disposable casualties, with dire consequences for the ways wars are remembered, which in turn has dire consequences for the projected casualties from future wars. We can observe this bias at work in the way wars, whose lethal repercussions spread across space and time, are tidily bookended in the historical record. Thus, for instance, a 2003 New York Times editorial on Vietnam declared that" during our dozen years there, the U.S. killed and helped kill at least 1.5 million people.'?' But that simple phrase "during our dozen years there" shrinks the toll, foreshortening the ongoing slow-motion slaughter: hundreds of thousands survived the official war years, only to slowly lose their lives later to Agent Orange. In a 2002 study, the environmental scientist Arnold Schecter recorded dioxin levels in the bloodstreams of Bien Hoa residents at '35 times the levels of Hanoi's inhabitants, who lived far north of the spraying." The afflicted include thousands of children born decades after the war's end. More than thirty years after the last spray run, Agent Orange continues to wreak havoc as, through biomagnification, dioxins build up in the fatty tissues of pivotal foods such as duck and fish and pass from the natural world into the cooking pot and from there to ensuing human generations. An Institute of Medicine committee has by now linked seventeen medical conditions to Agent Orange; indeed, as recently as 2009 it uncovered fresh evidence that exposure to the chemical increases the likelihood of developing Parkinson's disease and ischemic heart disease." Under such circumstances, wherein long-term risks continue to emerge, to bookend a war's casualties with the phrase "during our dozen years there" is misleading: that small, seemingly innocent phrase is a powerful reminder of how our rhetorical conventions for bracketing violence routinely ignore ongoing, belated casualties.

### 1ac advocacy statement

#### Robert and I are committed to opening space for agonistic debate within and between political communities, and therefore advocate that the United States federal government should ease restrictions on travel between the United States and Cuba.

### 1ac advocacy

#### Contention 2 is ADVOCACY:

#### The idea of achieving *consensus* in the debate community is similarly *impossible* and *undesirable* in the face of overwhelming *diversity* of viewpoints, experiences, and goals for participation –

#### *Antagonism* is increasing due to attempts to *universalize* individual experiences or preferences– this process results in escalating *psychological* and *social* *violence*

#### Debates should NOT focus on achieving desirable *outcomes* but instead on preserving a *forgiving* *process* sufficiently *open to disagreement* that *all can benefit* – the *ballot is key*

Crosswhite 2 (James Crosswhite, Professor, Department of English, University of Oregon, Ph.D. Philosophy, UC San Diego, B.A. Philosophy, UC Santa Cruz, “Conflict in Concert: Fighting Hannah Arendt's Good Fight,” JAC, 22(4), Fall 2002, pp.948-959, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol22.4/crosswhite-conflict.pdf)

Early in her essay, and again at the end, Roberts-Miller shakes hands¶ with her opponent and acknowledges that there is a legitimate grievance¶ against agonistic rhetoric. The basic problem with valuing agonistic¶ rhetoric is that one seems at the same time to be promoting mere¶ wrangling. The opponents of agonistic rhetoric have opposed it on these¶ grounds. One needs a way to distinguish between agonistic rhetoric that is merely succeed-at-all-costs-and-never-give-in combat and agonistic rhetoric that uses competition and struggle to accomplish something greater than simple conquest. She is not sure that she has a satisfying way¶ of addressing this problem, but she cites a passage from John Locke in¶ which the essence of wrangling is that the wranglers are incapable of¶ changing their minds, of being convinced by opposing arguments. Later¶ in her essay, in her gloss on a passage from Arendt, she develops this¶ important feature of agonistic discourse: "It is not asymmetric manipulation¶ of others ... it must be a world into which one enters and by which¶ one can be changed" (593). This is a familiar condition by which¶ argumentation theorists attempt to delineate just what argumentation is.¶ If the interlocutors are not willing to change their minds, then they are not¶ engaged in argumentation. Near the end of her article, she regrets that¶ Arendt did not do more to distinguish polemical agonism from wrangling,¶ and then she drops the discussion.¶ It would of course be very interesting to hear more about this. The¶ agonistic/collaborative distinction is made in large part, according to¶ Roberts-Miller herself, because one cannot distinguish the valuable kind¶ of rhetoric from the destructive kind. If neither Arendt nor Roberts-Miller¶ can address this, then something is seriously amiss. At this point, it is just¶ impossible not to regret that the last half-century's resurgence of argumentation¶ theory is not more broadly acknowledged by those who make¶ a profession of rhetoric , writing, and literacy. Chaim Perelman and Lucie¶ Olbrechts-Tyteca labor carefully in The New Rhetoric to describe what¶ makes possible the "contact of minds" that is a condition for the possibility¶ of genuine argumentation. Franz van Eemeren and the late Rob¶ Grootendorst worked for years on their "pragma-dialectical" rules for¶ argumentative discourse. And more recently, in The New Dialectic,¶ Douglas Walton has systematized his thinking on the rules for argumentative¶ dialogues and distinguished the rules for eristic dialogues from the¶ rules for inquiry dialogues, deliberative dialogues, and other kinds of¶ argumentative discourse. It would be interesting to know whether Roberts-¶ Miller would find in this work a way to elaborate the concept of¶ polemical agonism and save it from its indistinguishability from wrangling.¶ However the threat of agonism's logical indistinguishability from¶ wrangling is only part of the problem. There is also a psychological¶ dimension to the objection to agonistic argumentation. Some people are¶ just psychologically defeated by it. Their experience-in childhood, in a¶ bad marriage, in the course of life in general, or even in court and with¶ lawyers, and perhaps in education-is to have been outdone by argumentation.¶ It has not been a way for them to gain a hearing, or a way to¶ negotiate, or a way to resolve conflict, or a way to learn, or a way to gain self-knowledge. They have succumbed to the threat that Socrates feared¶ for his own interlocutors-misology, the hatred of arguments-because of the experience of being constantly defeated by them and by those who wield them with virtuosity. This is not a problem that can be directly addressed by theorizing and argumentation, although the theory of¶ argumentation is quite an important part of it. It requires rather a practical¶ kind of wisdom and virtuous action. When Socrates breaks off the¶ argument with young Theaetetus in Plato's dialogue of that name, it is¶ because he understands Theaetetus and his condition, the stage of his¶ formation, and the threat of misology, and because he has the virtue to act¶ on the younger man's behalf, to keep a space open for his individual development. One of the less noted objections to agonistic rhetoric is that¶ it damages those who are defeated by it, that it creates an association¶ between reason and failure, reason and psychological pain. It would be¶ interesting to hear Roberts-Miller address this objection. What would it¶ take not only to theorize a logical distinction between agonistic rhetoric¶ and wrangling but also to make use of the distinction in our practice and¶ teaching?¶ The central move in Roberts-Miller's deployment of Arendt's thinking¶ is to accept the distinction between agonistic and collaborative¶ rhetoric but to present arguments that reverse the value hierarchy that the¶ split sets up: to replace "much of our dislike of conflict with a dislike of consensus." Here she gives us Arendt at her most Heideggerian. Human¶ beings are beset by a powerful drift toward conformity that is an evasion¶ of individual responsibility. This drift is not simply a superficial, external¶ conformity but a deep one in which our thinking becomes the thinking of¶ no one in particular and in which our individual identities meld in an¶ anonymous social self. Ironically, this conformity is so deep that we can¶ be most social even while most isolated; in fact, conformity depends in¶ part on a certain kind of isolation, an unwillingness to express our¶ disagreements and test them by arguments in some public way. Instead,¶ one's social and institutional identities pretty much determine how one¶ should think and act on almost all occasions. This conformist sociality is¶ the absolutization of bureaucracy and the apotheosis of collaborationism.¶ In Arendt's and Roberts-Miller's hands, the idea of the collaborative¶ takes on all the resonance the word had when it was used of those who¶ capitulated to the Nazis. One can almost see and hear scenes from The¶ Sorrow and the Pity as one ponders these Arendtian ideas. And, of¶ course, Arendt's prime exhibit of "collaborative man" is the desk murderer¶ Adolph Eichmann, the perfect administrator who, even after¶ recognizing his complicity in the murder of millions, could understand¶ his guilt only as the guilt of obedience to his superiors, the guilt¶ of doing his official duties. Eichmann is the thoroughly historicist,¶ perfectly formed social constructionist. To the challenge that he¶ should have spoken out against what was going on, he replied: "Under¶ the circumstances then prevailing such an attitude was not possible.¶ Nor did anyone behave in this fashion. From my experience I know that¶ the possibility, which was alleged only after the War, of opposing orders¶ is a self-protective fairy tale. " Arendt's argument depends on Eichmann's¶ words never losing their power to chill us. And so Roberts-Miller looks¶ to Arendt for help in "replacing our mistrust of conflict with a mistrust¶ of consensus."¶ What Eichmann and collaborationism both lack is a capacity for¶ being hospitable to a conflict of ideas. True individuality (and not the¶ passive isolation of the "personal"; even Eichmann was not "personally"¶ in favor of the persecution of the Jews) requires active political interaction¶ that involves conflict and competition and the struggle and testing of¶ competing perspectives in argumentation. True individuality requires¶ risk-the exposure of our individual thoughts to the sometimes painful¶ experience of their public examination. This is the heroism of thinking.¶ One always risks losing and having to change. However, as Stanley¶ Cavell would point out, this is also the joy and adventure of individuality:¶ to change, to imagine oneself as on some kind of path, to think of change¶ as (sometimes painful) transformation. This conflict, says Roberts-Miller,¶ need not be forced. It is the form taken by open acknowledgment¶ of difference. We find identities in the course of these conflicts; we set out¶ on paths toward ourselves. And this can all take place only when there is some kind of social space for it and when there are individuals capable of it. And so, says Roberts-Miller, we should trust collaborationism less and¶ look to the agonism that allows for individuality and openness to¶ difference.¶ In some ways, I am perhaps the worst person to comment on this¶ argument because I so wholeheartedly endorse it and because my own¶ interest is in amplifying and promoting it. It is hard to think of what major¶ shift in rhetoric, writing, and literacy studies would be more salutary than¶ the one Roberts-Miller is leading us toward here. However, for just this¶ reason I find her qualifications and reservations about this project almost¶ incomprehensible. A primary Roberts-Miller fret is that this ideal of¶ agonistic rhetoric is somehow "elitist." In the context of this doubt, she¶ describes agonism as requiring that one "simultaneously trust and doubt¶ one's perceptions, rely on one's own judgments and consider the judgments¶ of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think" (597).¶ Now, since she is promoting a greater mistrust of collaborationism and a¶ greater trust of the agonistic, it is hard to see how this in itself might be¶ "elitist." Nowhere is a demonstrated capacity for agonistic rhetoric¶ represented as a qualification for political participation or social privilege.¶ Why should the mere argument that agonistic rhetoric has important¶ social, political, and individual value be suspected of furthering some¶ kind of elitism? If there is a kind of discourse that undermines the¶ thoughtless intellectual and practical conformity on which totalitarianisms¶ of all kinds depend, and if this kind of discourse develops human¶ individuality and allows for the expression of the differences on which¶ the idea of a free society depends, then its value goes way beyond the¶ interests of some elite faction.¶ Part of Roberts-Miller' s discussion suggests that perhaps not everyone¶ can engage in Arendtian "thought" of this kind, that the ideal is¶ somehow too high. However, it is difficult to see how this counts against¶ the ideal. The ideal of informed voters going through careful deliberations¶ about social and political goods when they vote is also an "elitist"¶ ideal if elitism simply means that not all voters are capable of this. Many¶ of the most worthwhile social ideals for which human beings strive—tolerance,¶ freedom, justice—are beyond the current capabilities of many¶ people, even the people that are striving for them. This does not mean that¶ the ideal cannot orient their thinking and their action or their work on law¶ and policy – or their teaching and writing.¶ Part of this vague notion that agonistic rhetoric is somehow elitist¶ rests on a reified and destructively essentialist idea of what human beings¶ are capable of. To say that agonistic rhetoric is not a kind of thought in¶ which everyone can engage is to try to confine human beings to a current¶ historical situation and educational system that are not the results but the¶ causes of this purported incapacity. If agonistic rhetoric is really what¶ Roberts-Miller says it is, then the point would seem to be to change our¶ educational practices and work tirelessly to amplify the attractiveness of¶ agonistic rhetoric in all the spheres where it might have some effect.¶ If there are those who are incapable of both thinking for themselves¶ and imagining how others think, incapable of the internal dialogue of¶ reason, incapable of the transformation that occurs when we risk our¶ perspectives in the attempt to understand the perspectives of others (and,¶ as Gadamer says, simply to understand is to be transformed and partly¶ convinced), then what is education for but to develop the capacity for¶ this? I take it that someone who sees the truth in Arendt's description of¶ thoughtlessness will not be involved in education that is simply aimed toward¶ producing efficient laborers who will fill the slots that the reigning bureaucracies¶ have identified as needing to be filled (see Gadamer 379,567).¶ Roberts-Miller cites a telling passage from Arendt: "As a living¶ experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be¶ known only to the few" (597). First, we must accentuate the "perhaps¶ wrongly!" It is not presumptuous to believe that people everywhere have¶ struggled to develop Arendtian "thinking," and that they have struggled,¶ too, to participate in agonistic rhetoric, and that where they have failed to¶ do so, it is because they were held back, either materially or socially, by¶ design or by misfortune. However, this passage is also reminiscent of the¶ Kantian ideas of freedom and morality. Even though we have no sense¶ experience of freedom, even though it is an idea of "reason" alone, and¶ so according to Kant should not be a fact, he still regards freedom as a fact¶ because it is proved by morality itself. And even if no one has ever acted¶ morally, freely, and Kant at one point openly doubts whether anyone ever¶ has, it would still be a fact because freedom is necessary for morality, and¶ to deny it altogether is to deny what moral experience we do have.¶ The tradition of critical theory that follows from Kant, the tradition¶ in which Arendt herself partly stands, makes a great deal of these kinds¶ of ideas. Herbert Marcuse sometimes calls them "utopian," but he does¶ this in the context of a rehabilitation of utopian thinking. In his view,¶ whether utopian ideals are realizable or not, they still provide a critical¶ standard by which we can measure our current social condition and the¶ direction in which our political programs are taking us. They provide a¶ measure. They are partly constitutive of our thought and action, which¶ would be very different without them. Jiirgen Habermas uses the idea of¶ an ideal speech situation in much the same way. He knows that this idea¶ is "counterfactual," that there has never in reality been such a situation.¶ However, if it is an illusion, it is a "constitutive illusion" that gives us a¶ more complete understanding of our actual situation by providing a¶ measure, for insofar as our actual communicative situations fail to realize¶ this ideal, they are potentially criticizable. It is finally up to actual¶ interlocutors to decide how much falling short is tolerable in each¶ situation.¶ Agonistic rhetoric and Arendtian thought are themselves ideas of this¶ sort, capable of lighting up a direction for educational efforts and¶ providing a measure for the actual thinking and communication we are¶ attempting to understand and evaluate. They are not the only such ideas,¶ but as Roberts-Miller argues, they are significant ones, and, I would add,¶ significantly undervalued just now, when cultural and political and¶ economic conflicts are too easily conceptualized-on all sides-on the¶ model of a clash of civilizations which only violence can adequately¶ address. As Arendt wrote: "We do not know where ... developments will¶ lead us, but we know, or should know, that every decrease in power is an¶ open invitation to violence" (87). Power, for Arendt, is the ability to act¶ in concert, and the agonistic rhetoric of the public sphere is the ability to¶ have conflict-in-concert.¶ The issue is not elitism. The issue on an educational level is how to¶ address the situation of those who have not yet developed their capacity¶ for this kind of thinking and argumentation-and I don't believe that¶ there is a general educational-bureaucratic solution or a scientific pedagogy¶ that will come to the rescue here. I am much more inclined to the¶ Socratic view that you have to know the psyche with which you are¶ dealing. Because individuals vary so greatly in their psychological formation around experiences of argumentative discourse, and because the rhetorical psyche also fractures along all the usual multiple and unsystematic lines of race, gender, and so on, this will always be a matter that individual teachers must address with individuals and classes as best they can-and against whatever educational-bureaucratic power has¶ installed itself and its general "solutions" at the time. The issue on a political level is always to fight to keep this public sphere open. The¶ courage and vigilance required here have not been exaggerated.¶ There are a few other remaining challenges in Roberts-Miller's¶ argument. In her own polemical agonism, she exaggerates the distinction¶ between the agonistic and the collaborative. Anyone who thinks through¶ the relation between agonistic and collaborative rhetoric more thoroughly¶ will find a great deal of the collaborative in the agonistic and the¶ agonistic in the collaborative – enough, perhaps, to begin to destabilize¶ the distinction itself. In fact, agonistic rhetoric may require a depth of¶ cooperation and mutual practical respect that collaborative rhetoric does¶ not. After all, the practical respect required to go on discoursing with¶ someone who does not agree with you requires a more profound moral¶ relation than that required to go on speaking with someone with whom¶ you are reaching an agreement. There are many other deep interactions¶ and inter-identities to be explored in these concepts. Any program that¶ would follow from Roberts-Miller's arguments would have to be aware¶ of these to be practicable at anything more than an abstract level.¶ In fact, it is here that we encounter another of the formal ironies in¶ Roberts-Miller's approach. At her most polemical moment, when she¶ begins the hyperdistinguishing that finds a new binary in agonistic¶ rhetoric itself, she at the same time begins to reconcile the social and the¶ individual, the collaborative and the agonistic. The new pair is persuasive¶ agonism (associated with John Gage) and polemical agonism (associated¶ with Hannah Arendt). Persuasive agonism is aimed at gaining the¶ agreement of others and so the criterion of its success is persuasion.¶ Polemical agonismis aimed partly at the invention and clarification of the¶ ideas themselves, as well as at their public testing and further develop¶ ment. The criterion of success is the quality of the subsequent controversy.¶ Although this distinction doesn't quite capture the Gagean position¶ (since Gage describes the argumentation he teaches as a way of discovering¶ the best grounds for a position), it does allow Roberts-Miller a very¶ interesting and Quintilianesque move that tells us how speaking well is different from speaking persuasively, for persuasion is not the ultimate¶ goal. Polemical agonism is not the asymmetric work of a single rhetor bent on overpowering an interlocutor in a competition. Instead, its¶ success lies in the continuing agreement of the conflicting parties to¶ persevere in argumentation, to go on testing ideas together. This new¶ distinction allows Roberts-Miller to find in polemical agonism a deeper¶ kind of "collaboration," a conflict-in-concert. Polemical agonism is not¶ the simple resolution of conflict in agreement but the continuation of¶ conflict in a creative and valuable way, a way of having conflict that¶ requires deep kinds of cooperation.¶ Now, one could try to undermine this new pair in the usual ways. For¶ example, it is difficult to imagine how polemical agonism would take¶ place unless it somehow integrated persuasive agonism. Without the¶ provisional goal of persuasion, it is hard to see how polemical agonism¶ could achieve its aim of sustaining a high quality of public controversy.¶ The athletic analogy comes to mind here. We play to win because that is how the best playing gets accomplished. And in the end this is the position¶ Roberts-Miller herself takes when she writes that Arendtian rhetoric¶ leads not to ultimate Truth but to decisions, for decisions come only when¶ we do come to agreement, only when an argument does persuade--and¶ yet, as Roberts-Miller also points out, these decisions must be reconsidered¶ later, and so a continuing controversy must be possible. This is¶ certainly an integrating of the polemical and the persuasive.¶ Perhaps the most striking fact about Roberts-Miller's overall argument¶ is not just that it is so timely and appropriate but that it implicitly¶ forecasts a reconvention of rhetoric itself. I have already mentioned that¶ argumentation studies have for the last half-century labored to develop¶ theories of argumentation that would capture much of what Roberts-Miller¶ needs to flesh out this case for agonistic rhetoric and to distinguish¶ it from wrangling. However, this work is still too little known among¶ rhetoricians and receives little detailed attention in their literature. Yet,¶ it represents perhaps the greatest development of rhetoric in our lifetimes.¶ And then, from another side, there has been a complicated and troubling¶ discussion of the relations among language, discourse, power, and¶ violence that would intensify and deepen this worry that Roberts-Miller¶ has about domination and wrangling. From Walter Benjamin through¶ Arendt's own important elaboration of the distinction between power and¶ violence, through the conversation between Levinas and Derrida on¶ metaphysics and violence, to Foucault's back and forth on power and¶ violence, all the way to two recent books on just this issue, Beatrice¶ Hanssen's Critique of Violence and Hent De Vries's Religion and¶ Violence-both of which try to organize and sustain the controversy on¶ exactly the issue of the difference between debate and discussion, on the¶ one hand, and domination and violence and entrenched antagonisms on¶ the other-the ideal of something like an agonistic rhetoric has been at¶ stake. At the unstable center of this highly developed controversy, the¶ difference and identity of violence and power hold sway. Arendt had a big¶ stake in this, and insisted on the difference between power and violence¶ and on a form of power in which people could act in concert-a form of¶ power not at all unrelated to the way polemical agonism helps to sustain societies in which power keeps violence at bay. When Foucault was¶ confronted with Arendt's idea, he of course could not consent to this¶ valorizing even of the provisional consensus that comes out of polemical¶ agonism because Foucault had great difficulty acknowledging that power¶ might not involve domination. His finessing of the issue was to say that¶ "perhaps one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against¶ nonconsensuality" (379). As Derrida finesses the same issue, one can¶ hope to avoid only "the worst violence" and hope "to choose the lesser¶ violence within an economy of violence" (152, 313n.).¶ Is it utopian to imagine that Roberts-Miller's call for a new trust of¶ conflict, a call for an integration of Arendt's "thought" into rhetorical¶ studies, might be a forecast of a more general call to reconvene rhetoric¶ itself, to call back argumentation studies and the now decades-long¶ conflicts in critical theory and post-structuralism into the history of¶ rhetoric, where they belong?¶ There are powerful arguments to be made on behalf of the general¶ approach of Hannah Arendt to show how discourse-and argumentation¶ in particular-can be a way of having conflict, conflict that might otherwise be carried out in actual violence or some other kind of overt domination. And not only are there powerful arguments to be made, but¶ there are powerful attractions in the kind of sociality opened up by those¶ discursive practices, many of them described in a compelling way by¶ Roberts-Miller. One can always take the critical position and search out¶ the domination lurking in every concrete experience of peace and¶ freedom, but this is only natural. Real wisdom lies in knowing when and¶ where to do this. In the end, thinking all of this through will mean seeing¶ how agonism thought through becomes acting-in-concert and how the¶ critique of domination thought through becomes, as Foucault shows in his¶ refusal of both polemics and of consensus, a way of keeping the fight¶ going. There is reason to believe that the recent popular favoring of¶ collaboration is a kind of practical acting-out of a fear of domination, but¶ a discourse founded in a vision that sees only domination in agonistic¶ rhetoric and so has to seclude itself in a carefully controlled process of deindividualization¶ so only the collaborative can dominate will not easily¶ survive this thinking-through. Whether and how an agonism motivated by¶ the ideals so well expressed by Patricia Roberts-Miller in her essay will¶ itself survive a careful thinking-through remains to be seen. But she has¶ my fighting gratitude for making such a thought-provoking case.

#### Our model for *agonistic pluralism* in *topic debates* is NOT an unfocused free-for-all NOR a naïve plea to “all get along” – it’s simply a *recognition* that advocacy campaigns for increasing economic engagement *already* take a variety of forms – many are *inclusive* of federal policy change but few are *restricted* to it – only a pedagogy which *facilitate engagement* between diverse forms of advocacy can produce *trans-national coalitions* capable of effecting political action *across global borders*

Erfani & Whitmire 11 (Farhang Erfani, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, American University, Ph.D. Villanova University, B.A. University of the Pacific, and John F. Whitmire, Jr., Associate Professor and Department Head, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Western Carolina University, Ph.D., M.A. Villanova University, B.A. Wake Forest University, “Chapter Six: A New Fragility: Ricoeur in the Age of Globalization,” in *Paul Ricoeur: Honoring and Continuing the Work*, ed. Farhang Erfani, Lexginton Books, 2011, pp.61-80, Kindle Edition)

How can Ricoeur aid us in understanding and dealing with the phenomenon of globalization? We might begin with his notion of fragility. Whereas “tragedy” hinges on the fatality of a collision between two forces that leads to their mutual destruction, “fragility” means something different for Ricoeur. Fragility, he claims, bears an intrinsic relation to responsibility; it calls us to some kind of action; we feel ourselves enjoined, in the experience of the fragile, “to do something, to help, but, even better, to foster growth, to allow for accomplishment and flourishing.” [4] For better or for worse, globalization presents itself to us as an extraordinary event (or series of events) requiring our response; it is a political phenomenon that puts us in yet another position of fragility. To paraphrase Sartre, globalization may very well be the unsurpassable horizon of our times, and as such, it represents a unique call to responsibility. Now, a good deal of our philosophical canon is predicated upon the existence and the unity of a city-state, which political theorists have for some time been stretching in an attempt to fit the larger model of the nation-state. What are we to do, then, with this even more “stretched” global model, in which the political world becomes progressively more alien to us? [5] What are we to do in a situation where human political agency itself— our capacity to act as a community in our world—becomes revealed to us as increasingly fragile? We find Ricoeur’s work to be particularly relevant here. Many have written about alienation, but few have adopted Ricoeur’s unique approach to it. Whereas alienation is usually seen as something deplorable that we must work to overcome, Ricoeur argues that it is a constitutive element of the human condition; it can never be surmounted once and for all. But he also emphasizes that this should not lead us to “pessimism” or “defeatism,” [6] for alienation (or distanciation) is also the condition of the possibility of innovation, of freedom. The philosophical and political impossibility of a perfect coincidence with ourselves is the paradox of our existence: it makes it impossible for us to be fully at home, but it is at the same time what allows us to create our home. Alienation is for him a call to agency, a call for participation and reflection. It is Ricoeur’s unique analysis of alienation, then, that will offer us the most significant assistance in dealing with the phenomenon of globalization and its concomitant alienation and fragility. In this chapter, we will first deal with some competing understandings of globalization and cosmopolitanism. As we will see, the main schools of thought on the subject are caught up in what Ricoeur would consider various forms of “escapism.” Most thinkers either hide behind the national model, or else reject any possibility of a purely local politics. Ricoeur, along with a few others, stands in between the two. To better understand his position, we consider some of his key political and philosophical concepts. In the next section of the chapter, we turn our attention to the work of Chantal Mouffe, a radical democratic thinker, whose pairing with Ricoeur we believe strengthens each side’s arguments and political goals. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and philosophical anthropology complements and deepens her conception of agonistic citizenship. Ricoeur and Mouffe agree that we can neither deny the event of globalization, nor can we hope to achieve a unified cosmopolis as a way of overcoming the alienation of globalization through rational consensus. In the concluding portion of the chapter, we attempt to push their own insights beyond themselves, by arguing that their model of political agency relies too heavily on the “geographical” model of citizenship. We argue, by contrast, that horizontal (i.e. cross-national) communities of strategic interest offer the most productive possibility for the limited overcoming of alienation that is possible in a globalized, post-modern world. DEFINING COSMOPOLITANISM The first problem we face with regard to cosmopolitanism or globalization is one of definition. Sometimes the two are used interchangeably; philosophers in particular use “cosmopolitanism” when they are trying to find a positive way of understanding globalization from within the canon. Not only do the two denote different phenomena, however, each one has a multiplicity of meanings within different traditions. In general, however, the literature on globalization tends to examine economic, cultural and/ or political expansion across the face of the earth. “Cosmopolitanism” has a much longer history, but it too is multifaceted. For our own purposes here, however, rather than attempting to specify ever more precisely the eidos of globalization, we will begin instead with a description of the experience of alienation this phenomenon produces. As David Held nicely summarizes it, the “sheer scale of contemporary social and economic change appears to outstrip the capacity of national governments or citizens to control, contest, or resist that change. The limits to national politics, in other words, are forcefully suggested by globalization.” [7] In our view, globalization challenges the nation-state’s philosophical foundation— the Athenian paradigm—for it is not clear who will in fact be able to protect those communal goods in a globalized market economy that increasingly surpasses nation-states' capacities to do so. The factors that Held describes not only pose practical problems for maintaining a self-contained polis, they also require us to rethink the very conceptual framework of political philosophy. Since the Greeks, politics—the management of the polis—demanded political participation. However limited the Greek notion of citizenship was— for instance its exclusion of women— it nevertheless championed citizenry and collaboration for the sake of a greater common good. Politics was a response to the unsustainability of individualism and the fragility of the human condition. We argue that the “sheer scale of contemporary social and economic change” and its alienating experience ought to be understood as a new fragility, requiring novel thinking. This challenge should be welcomed as it requires us to rethink our political heritage, a task that many avoid by looking at the effects of globalization. Held has neatly classified three different responses to this sense of a loss of control experienced by nation-states and their citizens as a result of globalization. Held has christened these the “hyperglobalists,” the “skeptics,” and the “transformationalists.” For the hyperglobalists, nation-states are now obsolete. They believe that we have entered a “new epoch of human history.” [8] To them, any national resistance is futile, since capital and the global market recognize no such national boundaries. They believe that “globalization is primarily an economic phenomenon; that an increasingly integrated global economy exists today; that the needs of global capital impose a neoliberal economic discipline on all governments such that politics is no longer the ‘art of the possible’ but rather the practice of the ‘sound economic management.’” [9] Ricoeur too recognizes this tendency, noting that “modern society is the society for which this struggle [of man against nature], joined to the primacy accorded to calculation and efficiency, tends to become the new form of the sacred.” [10] The skeptics resist this approach. To them, the idea that we have entered a decidedly new era of globalization is a dangerous myth. To begin with, they do not believe that globalization is a wholly new phenomenon; they point out that there have been other historical epochs with fewer international regulations and even greater economic exchanges. More importantly, they insist that national governments are far from being obsolete; they are (and must continue to be) as strong as before, for “the forces of internationalization themselves depend on the regulatory powers of national governments to ensure continuing economic liberalization.” [11] According to the skeptics, the troubles with economic forces today must be dealt with at the local and national level. Among political theorists, this defense of local rights and values corresponds roughly with communitarian thought. The third school of thought consist of a mix of approaches; all of them contend that we live in a new era, but they differ in their response to it. Unlike the hyperglobalists, they have a cautious view of globalization; unlike the skeptics, they think that the old models cannot be retained as such. They do not believe that globalization will automatically and necessarily lead either to greater integration or greater fragmentation. In other words, what globalization is remains to be defined, and our response to it remains to be delimited. Both Ricoeur and Mouffe belong to this rather vast category. They share a certain pessimism about stubborn adherence to national interests; they also agree that there is not— nor should be— one model of globalization. Each provides us with interesting insights about the failure of the first two models, and we will return to their views shortly. Beforehand, however, two remarks are in order. First, as David Held correctly points out, these different schools of thought combine unusual ideologies. [12] For instance, among the hyperglobalists we find some rather strange bedfellows, such as Marxists [13] and neoliberals: Thomas Friedman and Antonio Negri agree that the age of the nation-state is over. Among skeptics, particularly in Europe and North America, we find unions and labor leaders agreeing with Samuel Huntington and other national conservatives. They of course have different reasons for resisting globalization; nevertheless, both prefer tighter borders and strong national protectionism. This cross-fertilization is perhaps a good indication that we must revise our traditional political categories in order to deal adequately with the phenomenon of globalization. Second— and this is particularly true of the hyperglobalists and skeptics— current theories of globalization and of political agency are still based on the nation-state, if not the city-state model. In the case of the skeptics, this seems most obvious. They believe that politics cannot be done without clear local borders. In a quasi-Greek model of politics, their notion of identity is strongly tied to a limited geographical area. The hyperglobalists, despite their rejection of the national model, also adhere to the same principle, though at a much larger level. For some of them, in a loose paraphrasing of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism, the nation-state is replaced by a one-worldly polis. Regardless of their prescriptions, though— whether the movement of globalization is seen primarily in terms of conflict (Marxists) or as the end of politics (neoliberals)— the world is now taken to be the city of Athens writ large, and must therefore (on this view) be governed as one body. [14] In any case, what is most obvious is that we now face the explicit need for a reconfiguration, or, in more Ricoeurian terms, a re-plotting of our current narratives, in order to account for and appropriate the changes to our political world that the forces of globalization have initiated. PAUL RICOEUR AND ALIENATION We return to Ricoeur. There are at least two different, though related, theories of alienation in Ricoeur’s philosophy. One is clearly political; the other stems from his hermeneutics. It will be instructive to begin by revisiting Ricoeur’s politics, with a particular emphasis on his views on alienation and citizenship, as well as his recommendations for global politics. But we will go on to argue that his notion of distanciation—Ricoeur’s second, ontological version of alienation—and his narrative ethics can make an even more powerful contribution to this encounter with globalization. Ricoeur’s politics began as a response to Marxism; [15] however, Ricoeur (like Mouffe) is critical of Marx’s overemphasis on economics. “Maybe the economic analysis of class struggle,” Ricoeur says, “is but one of the many plots that make up the complex of history.” [16] This sensibility for pluralism and his refusal to subscribe to what Isaiah Berlin called “monism” is of course a constant theme in Ricoeur’s work. In one of his earliest essays, “The Political Paradox,” Ricoeur deplored the reduction of politics to economics. Though they are related— and he insists that they even overlap [17] —he nevertheless defends the autonomy of politics. Political matters require their own distinct analyses, separate from the realm of economics. [18] To better understand his refusal to equate politics and economics, let us look at the origin of politics, according to Ricoeur. Following Eric Weil, Ricoeur considers the state an “organization of a historical community; organized into a State, the community is capable of making decisions.” [19] The goal of politics, then, is enabling or empowering a concrete community to act. In “From Nation to Humanity: Task of Christians,” he distinguishes the aspect of historical and geographical communities (the “nation”) from the political arm whereby it (nominally, at least) exercises power in a sovereign way (the “state”). [20] Clearly, issues of economics matter for the community’s historical identity and its self-governance, but these three (historical communities, their political arm, and the modes of production) must not be conflated. Ricoeur’s (or Weil’s) definition of politics is not particularly original. It is in line with the long-standing social contract tradition. This tradition, as Ricoeur construes it, is to be understood rather loosely; it refers to the recognition of our inability to live in solitude as well as to the original freedom that we exercise in choosing to be part of a community. This freedom is exchanged not just for the possibility of survival, but also that of leading a meaningful existence. With broad strokes, Ricoeur traces this political ideal from Plato and Aristotle all the way to Hegel, for whom the ideal citizen is fully at home in her community. Ricoeur therefore tells us that not only “Rousseau, at the bottom, is Aristotle,” [21] but that Hegel, and the “whole of Western political thought” subscribes to this broad approach. To accuse Ricoeur of oversimplification on this point, while easy to do, would be to miss his unique philosophical angle. What these thinkers have in common—despite their differences—is their commitment to overcoming and eradicating political differences in the unity of a single polis. It is Marx, according to Ricoeur, who will make a new contribution; class struggle, according to Ricoeur, posed a significant challenge to the edifice of traditional political thought. Instead of considering conflicts as superficial, bound to be overcome (even or especially in Hegel), Marx viewed economic conflict as the engine of history. Unfortunately, there was too much Hegel left in Marx. Not only did he view any form of merely political struggle as illusory (belonging to the ideological superstructure rather than the founding economic stratum), he also believed that economic conflict too could— potentially and certainly theoretically— be overcome. [22] In other words, Marx too subscribed to the view that the (potential, eschatological) unity of the community, which has been shattered through class struggle, could be restored. By viewing alienation only in economic terms, though, Marx ignored the specificities of politics. Philosophers before Marx deplored strife and eliminated it from the ideal practice of politics. Marx denounced their naiveté by showing that it is economics that tears the human community apart, not the lack of a better rationality. Yet, his engine of history was set to expire. Beyond a point of saturation and exhaustion— leading to a universal workers’ revolution— class struggle would cease to exist. Not coincidentally, Marx was rather vague in his depiction of the post-revolution political life. He tells us that without the class system, abolished in the final revolution, the State would wither away, and life as we know it would be radically altered since we would be in an entirely new historical era. In a nutshell, all forms of alienation would disappear in the absence of the economic structures that foster it. A polity would finally achieve its goal of oneness. But Ricoeur insists, “against Marx and Lenin, that political alienation is not reducible to another [form of alienation], but is constitutive of human existence.” [23] Why is alienation constitutive? Why is it unavoidable? Were it not for Marx’s omission of politics as an autonomous region with its own “finality,” couldn’t we still hope to eliminate political estrangement? Better yet, especially since capitalism proves to be quite resilient, shouldn’t we at least strive to eliminate alienation from politics? In his response, Ricoeur moves beyond Marx by paying close attention to the role and nature of power. [24] Going back to his definition of politics as a contract between the people and the state, Ricoeur argues that we can see two different versions of power. First there is power for the people; second, there is the State’s power. As Dauenhauer succinctly puts it, The state’s defining purpose is to enable its historicized community not only to promote the community’s survival but also to enable its members to act in concert and thus to be makers of their own history. It is to empower its people to exercise freedom in such a way that they can accomplish together things that they could not accomplish singly. In short, the state’s purpose is to produce a “power-in-common” among its citizens. [25] There is, however, a problem here with any representative democracy, the most common form of the modern democratic polis, since, as Ricoeur notes, “my elected representative (who is considered in principle my alter ego) turns out, once elected, to belong to another world— the political world which obeys its own laws of gravity.” [26] And as a consequence of this constitutive, ontological problematic, we face some specific ontic problems. For instance, the relation of political language “to rhetoric forces it to oscillate between rational argumentation and sophism which proceeds by seduction, or, worse, by intimidation.” [27] The problem, in short, is that the ones in power, those in charge of maintaining or advancing the power-in-common, regularly betray us. Ricoeur puts it bluntly: “politics fosters specific evils.” [28] This is not intended to be a cynical observation; it is, rather, the paradox inherent to politics. This “discordance between the pretension of the State and the true state of affairs” is a theme that we can also find in Ricoeur’s later work on Ideology and Utopia. There, he tells us that any regime— no matter how well intentioned— has a “credibility gap,” or a “case of overvalue,” and, as such, must engage in tactics that attempt to legitimate its own system of authority— to give itself more authority than we have legitimately yielded to it. [29] Like an individual self in bad faith, any state deceives itself; the very nature of power includes this abuse. Given these “evils” constitutive of politics, however, what a regime does to acknowledge and to address the “violence of the masters” [30] makes quite a difference. One could legitimately fault Ricoeur for not developing this argument further. This is not the place for us to develop this argument in detail, but we ought to indicate at least the theoretical knot that we see in Ricoeur’s argument. Ricoeur’s political configuration solely places fragmentation and its ensuing violence at the governmental level—the masters. [31] In other words, even though he calls it a necessary evil, he depoliticizes the people. He does not recognize the fact that the desire to live together itself is necessarily caught in a struggle, in a conflict of interpretations of the good life. Others, like Mouffe, have made a more convincing case that this abuse of power is constitutive of any political system and that fragmentation or division exists within the body politic, within the people as well. [32] Nevertheless, to go back to the problem of alienation, we can now see why Ricoeur maintains, against Marx, that political alienation is inevitable. As long as there is— and there always will be— a gap between the people and the State, some form of alienation is unsurpassable: the actions of my community, empowered by the State, are not explicitly mine; the political world operates according to its own laws. So what are we to do? According to Ricoeur, the very task of citizenship lies in resisting and limiting this abuse. Our opposition to the irreducible “hierarchical bond of command and authority” is grounded in the horizontal bond of wanting to live together. [33] In other words, citizenship becomes a Sisyphean task; it is an ongoing struggle for keeping the “space of freedom” alive. [34] This space requires a state (to enable community action), but is also threatened by it (insofar as the state is not the people). Ricoeur’s view of citizenship recognizes the irreducibility of political alienation and embraces an ongoing struggle: it is, as Mouffe would say, inherently “agonistic.” Our goal here is not, however, to evaluate Ricoeur’s philosophy of citizenship in general— a worthy task that others have taken up. [35] Rather, being generally sympathetic to his view, we wish to test it within the context of globalization. What does it mean to defend the power-in-common of a given community against political domination, when we begin to think on a scale larger than a particular nation? Is it still possible to keep political “evil” in check, when we conceive of communities broader than States, a situation urged upon us now more than ever in the epoch of globalization? As we mentioned before, Ricoeur is neither a hyperglobalist nor a skeptic. While acknowledging that we live in a political “situation without precedent,” he neither advocates entirely giving up on the national model nor trying to reproduce it at a higher level. [36] We can find at least two reasons in Ricoeur’s refusal to prematurely embrace the death of nation-states. In political terms, Ricoeur rightly points out that there is no politics at all without “institutional mediation.” [37] Communal agency requires this mediation, regardless of the community’s size. Second, from a hermeneutic perspective, reducing all people around the globe to a “multitude” of workers is also naïve, insofar as it would, while (nominally) surmounting at least some international conflicts arising from issues of political and cultural identity, replace them with the alienation of a purely market-driven identity. He argues that “it is in terms of the nation that the struggle against anonymity, against being leveled out and absorbed by world industrial society, takes place. This industrial society . . . also causes loss of identity; to a homogeneous science and a homogeneous technology stands opposed that plurality of life styles which are the nations.” [38] So Ricoeur’s claim is that the historical community of the nation has, to this point, provided at least some kind of counterbalance to the alienation of globalization. The modern nation-state has, therefore, been charged with giving us a fusion of the abstractly universal “rationality” of economics and technicity— which is by itself deeply dissatisfying— with the “reasonability” of “the concrete universal that defines politics as such.” [39] However, as we saw above, the sheer scale of the economic and social changes now moving forward are rapidly outstripping the ability of a nation-state to respond to them in an adequate way. In the final section of this essay, we ourselves will attempt to come to terms with our communal identities and political agency by rethinking the medium in which the extreme rationality of market-force capitalistic technocracy is fused with the concrete unity of the reasonable— as something other than the traditional nation-state. Thus, neither can we abandon all classical politics of the nation-state, nor can we continue to adhere blindly to those models. Globalization poses a new form of fragility to which we must respond. To find ourselves in this age of transition requires a revision of our ways of thinking ta politika; the escapism to private life (which Ricoeur calls “the ‘privatization’ of happiness” [40] ) that is so prevalent at present represents an abdication of this responsibility. To that end, Ricoeur suggests three models of integration that might help us to address our new fragility, to deal with the enigma of globalization such that we can overcome— to the extent that this is possible— this new form of alienation. While specifically addressing the future of the European Union, he makes three suggestions that he believes would help Europe work through its own difficult integration, and achieve some kind of unity of “identity” and “alterity.” To begin with, he encourages greater attention to translation, which is first of all a practical matter for Europe. But it is also an ethical endeavor: “it is really a matter of living with the other in order to take that other to one’s home as a guest.” [41] This “linguistic hospitality” must be complemented with “the model of exchange of memories.” Ricoeur’s dedication to narrative identity—at the personal and communal levels—makes him particularly concerned with remembering the past. Remembering and openly recounting the founding stories of our community not only allows us to better understand who we are, it also allows for “narrative hospitality,” [42] an understanding of where the Other comes from, and how we can find a common ground. Remembering each European nation’s past is also remembering a long history of aggression and violence, so Ricoeur’s final model of integration rests on forgiveness. As we narrate the past, we should be cognizant of our own failures, but also learn to forgive the Other’s transgressions. Each of these models, according to Ricoeur, allows us to begin taming global alienation, insofar as it allows us to begin to come to terms with the alterity of the Other’s story as a necessary, interrelated part of my own (on both the individual and the communal level). We hope that it is becoming clear that we value Ricoeur’s insights but we remain concerned that his model maintains the unity of the body politic; the above measures are quite helpful but Ricoeur is still operating within the Athenian paradigm of a city. Ricoeur’s recommendations— e.g. greater hospitality—are to help an Other, outside of the community, whereas we believe that the community itself is, to use Jean-Luc Nancy’s expression Inoperable. We find Ricoeur helpful in welcoming alienation but we do not adhere to his prescriptions at the political level. In the concluding section of this chapter, we will argue that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of narrative identity— not his political philosophy per se— is better suited for the task of reconfiguring our identity in the age of globalization, provided that we have fully appreciated the constitutive role of political antagonism— or agonism— as Chantal Mouffe. CHANTAL MOUFFE ON AGONISM Clearly, Ricoeur’s goal is to be realistic; he does not dream of a world without any alienation whatsoever. But it is also to be optimistic; globalization is not— or at least should not be— the end of “the principle of sovereignty.” [43] It offers us a chance to see the world from a new perspective. At this point, by bringing Ricoeur into dialogue with the work of Chantal Mouffe, we wish to further explore and evaluate Ricoeur’s suggestions. While we agree with Ricoeur that politics is inherently paradoxical, we wonder to what extent his solutions are feasible. We also wonder whether his initial insights about the nature of power and politics are preserved in his prescriptions for our age. Are the above models powerful enough to cope with a situation in which Exxon Corporation’s income surpasses the entire GDP of the already rich country of South Africa? Has the “violence of the masters” reached the point where Ricoeurian citizenship becomes impossible? Is Ricoeur’s own prescription mindful enough of the paradox of global politics? Though Ricoeur is always cognizant of the “obstacles” that face a true world order, and is equally careful in avoiding the essentialist traps of the cosmopolitan tradition, his teleology remains squarely within the tradition which posits an ideal of “united humanity.” [44] Whereas the citizens of a given nation were to resist the abuse of power of their institutions in the name of their initial commonality by way of the State, many of Ricoeur’s writings on global politics, particularly his theologically leaning essays, strive for the “placing and the empowering of a practice regulated by the global interest of humanity.” [45] While he clearly favors creating or lending greater support to existing international institutions such as the United Nations, it is not clear how these institutions would avoid the axiomatic failure— the abuse of power— that is unavoidable at the nation-state level. Why would the UN or the World Bank be any less susceptible to abuse? To make the matter worse, whereas there are some safeguards in place in democratic societies that prevent or curb the government’s overreach, there is very little protecting individuals at the global level. The work of Chantal Mouffe, in our view, can address these difficulties to a greater extent. Given the inherent limits of such a short chapter, we will only touch upon aspects of her work that contribute to a greater appreciation of political “agonism” as well as the application of this approach to the question of globalization. Though she does not work within the hermeneutic tradition, she does reject the traditional model of rationalism for politics and accepts— by way of Wittgenstein and Derrida— that language is not a neutral medium in which thought occurs; it is, rather, the very condition of thought. [46] Mouffe’s critique of rationalism is a recurring theme in her books and articles. Given that radical democracy is fundamentally anti-essentialist, much of the western tradition of political philosophy, which is primarily based on a kind of rationalistic, foundationalist assumption about politics, becomes questionable. We mean by this not to oppose rationalism to empiricism, but to stress two primary qualities about this “rationalistic” tradition, an archaeological one and a teleological one: 1) the necessity of founding a polis (for whatever reason) is one that is, in principle, recognizable by all humans, and 2) the belief that all conflicts in a given polis can ultimately be resolved through a judicious use of reason (again, at least in principle, or as a regulative ideal). Plato and Aristotle believed that they could found politics by way of universal human reason (whether a perfectly universal one, or a more localized, phronetic version thereof [47] ). Augustine and Aquinas grounded politics in the harmony of divine reason. Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel all established the polis on a primary rational decision involving assumptions about recognition or the enjoyment of property. And today’s political philosophy of Habermas and Rawls is concerned to a large degree with epistemologically justifying politics in reason. In all fairness, of course, we must admit that there are a few figures in the history of political thought, such as Machiavelli and Tocqueville, who moved away from this overly rationalistic model. Such figures have especially interested contemporary political thinkers, especially Marxists. Claude Lefort and Louis Althusser have had a kindred interest in Machiavelli’s analysis of power. But Mouffe chooses another source in the political tradition: she examines the conservatives, such as Carl Schmitt and Michael Oakeshott. These thinkers understand the importance of traditions, contingency, power, and the impossibility of an absolutely rationally grounded politics. This is a fascinating move, in so far as Mouffe’s interest is in leftist democratic struggles— which is not, to say the least, a shared goal with the conservatives she chooses to analyze. Carl Schmitt, in particular, is an intriguing figure: a theorist with great sympathy for the Nazi Germany, he also despised modern liberalism and its pretense for universalism. In distinction to the liberal model of universal reason and justice, Schmitt underlines the fact that exclusion is necessary in any given community. Or, as he puts it, there are always friends and enemies. The struggle between the two (e.g. between masters and slaves for Hegel, or proletariat and bourgeoisie for Marx) is unavoidable. As long as one defines oneself, the definition is based on what one is not, one’s enemy or Other. This is, in short, a reworking of Spinoza and Hegel’s omnis determinatio est negatio. And this principle would still hold true, he argues, in the ideal of a post-Revolutionary Marxist world. The reason for this is that in any democracy, even the liberal model, there is always “a moment of closure which is required by the very process of constituting the ‘people.’” [48] There are, at the least, boundaries defining who belongs to this democracy and who does not. But, according to Schmitt, the liberals do not recognize this work of exclusion in their paradigm and still champion a putatively absolute universality. They do not realize that this “us vs. them” model also works in another way in the liberal paradigm: those who do not wish to follow the tenets of a universal liberalism, they are the enemy. In sum, “Schmitt highlights the fact that democracy always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion.” [49] The Rawlsians and the Habermasians who advocate the rational consensus model do not admit that their consensus is not an absolutely rational consensus but a work of exclusion— which Mouffe finds necessary. For Mouffe, these rationalist thinkers refuse to see the importance of the political as a form of groundless decision-making. The political decision, in which the “us” and the “them” is constituted, is always made without an absolute, essential justification. The decision, though not “rational,” is not arbitrary either. Very much in tune with the hermeneutic tradition, Mouffe says that when we are going to try to establish this form of consensus— in fact, to define what the common good is, because that’s what is at stake in politics— we can’t do without this dimension on the condition that we recognize that there is no such a thing as a universal auditoire or the common good and that it is always a question of hegemony. What is going to be defined at the moment as the common good is always a certain definition that excludes other definitions. Nevertheless, this movement to want a definition of the common good, to want a definition of a kind of consensus that I want to call “reasonable” in order to differentiate it from “the rational,” is necessary to democratic politics. [50] What is ultimately impossible is the perfectly reconciled and harmonious polis that the Western tradition of political philosophy favors, because any consensus, even the most inclusive one, always has an element of exclusion. Does this mean that we must value exclusion? For Mouffe, this is the paradox of democracy, conceived of as the result of two contrary forces; Schmitt was right in pointing this out, but wrong in rejecting democracy for it. Democracy represents the presence of a contingent and localized demos, a people. So for the sake of the people, of its sovereignty, a democracy makes decisions that are best for its demos only. But at the same time, democracy belongs to the tradition of universal human rights and universal humanism in general. [51] So, what kind of citizens do we get in this model? What does a radical democratic citizen look like? What does the democratic paradox entail for citizenship? Here Mouffe provides us with an interesting and hermeneutic picture of democracy. She advocates an “agonistic” model of citizenship. On the one hand, she wants to preserve the need for struggle and its inevitability— which made the reconciled polis impossible— on the other, she cannot espouse a model that is self-destructive, either. This leads her to make a fundamental terminological distinction between “enemies” and “adversaries”: “Antagonism” is a relation between enemies; they want to destroy each other. “Agonism” is a relation among adversaries. I mean “adversaries” not at all in the sense in which this word is often used by liberal thinkers. The term adversary is a very common term not only in politics but also in ordinary discourse. But what most liberal thinkers mean when they speak of adversary is what should be more properly called “opponent” or a “competitor,” in the sense that what they want to do is to occupy the place of the other . . . the main aim of democratic politics is to transform antagonism into an agonism. [52] The agonist citizen is one who does not seek the other’s death. On the contrary, it is a citizen who simply has a different interpretation of what liberty and equality mean. “An adversary . . . is a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality.” [53] In other words, this is a question of interpretation, of hermeneutics. But because there is this shared horizon of principles, we do not have a tyrannical consensus because what liberty and equality mean are always being renegotiated through the political. This is, incidentally, why Mouffe’s politics of pluralism does not allow for political suicide. Because our goal is to preserve the plurality of view, pluralism is more than a fact; it is an axiom. As such, it can be defended and protected. Pluralism entails a respect for different views, but also giving a certain equal weight to them, though not to all of them: as we have already noted, there must always be some exclusion. Mouffe gives us an example: with the case of Salman Rushdie, some fundamentalist Muslims in England said that based on their religion, which liberalism seeks to respect, they should be allowed to kill Rushdie. But according to Mouffe, only liberals who do not understand pluralism as an axiomatic principle and therefore have no sense of inclusion/ exclusion would not be able to counter that argument. In her view, “in order to have a pluralist society, you cannot have total pluralism because total pluralism would mean that the enemies of pluralism are going to be able to destroy the basis of that society.” An absolute pluralism, then, is simply impossible. [54] How is Mouffe’s model applicable to the question of globalization? How can we maintain something of the Western tradition’s ever-growing emphasis on the universality of the human community, while at the same time recognizing Mouffe’s crucial insights about 1) the impossibility of constructing a fully reconciled polis (much less a universal one), and 2) the consequent necessity of an agonistic citizenry? Much of Mouffe’s (and Laclau’s) work has been highly theoretical, though readers could always find hints about the consequences or the applications of the theory of hegemony. In her latest work, On the Political, [55] Mouffe has fortunately taken a different approach—an “ontic” [56] one, she says, with a special focus on the question of cosmopolitanism. Given the scope of this chapter, we can only refer to her main conclusions. She once again outlines the dangers of the consensual and dialogical models for politics, with an emphasis on three noticeable conceptual and practical failures of the rationalist model, when applied to the question of cosmopolitanism. To begin with, these thinkers (a subset of Held’s hyperglobalists) correctly deplore the violence of globalization and instead advocate a deliberative and dialogical approach, seeking to convince the “skeptics” that their resistance is a kind of irrational parochialism, and that globalization, when embraced, represents a great step toward the universal human community. But they clearly know that many refuse to “put their [own] dogmatic certainties into question,” and ***instead*** choose to resort to violent resistance. As Benjamin Barber has famously put it, against the movement of “McWorld,” we see a growing “Jihadist” resistance. So what are the hyperglobalists to do with those who refuse to listen to the “voice of reason”? As Mouffe points out, the consensual model has no real solution here. Its advocates must simply hope that these “side-effects” will disappear with “the advent of a cosmopolitan order.” [57] Second, at a more practical level, Mouffe shows that many countries that have adopted the deliberative model have taken a turn for the worse. This is particularly the case in Europe, which has experienced a resurgence of nationalism and right-wing populism after (or more importantly, despite) the forging of a kind of centrist “consensus” among its citizens. When we examine the state of democratic politics in all the countries where right-wing populism has made serious inroads, we find a striking similarity. Their growth has always taken place in circumstances where the differences between the traditional democratic parties have become much less significant than before . . . in each case a consensus at the center has been established, which did not allow voters to make a real choice between significantly different policies. [58] This is not surprising to Mouffe, insofar as she believes an absolute consensus, a fully reconciled polis, is not possible: any consensus, or work of inclusion, is going to have a corresponding moment of exclusion. The lack of choice, and the backlash of a turn to extremism in face of the neoliberal hegemony, has had similar effects in the world. Finally, since the deliberative and consensualist model dismisses power in politics, it cannot appreciate the impossibility of achieving a one-world state, given the disparities that exist between nations, disparities which have crippled the UN. [59] Against this background, Mouffe emphasizes the need for a new model, an agonistic one. “The left,” she insists, “should acknowledge the pluralist character of the world and adopt the multipolar perspective” [60] rather than one which attempts to fabricate an illusory absolute consensus. Since politics is precisely the question of conflict of interpretations and the plurality of values, Mouffe suggests that we ought to have a multipolar global world. Instead of having a neoliberal model that treats all opponents of universal cosmopolitanism as irrational and parochial, she puts forth the idea of “several autonomous regional blocs.” [61] Though this summary of her work is all too brief, we hope to have emphasized some key issues in Mouffe’s thought that are relevant to our investigation. She is clearly in agreement with Ricoeur in terms of her prescriptions for the global era— translation, narrative hospitality, and forgiveness, it seems to us, would be crucial components of a genuinely agonistic (rather than antagonistic) international political process. Unlike Ricoeur, however, she manages to preserve political agonism in this larger scale, rather than positing (even as a regulative ideal) a unified, reconciled humanity. In the final section, we will see how these perspectives can help us reconfigure our understanding of political agency. Beforehand, though, we wish to register one particular concern. While we clearly appreciate their contributions and find ourselves very much in agreement with the spirit of their works, both Mouffe and Ricoeur’s prescriptions are perhaps too European. Of course, neither one has an essentialist view of Europe. [62] And if there is any Eurocentrism in their work, it comes with no ill-intent. Their recommendation for a stronger and more independent Europe is certainly understandable, but we doubt this may be the route for the rest of the world. Europe is culturally and infrastructurally equipped for such resistance to the excesses of globalization. Indeed, the European Union is a great model of negotiating the boundaries between the local and the global tensions. But Mouffe and Ricoeur are also taking clear aim at the United States and its neoliberal hegemony. What, then, are progressive American citizens to do? What are citizens of developing countries to do? In a case where extremities meet, citizens of America and most developing countries cannot rely on their government to protect them against globalization or parochialism. Most of the world is not fortunate enough to have an institution like the EU— all its flaws aside— to turn to. The lack of alternatives that Mouffe has deplored often has the effect of making citizens in such countries give up the political fight. In the next section, we argue that while we cannot abandon the nation-state model altogether, we should reconsider our model of citizenship, and, in line with Ricoeur’s way of dealing with alienation, conceive of a citizenship that is not ***solely*** geography-based, but ***instead*** links those of similar values across the globe. We believe that by reconfiguring our notions of ourselves, we can begin to overcome[s] the political alienation that has plagued many globalization-ravaged nations, and offer their citizens a way to make their voices heard. NEW NARRATIVE FOR CITIZENSHIP Let us briefly revisit Ricoeur’s notion of distanciation. In the hermeneutic tradition, Ricoeur’s position on the importance of critical distance is slightly different than Heidegger and Gadamer. Unlike them (and their perhaps too-heavy attachment to belonging), Ricoeur does not overly lament the problem of alienation. Hermeneutic thinkers agree that overdetermination of meaning and the consequent need for interpretation makes ontological coincidence impossible. They also agree that we are temporal beings, within a historical tradition, whose work is to retrieve possibilities of the past that have been given over (tra-ditio) to us. An authentic, living tradition is not one which merely repeats the past, but which takes up the possibilities inherent in it in innovative ways, possibilities that can be thought of as “arrows of futurity which have not been fired or whose trajectory has been interrupted.” [63] This gift of the past is what allows us to understand the present and to project ourselves into the future. For Ricoeur, the distance with the past is cause for celebration; it is productive. It forces us to be active agents in the construction of meaning— both of our world and of ourselves. Analogously, in his analysis of the world of the text, Ricoeur found that the liberation of the text from authorial intention means that the reader becomes an integral part of the process of meaning-giving. The reader must figure her way through the text, constantly questioning her own assumptions in dialogue with it. In fact, in his work on Marx, Ricoeur underlined the fact that any form of emancipation and liberation goes through the dual process of alienation and reconfiguration. The loss that we experience through the processes of globalization, and the inadequacy of our old theories of politics in face of this experience, should therefore be seen as an exciting possibility for innovation. The return to religious fundamentalism and xenophobic nationalism, on the other hand, are both reactionary measures that try to overcome this alienation in counterproductive ways. They attempt violently to overcome that alienation now enjoined on us by globalization without creating a new form of life, but rather by way of a return to the past conceived of as a static object rather than a living source of possibilities. What, by contrast, does Ricoeur suggest we do in face of the distance of alienation— and, more importantly for our purposes, the particular experience of alienation deriving from globalization? In each case, the answer is the same: reinterpret, reconfigure and redefine. In his work on narratives, Ricoeur tells us that the past is not given to us as a dead set of facts. It is a lived perspective; history is the story of who we are, of how our ancestors lived the world. The world thus comes to us pre-shaped, always already interpreted. But this figure and shape, given linguistic and temporal distance, require reconfiguration; they require us to re-write the stories and to give them a new figure. A narrative, according to Ricoeur, is the process of emplotment that enables us to give coherence—concordance— to the discordant elements of life. In the globalization debate, the discord we face is that of past theories that can no longer effectively explain our world and our place within it. How, then, are we to be global citizens, if neither the traditional nation-state nor the world-state narrative seems to do the job? As we have already seen, in the face of overwhelming global market forces, the state has become, at least in some cases, powerless to protect the concrete unity of life that is found in the nation. How are we to employ the kind of political agency that— till now— it has been the function of the State to exercise (on behalf of a historical and geographic community)? We agree with Ricoeur (and Dauenhauer) that strict nationalism and pure elimination of all local differences would not work. For the foreseeable future, state institutions will matter. To utilize both Ricoeur and Mouffe’s contributions, we can envisage a new form of political identity, one that embraces both agonism and plurality. It would begin with a new sense of identity. We recently argued that the traditional model of land-based citizenship is deficient in at least two ways: 1) it does not take into account the unavoidable fragmentation that Mouffe has addressed (if there is no “one-state” [see also Lefort], how can there be “one-world”?), and 2) it is increasingly clear that the ones in power— the ones that Machiavelli called the rulers— no longer show any overarching fidelity to the land. Despite much patriotic discourse, no major corporation would put the one-state before its profits. If it is better (i.e. more profitable) to outsource or relocate, it will do so. This basic alienation experienced by the majority of people, an exile that did not force them to leave the land, but instead removed their political agency while restricting them to the same polis, requires us to reconsider who we are in a radical way. Even though we are culturally, historically local people, economic (and other) conditions also make each of us allies of others across borders. Often we have perhaps less in common with our neighbors in North Carolina and Washington, D.C., than we have with others in different countries who share our ethical stances. We do not, of course, mean to say that we have nothing in common left with our fellow local citizens. On some issues, we retain similar concerns, though those are slowly receding. A reconfiguration of my identity requires me to see that my interests are too diverse to fit one geographical citizenship. To give a concrete example: since the seventies, Greenpeace and Human Rights Watch have brought under the same political umbrella people of different countries, with the same moral outlook. To contribute to their cause, to participate in their efforts, does not require local allegiance. But neither does it mean that we are all one, or that we are all in one-world. Human rights concerns, labor concerns, gender, racial, and environmental concerns often overlap, but not always. Various groups can, to use Laclau and Mouffe’s term, create a “hegemonic front” in some cases, but it does not mean that they are one and the same in all cases. One of the oft-repeated maxims we hear is to “think globally and act locally.” This is, in some ways, a valuable motto. But it limits action to the geographically local. It ignores the fact that sometimes I have a duty to others— say, human rights victims— even though it is not a strictly local issue. Acting locally— in this case, pressing my own government— is not enough. For emancipatory causes, local governments may not listen. But putting international pressure on others may prove more efficient. This perspective on citizenship does not eliminate local governance, though it acknowledges its weakening force. Nor does it eliminate local identities; it does, however, require that we cease to define ourselves in merely one way, as citizens of a given nation-state, for the purposes of political agency. We may be culturally of one tradition, but we also have other ethical and political motivations that are not necessarily represented by that nation-state. This new outlook and ethos requires a richer plot. We must figure ourselves out afresh, must re-shape our identities to accommodate both local and global agency. Though we are far from having a clear picture of how this would work institutionally— and national governments will be unavoidable for the foreseeable future— to be authentic agents, to be active now means coming to terms with the adversities, the agonies and divisions of local and global politics. Negotiating my own multiple identity, as well as the relationships between those communities to which I belong, requires the kind of “pragmatics of judgment” Ricoeur explores in his meditations on fragility and responsibility. [64] An innovative narrative is needed before we can begin to think of the institutions capable of enabling this new kind of agency; but what we are advocating, in short, is a new sort of cosmopolitanism— one not harnessed to the assumptions of a universalist “reason” or global world-state. This is a more hermeneutic cosmopolitanism, rooted in real linguistic, cultural, religious, and gender differences (and, conversely, agonisms as well). This response to globalization begins with an awareness that whereas the protections of the modern nation-state have many definite practical advantages— and we should, consequently, continue to rely on the representative force of these institutions in many conflicts of interest— these must be supplemented with more democratic, trans-national organizations. These organizations must enable us to re-plot our narratives of selfhood, and empower us to act not merely as geographic communities (as states make possible), but as supra-local communities of interest, with the more horizontal political power necessary to counter the power that large, multinational corporations are already taking advantage of. Where the concrete universal of the nation fails in providing us with a solid enough identity, and the political arm of the state cannot deliver on its promise to grant us the power-in-common we need to counter the forces of globalization, a multiplicity of these supra-local concrete universals must intervene. Although the alienation that is constitutive of any politics can never be wholly overcome, this is the best route we can see whereby the deleterious effects of that particular alienation most characteristic of globalization can be somewhat mitigated, reconfigured in not just a theoretical, but also a practical form that allows for genuine political agency on the part of a global citizenry.

#### There is no single root or proximate cause of global problems, and no hard and fast solution – only advocacy models grounded in agonistic pluralism can develop methods for non-violent reconciliation of domestic and international conflicts

SEP 11 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Paul Ricoeur,” first published 11-11-2002, substantive revision 4-18-2011, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ricoeur/#3.7)

3.7 Politics For Ricoeur, as for Aristotle, the political institution is the most¶ comprehensive of social institutions. It provides the social space for¶ other institutions—e.g., religious institutions, economic¶ institutions—and protects each of them from being encroached upon by¶ any of the others. Thus the political institution, especially if it¶ unites people as fellow citizens in a state, embodies the power that¶ makes possible the full expression of all basic human capabilities.¶ Furthermore, it seeks to give stability and durability to what its people¶ achieve.¶ But political power is inherently ambivalent or paradoxical. On the¶ one hand, this power is power-in-common, a power that springs directly¶ from the capacity people have to join with one another in common¶ action. Together they can do things that none could do alone¶ (Oneself as Another, 194-95). Hence there is truth in¶ Eric Weil's definition of the state as “the organization of a¶ historical community; organized into a state, the community is capable¶ of making decisions.¶ On the other hand, all politics about which we know anything involves¶ a distinction between the ruler and the ruled. The ruler has¶ domination over and can compel obedience from the ruled. Hence there¶ is truth in Max Weber's view that political power always threatens¶ violence. Paradoxically, then, [special-character:ldquo[no historical¶ community can exist without a power that surpasses the play of¶ individual interests, without a State. But on the other hand, power¶ can only appear as a force that does violence, as a constraint that¶ limits interests, limits even the vocation of individuals. The State…is a force of ¶ unconditional constraint. It is legitimate violence in history.¶ The defining task for any defensible politics is to learn what justice¶ calls for and to establish and protect the institutions that make¶ justice effective. This is tantamount to saying that the ultimate¶ objective of all defensible political practice is to make¶ power-in-common prevail as far as possible over domination. But¶ because domination is never wholly eliminable, defensible politics are¶ inherently fragile.¶ Among the most important reasons for the fragility of politics is that¶ the kind of discourse proper to political life is rhetoric,¶ specifically what Aristotle calls deliberative or political rhetoric.¶ Rhetoric is distinct from both rational demonstration with its fully¶ warranted conclusions and the sheer sophistry of clever talk designed¶ to extort agreement from people by the use of threats or false¶ promises.¶ Political action is primarily oriented to the future. But one cannot¶ have certitude about the future, only an opinion. Rhetoric is thus the kind¶ of discourse appropriate for stating and discussing opinions. As a¶ consequence, the results of political deliberations are never beyond¶ reasonable contestation. No proposed constitution, law, or political¶ undertaking can be definitively justified. Therein lies the fragility¶ of politics.¶ People can become frustrated with the inability of political discourse¶ to achieve certitude. This tempts them to embrace some doctrine or¶ method that claims to yield incontrovertible conclusions rather than¶ merely likely ones. For example, some people are tempted to adopt a¶ utopian program that claims to lead to an achievable ideal¶ society. Others are tempted by an ideology that claims to prescribe¶ the true path that a political society ought to travel. And still¶ others are tempted to embrace a method or procedure—e.g., cost¶ benefit analysis or rational choice theory—that purports to¶ yield results that are immune to reasonable challenge. Finally, there¶ are those who are tempted to opt out of political discourse on the¶ grounds that its results are too meager to be worthwhile.¶ Those who succumb to any of these temptations at least implicitly call¶ for the exclusion of some people from the discourse that determines¶ political action. Those who opt out exclude themselves. Those who¶ give in to any of the other temptations mentioned above would exclude¶ those who do not share their approach. The ineliminable possibility—and historically, the likelihood—of such exclusions makes politics¶ fragile. Every exclusion gives the included some domination over the¶ excluded. Since the objective of responsible politics is to have¶ power-in-common prevail as far as possible over domination, exclusions¶ are always to be minimized. Or, more positively, the opinions of as¶ many people as possible ought to be represented in political¶ discourse, for doing so best promotes power-in-common.¶ Political responsibility is born of the fragility of politics. The¶ basic responsibility of citizens is twofold. On the one hand, they¶ ought to recognize that the political domain is relatively autonomous¶ vis-à-vis other domains. It has its own proper objective and¶ norms. Accordingly, citizens ought to resist efforts to subject¶ political action to norms belonging to other domains, such as¶ economics, or technology, or religion. On the other hand, citizens¶ ought to work to have political institutions and practices promote as¶ widespread political participation as is feasible.¶ For Ricoeur, this twofold responsibility has both a domestic and an¶ international dimension. History shows that domestic exclusions can¶ come from any number of sources, e.g., poverty, racial or religious¶ prejudice, etc. Citizens ought to oppose all such exclusions. Indeed,¶ they ought to support the rehabilitation even of those who have¶ excluded themselves by committing¶ crimes.¶ Many political problems today—e.g., how to deal with¶ environmental degradation, the proliferation of terrible weaponry,¶ epidemics—cannot be successfully dealt with by any particular¶ state alone. Only international cooperation can succeed. Historically,¶ any number of factors—e.g., language, religion, race, military¶ conquest—have been obstacles to cooperation of this sort. It is¶ incumbent on citizens to do what they can to encourage their societies¶ to remove or at least weaken these obstacles. To do so one need not¶ promote any form of world government. Rather, citizens ought both to¶ work through the institutions of civil society to pardon other people¶ and states for the harms they have caused and to support treaties and¶ pacts that all affected states can reasonably be urged to commit¶ themselves to.¶ In short, responsible citizens always look for ways to increase the¶ number of people, both domestically and internationally, whose relevant¶ opinions can be taken seriously in political deliberations. There is no¶ set of rules that can rightly specify just how citizens ought to¶ discharge this responsibility. As in personal ethics, they have to draw¶ on a practical wisdom. Doing so is the only way to work for¶ power-in-common to prevail over domination and to protect genuine¶ politics from the threats to which it is always¶ subject.

# 2ac

### 2ac t no migration

#### Economic engagement includes offers to remove financial restrictions – distinct from travel promotion

Haass and O’Sullivan 2K (Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State and close advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell, received the State Department's Distinguished Service Award, and Meghan O’Sullivan, former deputy national security adviser on Iraq and Afghanistan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and senior fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy,” Brookings Institution, 2000, pp. 5-6, Google Book)

As is evident from the fairly small existing literature on the use of incentives in foreign policy, many different engagement strategies exist, depending¶ on such variables as the actors engaged, the incentives employed, and the objectives pursued. The first important distinction to be made in any typology¶ of engagement is whether the strategy is conditional or unconditional. A strategy of unconditional engagement would offer certain changes in U.S. policy¶ toward the country without the explicit agreement that a reciprocal act would¶ follow. Depending on the intention behind these unconditional initiatives—¶ and, of course, the reaction of the target country—this form of engagement¶ may be short-lived. Charles Osgood, in his GRIT (graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction) theory offers a model of cooperation¶ that stems from an uninvited, opening initiative by one country.8¶ Although¶ the act in itself is unconditional, the failure of the target country to reciprocate with meaningful gestures soon leads to the abandonment of the strategy; alternatively, if the initial accommodating steps are met with positive¶ moves, cooperation ensues. President George Bush’s 1991 nuclear reduction initiative, which was reciprocated by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev,¶ is one instance of a GRIT approach spurring cooperation. Conciliatory gestures made by the United States to Iran in March 2000 may be another.¶ Another form of unconditional engagement takes a broader perspective,¶ by regarding inducements offered to civil society and the private sector over¶ time as playing an important role in creating openings for cooperation further down the road. In these unconditional strategies, certain initiatives or¶ changes in U.S. policy toward the country are made without necessarily expecting, or even soliciting, reciprocal acts from the regime. This form of¶ engagement may be implemented by nongovernmental actors, such as the¶ programs sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy that promote democracy and the development of institutions in many authoritarian regimes. Alternatively, this engagement may entail explicit modifications¶ to U.S. policy, as occurred with Cuba in March 1998 and January 1999. By¶ allowing licensed sales of food and agricultural inputs to independent entities in Cuba, by easing travel and financial restrictions, and by promoting¶ communication between America and the island, the United States sought¶ to buttress the development of civil society and the private sector in Cuba.9¶ In doing so, the United States hoped to build momentum leading to greater¶ political changes, which would facilitate U.S.-Cuban cooperation in the future, perhaps many years down the road.¶ In contrast, the expectations surrounding conditional engagement strategies are more contractual; in its most narrow form of the tit-for-tat process¶ explored by Robert Axelrod, cooperation is based on a strict cycle of reciprocity.10 However, conditional engagement can also refer to a much less¶ tightly orchestrated series of exchanges in which the United States extends¶ inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. These desired¶ alterations in the behavior of the target country may be particular, welldefined policy stances, or as in the case of Alexander George’s conditional¶ reciprocity, they may refer to more vague changes in attitudes and the overall orientation of regimes.11 While recognizing the subtle differences among¶ the various concepts of conditional engagement, this book uses the term¶ largely to refer to strategies of reciprocity with focused, policy objectives in¶ mind. The Agreed Framework struck between the United States and North¶ Korea in 1994 is one such example. In a specific effort to curtail nuclear¶ proliferation, America linked the provision of economic incentives to the¶ fulfillment of North Korean commitments to halt Pyongyang’s development¶ of nuclear weapons.¶ Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from¶ which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such¶ as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology,¶ loans, and economic aid.12 Other equally useful economic incentives involve¶ the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans,¶ or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United¶ States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global¶ economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most¶ potent incentives in today’s global market.13¶ Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of¶ summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military¶ engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and¶ human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers.14¶ These areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building¶ people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange¶ of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.

### 2ac fw

#### Maximizing points of contention is better for their skills

Yovel 03 (Jonathan Yovel, assistant professor, faculty of law, coordinator of law and philosophy @ University of Haifa, Israel, Cardozo L. Rev. 635, Cardozo Law Review, 1-24-03)

While reactive forces respond to their context and in this way are dictated by them, active forces find their own mediums for action. There is a catch, however. Force needs resistance in order to matter, grow, and be challenged. In a paragraph whose importance to the understanding of Nietzsche's "mechanics" of power can hardly be exaggerated, he spells it out: Strong nature ... needs objects of resistance; hence it looks for what resists ... The strength of those who attack can be measured in a way by the opposition they require: every growth is indicated by the search for a mighty opponent ... . The task is not simply to master what happens to resist, but what requires us to stake all our strength, suppleness, and fighting skill - opponents that are our equals. n41 Thus the will is measured in the scope of its challenges. But the active will is not satisfied by those challenges it happens to come by. For the challenge to be worthwhile it must be the most powerful possible, and so the Person of Power must cultivate the will to power of those who are not. In debate, the Person of Power will make the best of her opponent's position, nourish it, then go after the strong points or strongest version or interpretation. Kasparov must play Karpov, then Deep Blue. The philosophical problems most worthy of engagement - and Nietzsche spoke of problems as something a philosopher challenges to single combat - are the toughest ones. Of himself, he asserts "I only attack causes which are victorious ... . I have never taken a step publicly that did not compromise me: that is my criterion of doing right." n42 In society, the law that best serves the Person of Power is that which empowers the other to best prepare him for such "war." n43 Law must elevate the other's own powers to the fullest of [\*650] their potential (the overman, of course, has no presupposed potential: a potential for her would be power-constraining rather than a horizon for development). The Person of Power will not rely on social norms to serve her in overcoming or in dominating: that is the way of ressentiment. Instead she will form law that will make the best out of that which she must stand up to, namely the others. Nietzsche is no closet-liberal: the principle of law as empowerment of the other is strictly a mean for the will to become more, for the power to will. n44 Law does not empower the other as a subject, although through empowerment the other might discover her own power and so much the better. The other - the person enslaved by the psychology of ressentiment, be he called slave or master - needs not be empowered to become less contemptible, yet it is because of his contemptibility that he must be elevated. Empowerment of the other is the active will's maxim in the exact sense in which the elevated will categorizes natural phenomenon and shapes cognition and language - namely, creating the environment for the best possibilities for the will to cast itself in the world, both natural and social.

#### AFF is the *only way* to reinvigorate the debate space and reassert intellectual agency and skills development – otherwise, antagonism reifies exclusive structures and excludes effective scholarship

Roberts-Miller 02 (Patricia Roberts-Miller, Associate Professor of Rhetoric @ the University of Texas, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt's Agonistic Rhetoric,” http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol22.3/miller-fighting.pdf)

Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorbing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort offorce in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slogans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtfulness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I wantto emphasize this point, as itis important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who mayor may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences--<>r, at least, resist the modem tendency toward totalitarianismby thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herselfto become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated contemplation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from 'all others. '" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers: they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.

#### Over-commitment to rules-enforcement empowers exclusionary structures – causes antagonism, which turns decisionmaking and guts education

Steele 10 (Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas, Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 109-111)

The rules of language and speaking can themselves serve to conceal truth in world politics. I begin here with the work of Nicholas Onuf (1989), which has inspired constructivists to engage how “language is a rule-governed activity” (Wilmer 2003: 221). Rules help construct patterns and structures of language exchanges, and “without these rules, language becomes meaningless” (Gould 2003: 61). From the work of Onuf, we recognize that rules do more than set appropriate boundaries for language, as the ¶ paradigm of political society is aptly named because it links irrevocably the sine qua non of society— the availability, no, the unavoidability of rules— and of politics— the persistence of asymmetric social relations, known otherwise as the condition of rule. (1989: 22) ¶ Rules lead to rule— what Onuf (1989) titles the “rule-rules coupling.” Thus, linguistic rules demarcate relations of power and serve to perpetuate the asymmetry of social relations. The structure of language games is valued because it provides order and continuity. But because those rules are obeyed so frequently and effortlessly, they are hard to recognize as forms of authority. ¶ Where does the need for such continuity arise? As mentioned in previous chapters, Giddensian sociology suggests that the drive for ontological security, for the securing of self-identity through time, can only be satisfied by the screening out of chaotic everyday events through routines, which are a “central element of the autonomy of the developing individual” (Giddens 1991: 40). Without routines, individuals face chaos, and what Giddens calls the “protective cocoon” of basic trust evaporates (ibid.). Yet, as I have discussed in my other work (2005, 2008a) and as Jennifer Mitzen notes (2006: 364), rigid routines can constrain agents in their ability to learn new information. This is what the rhythmic strata of aesthetic power satisfies. In the context it creates for parrhesia, these routines, connected to an agent’s sense of Self, shield that agent from the truth.4 “The shallowness of our routinized daily existence,” Weber once stated, “consists indeed in the fact that the persons who are caught up in it do not become aware, and above all do not wish to become aware, of this partly psychologically, part pragmatically conditioned motley of irreconcilably antagonistic values” (1974: 18). The need for such rhythmic continuity spans all social organizations, including scholarly communities (thus we refer to such communities as “disciplines”). ¶ The function of these rules creates a similar problematic faced by the parrhesiastes who is attempting to “shock” these structured rules and habits of the targeted agent. Because the parrhesiastes may find the linguistic rules or at least “styles” or language used by the targeted power to be part of the problem (the notion that one must be “tactful,” for instance), she or he must perform a balancing act between two goals. First, the parrhesiastes must challenge the conventions that serve to simplify and even conceal the truth the parrhesiastes is speaking. Second, the parrhesiastes must observe some of these speaking rules, part of which may themselves be responsible for or derivate toward the style of the Self that needs to be challenged by the parrhesiastes. Favoring the first, the parrhesiastes is prone to being ignored as irrational, as someone “on the fringe” or even unintelligible or, in the words of Harry Gould already noted, “meaningless.” Favoring the second moves the parrhesiastes away from the truth attempting to be told or at least obscures the truth with the language of nicety. As developed by Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, parrhesia existed within this spectrum: at times, it bordered on “harsh frankness” that was “not mixed with praise”; at other times, the frankness was more subdued (Glad 1996: 41). 5 As the examples of Cynic and academic-intellectual parrhesia provided later in this chapter illustrate, different manifestations of truth-telling as a form of counterpower occupy different spaces along this spectrum— balancing between abiding by these conventions of decorum and style; the need to provide forceful, decloaked truth; or, in the case of Cynic parrhesia, flauntingly contradicting the conventions altogether. ¶ The parrhesiastes will most likely face charges of the first order (ignoring convention) regardless of the manner in which parrhesia is delivered. If, indeed, “the truth hurts” and if the target of such truth cannot deny the facts being delivered, the most convenient option for the victim is to blame “the way” in which the [risk-takers] said something, knowing full well that it was the substance of what that person said that was, for the victim, inappropriate or, more to the point, inconvenient.

#### No such thing as a single locus of good ground in academia – all consensus is conflictual

Mouffe 2k (Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory @ the University of Westminster, held research positions at Harvard, Cornell, the University of California, the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism,” Department of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies, http://users.unimi.it/dikeius/pw\_72.pdf)

Envisaged from the point of view of¶ “agonistic pluralism”¶ , the aim of democratic politics is to¶ construct the¶ “them”¶ in such a way tha¶ t it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be¶ destroyed, but an¶ “adversary”¶ , i.e. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to¶ defend those ideas we do not put into question. This is the real meaning of liberal democratic¶ tolerance¶ ,¶ which does not¶ e¶ ntail condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to¶ standpoints that we disagree with, but treating those who defend them as legitimate¶ opponents. This category of the¶ “adversary”¶ does not eliminate antagonism, though, and it¶ should be distingui¶ shed from the liberal notion of the competitor with which it is sometimes¶ identified. An¶ adversary is an enem¶ y¶ , but a legitimate enem¶ y¶ , one with whom we have some¶ common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico¶ -¶ political principles of¶ liberal¶ democracy: liberty and equalit¶ y¶ . But we disagree¶ on¶ the meaning and implementation¶ of those principles and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through¶ deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed, given the ineradicable plura¶ lism of value, there¶ is not rational resolution of the conflict, hence its antagonistic dimension.¶ 33¶ This does not¶ mean of course that adversaries can never cease to disagree but that does not prove that¶ antagonism has been eradicated.¶ To accept the view of¶ the adversary is to undergo a radical¶ change in political identit¶ y¶ . It is more a sort of¶ conversion¶ than a process of rational¶ persuasion (in the same way as Thomas Kuhn has argued that adherence to a new scientific ¶ paradigm is a conversion). Compromises¶ are, of course, also possible; they are part and¶ parcel of politics; but they should be seen as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation.¶ Introducing the category of the “adversary" requires complexifying the notion of antagonism and distinguishing it from agonism. Antagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism is struggle between adversaries. We can therefore reformulate our problem by saying that envisaged from the perspective of “agonistic pluralism" the aim of democratic politics is to transform antagonism into agonism. This requires providing channels through which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues, which, while allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but as an adversary. An important difference with the model of ‘ deliberative democracy", is that for ‘agonistic pluralism", the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus possible, but to mobilize those passions towards democratic designs.¶ One of the key thesis of agonistic pluralism is that, far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence. Modern democracy’s specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order. Breaking with the symbolic representation of society as an organic body - which was characteristic of the holist mode of social organization - a democratic society acknowledges the pluralism of values, the “disenchantment of the world” diagnosed by Max Weber and the unavoidable conflicts that it entails.¶ I agree with those who affirm that a pluralist democracy demands a certain amount of consensus and that it requires allegiance to the values, which constitute its “ethico-political principles". But since those ethico-political principles can only exist through many different and conflicting interpretations, such a consensus is bound to be a “conflictual consensus". This is indeed the privileged terrain of agonistic confrontation among adversaries. Ideally such a confrontation should be staged around the diverse conceptions of citizenship, which correspond to the different interpretations of the ethico-political principles: liberal-conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal, radical-democratic, etc. Each of them proposes its own interpretation of the “common good", and tries to implement a different form of¶ its own interpretation of the “common good", and tries to implement a different form of hegemony. To foster allegiance to its institutions, a democratic system requires the availability of those contending forms of citizenship identification. They provide the terrain in which passions can be mobilized around democratic objectives and antagonism transformed into agonism.¶ A well functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as it is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility.¶ It is for that reason that the ideal of a pluralist democracy cannot be to reach a rational consensus in the public sphere. Such a consensus cannot exist We have to accept that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony as a stabilization of power, and that it always entails some form of exclusion. The idea that power could be dissolved through a rational debate and that legitimacy could be based on pure rationality are illusions, which can endanger democratic institutions.¶ What the deliberative democracy model is denying is the dimension of undecidability and the ineradicability of antagonism, which are constitutive of the political. By postulating the availability of a non exclusive public sphere of deliberation where a rational consensus could be obtained, they negate the inherently conflictual nature of modern pluralism. They are unable to recognize that bringing a deliberation to a close always results from a decision which excludes other possibilities and for which one should never refuse to bear responsibility by invoking the commands of general rules or principles. This is why a perspective like “agonistic pluralism" which reveals the impossibility of establishing a consensus without exclusion is of fundamental importance for democratic politics. By warning us again of the illusion that a fully achieved democracy could ever be instantiated it forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive. To make room for dissent and to foster the institutions in which it can be manifested is vital for a pluralist democracy and one should abandon the very idea that there could ever be a time in which it would cease to be necessary because the society is now “well ordered”. An ‘agonistic’ approach acknowledges the real nature of its frontiers and the forms of exclusion that they entail, instead of trying to disguise them under the veil of rationality or morality.¶ Asserting the hegemonic nature of social relations and identities can contribute to subverting the ever-present temptation existing in democratic societies to naturalize its frontiers and essentialize its identities For this reason it is much more receptive than the deliberative model to the multiplicity of voices that contemporary pluralist societies encompass and to the complexity of their power structure.

#### No uniqueness – civic engagement low now – only AFF’s discussion of agonistic, reconciliatory advocacy solves

AACU 12 (Association of American Colleges and Universities, The National Task Force on Civic Learning and Democratic Engagement, “A Crucible Moment: College Learning and Democracy’s Future,” Washington, DC, A National Call to Action, 2012, http://www.aacu.org/civic\_learning/crucible/documents/crucible\_508F.pdf)

Events “are moving us toward what cannot be,” warns David Mathews, president of the Kettering Foundation, “a citizenless democracy” (London 2010, iv). The oxymoronic phrase is chilling. Mathews points to numerous trends in public life that “sideline citizens”: recasting people’s roles from producers of public goods to consumers of material ones, gerrymandering districts and thus exacerbating the deep divides that already shape our politics, diminishing opportunities for civic alliances, and replacing what ought to be thoughtful deliberation about public issues with incivility and hyperpolarization. The US Census Bureau’s most recent population survey captures citizen passivity in its finding that only 10 percent of citizens contacted a public official between November 2009 and November 2010 (US Census Bureau 2010). Such troubling phenomena are not necessarily news. A decade ago, Robert Putnam in Bowling Alone (2000) argued that there was a decline in social capital, especially in “bridging capital,” which he defined as the capacity to work across differences. Withdrawal into comfortable enclaves and wariness of others who appear different persist. Meanwhile, public confidence in the nation’s political institutions spirals downward: a New York Times/CBS News poll on September 16, 2011, revealed that only 12 percent of American approve of the way Congress is handling its job (Kopicki 2011). In 2007, a conference titled “Civic Disengagement in our Democracy” provided evidence that “among the 172 world democracies the United States ranks 139th in voter participation.” Conference leaders also warned that there was a “decline in both the quantity and quality of civic education” (McCormick Tribune Foundation 2007, 6–7). These assessments echo an earlier warning from the 1998 National Commission on Civic Renewal, chaired by William Bennett and Sam Nunn, which asserted, “In a time that cries out for civic action, we are in danger of becoming a nation of spectators” (1998, 12). In response to these and other dangerous trends, A Crucible Moment: College Learning and Democracy’s Future calls for investing on a massive scale in higher education’s capacity to renew this nation’s social, intellectual, and civic capital. As a democracy, the United States depends on a knowledgeable, public-spirited, and engaged population. Education plays a fundamental role in building civic vitality, and in the twenty-first century, higher education has a distinctive role to play in the renewal of US democracy. Although the Bennett-Nunn commission overlooked higher education as a potential source of civic renewal, this report argues that colleges and universities are among the nation’s most valuable laboratories for civic learning and democratic engagement. The beneficiaries of investing in such learning are not just students or higher education itself; the more civic-oriented that colleges and universities become, the greater their overall capacity to spur local and global economic vitality, social and political well-being, and collective action to address public problems. Today, however, a robust approach to civic learning is provided to only a minority of students, limiting higher education’s potential civic impact. Too few postsecondary institutions offer programs that prepare students to engage the questions Americans face as a global democratic power. A Crucible Moment calls on the higher education community—its constituents and stakeholders—to embrace civic learning and democratic engagement as an undisputed educational priority for all of higher education, public and private, two-year and four-year. While all parts of the higher education enterprise need to build civic capital for our society, the focus of this report is on undergraduate education. Such engagement will require constructing environments where education for democracy and civic responsibility is pervasive, not partial; central, not peripheral. David Mathews describes democracy as depending on an ecosystem, not only of legislative bodies and executive agencies, but also of civic alliances, social norms, and deliberative practices that empower people to work together in what Elinor Ostrom calls the “coproduction” of public goods (London 2010, iv). Every sector and every person can contribute to this civic enterprise, including the K–12 education sector, where education for democracy and civic responsibility needs to be a bedrock expectation. A Crucible Moment explores how higher education can serve—for this generation of students and for the nation’s globally situated democracy—as one of the defining sites for learning and practicing democratic and civic responsibilities. Since it is now considered necessary preparation for today’s economy, postsecondary education has a new and unparalleled opportunity to engage the majority of Americans with the challenges we face as a diverse democracy. Moreover, today’s US college campuses, physical and virtual, bring together a wider range of students—across class and color, religion and gender, nationality and age—than ever before in our history. As such, two-year and four-year colleges and universities offer an intellectual and public commons where it is possible not only to theorize about what education for democratic citizenship might require in a diverse society, but also to rehearse that citizenship daily in the fertile, roiling context of pedagogic inquiry and hands-on experiences.

### 2ac word pic

#### Re appropriating the meaning of oppressive words is the ultimate confrontation to oppressive language

Butler 4 - (Judith, “Undoing Gender,” Routledge)

In the same way that the terms of an exclusionary modernity have been appropriated for progressive uses, progressive terms can be appropriated for progressive aims. The terms that we use in the course of political movements which have been appropriated by the Right or for misogynist purposes are not, for that reason, strategically out of bounds. These terms are never finally and fully tethered to a single use. The task of reappropriation is to illustrate the vulnerability of these often compromised terms to an unexpected progressive possibility; such terms belong to no one in particular; they assume a life and a purpose that exceed the uses to which they have been consciously put. They are not to be seen as merely tainted goods, too bound up with the history of oppression, but neither are they to be regarded as having a pure meaning that might be distilled from their various usages in political contexts. The task, it seems, is to compel the terms of modernity to embrace those they have traditionally excluded, where the embrace does not work to domesticate and neutralize the newly avowed term; such terms should remain problematic for the existing notion of the polity, should expose the limits of its claim to universality, and compel a radical rethinking of its parameters. For a term to be made part of a polity that has been conventionally excluded is for it to emerge as a threat to the coherence of the polity, and for the polity to survive that threat without annihilating the term. The term would then open up a different temporality for the polity, establishing for that polity an unknown future, provoking anxiety in those who seek to patrol its conventional boundaries. If there can be a modernity without foundationalism, then it will be one in which the key terms of its operation are not fully secured in advance, one that assumes a futural form for politics that cannot be fully anticipated, a politics of hope and anxiety.

#### Censorship fails—destroys our ability to fight dominant interpretations of words

Schram, 95 - prof social theory and policy @ Bryn Mawr College, (Sanford F. Schram, professor of social theory and policy at Bryn Mawr College, 1995, words of welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty

Euphemisms also encourage self-censorship. The politics of renaming discourages its proponents from being able to respond to inconvenient information inconsistent with the operative euphemism. Yet those who oppose it are free to dominate interpretations of the inconvenient facts. This is bad politics. Rather than suppressing stories about the poor, for instance, it would be much better to promote actively as many intelligent interpretations as possible.

### 2ac anthro

#### This is particularly true for anthropocentrism – total rejection fails—understanding humans as part of the environment is key

Grey, 93. William, Reader in Philosophy at the University of Queensland. “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71.4, pages 463-475, http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html.

There is an obvious tension which arises when attempting to rectify the first two worries at the same time. For extolling the virtues of the natural, while at the same time vilifying the man-made or artificial, depends on a distinction between the natural and the artificial which the stress on a continuity between human and nonhuman (the focus of the second worry) undermines. On the one side there is emphasis on continuity and dependency, and on the other on distinctness and separation. It seems that, while we are a part of nature, our actions are nevertheless unnatural. This is one of the points where deep ecologists often risk lapsing into an incoherence, from which they are able to save themselves (as I will illustrate) with the help of a little covert anthropocentrism. Or putting the point another way, a suitably enriched (non-atomistic) conception of humans as an integral part of larger systems—that is, correcting the misconception of humanity as distinct and separate from the natural world—means that anthropocentric concern for our own well-being **naturally flows on to concern for the nonhuman world.** If we value ourselves and our projects, and part of us is constituted by the natural world, then these evaluations will be transmitted to the world. That we habitually assume characteristically anthropocentric perspectives and values is claimed by deep ecologists to be a defect. And as a corrective to this parochialism,

we are invited to assume an "ecocentric" (Rolston 1986, Callicott 1989) or "biocentric" (Taylor 1986) perspective. I am not persuaded, however, that it is intelligible to abandon our anthropocentric perspective in favour of one which is more inclusive or expansive. We should certainly abandon a crude conception of human needs which equates them (roughly) with the sort of needs which are satisfied by extravagant resource use. But the problem with so-called "shallow" views lies not in their anthropocentrism, but rather with the fact that they are characteristically short-term, sectional, and self-regarding. A suitably enriched and enlightened anthropocentrism provides the wherewithal for a satisfactory ethic of obligation and concern for the nonhuman world. And a genuinely non-anthropocentric view delivers only confusion.

#### No impact ---- anthro doesn’t spillover to other forms of violence

**Goldman 01** (Michael, Dept. Philosophy @ Miami U. Ohio, Journal of Value Inquiry, “A Transcendental Defense of Speciesism” 35:59-69, Springer)

While we may agree that racism, sexism, classism, and other forms of discrimination against human beings are abhorrent, it is not the case that the only reason to reject these forms of discrimination is the principle of equal consideration of interests that Singer advances. It is not even a compelling reason. All that Singer has shown is that one principle sufficient for rejecting racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression is a principle of equal consideration of interests. He has not shown that it is the only principle that can generate that moral conclusion. There are other principles that co-exist with and explain our intuitions about various forms of discrimination against non-dominant human beings, but they do not always apply to non-human animals. While we can easily grant that Singer’s principle applies to non-human, sentient animals as well as it does to human beings, it does not follow that whatever consideration is morally obligatory with respect to all human beings will be similarly obligatory with respect to non-human sentient animals. Singer provides no reason to think that it is that principle alone that can justify our condemnation of the oppression of non-dominant human beings.

**Environmental collapse won’t cause extinction**

**Easterbrook, 03** (Gregg, Senior Editor of the New Republic, July 2003, “We're All Gonna Die!,” Wired Magazine, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html, Hensel)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

Resilient

**The environment’s survived everything**

**Easterbrook, 95** (Gregg, Senior Editor of the New Republic, 1995, *A Moment on Earth*, p. 25, Hensel)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

#### Sentience determines what is important – humans come first

**Dunayer ‘5** [Joan, “Reply to a self-proclaimed speciesist,” Vegan Voice, <http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/Morality/Speciesism/ProudSpeciesist.htm> November 2005//GBS-JV]

"I am a speciesist myself and make no apologies for that," Peter Milne writes in "Disagreeing with Speciesism Theory" (June–August 2005 Vegan Voice). No doubt, he never would announce with equal pride, "I’m a racist." Feminists and gay-rights advocates don’t declare themselves sexists and homophobes. In sad contrast, people who consider themselves advocates for nonhuman animals tolerate, even espouse, the very bigotry that they should be combating: speciesism. What is speciesism? A failure, on the basis of species, to accord anyone equal consideration. It’s speciesist to deny anyone equal consideration either because they aren’t human or because they aren’t human-like. Nonspeciesists advocate equally strong basic rights—for example, to life and liberty—for all sentient beings. According to Milne, vegans are speciesist because they "discriminate" between plants and animals. By definition, to discriminate against members of any group means to discount their interests. Being insentient, plants have no interests; therefore we can’t discriminate against them. "We pass judgment that plant lives are less significant than animal lives in the realm of feeling and emotions," Milne states. Plants’ feelings and emotions aren’t "less significant"; they’re nonexistent. "Some tests indicate that plants have a basic consciousness," Milne says. No tests that scientists regard as valid. Milne’s claim that it’s speciesist to eat plants but not animals is sheer nonsense. In Milne’s view I exclude plants (and other organisms without a nervous system) from equal consideration because I don’t recognize "differences in the consciousness of different species." As someone whose graduate research in psychology foc

used on nonhuman cognition, I’m well aware that the consciousness of every sentient being differs from that of every other. Along with his belief that plants are conscious, Milne’s preposterous claim that insects live "constantly in fear of being devoured or killed in some other way" shows his dearth of scientific knowledge. Milne’s worldview is religious rather than based on evidence and logic. He believes in a hierarchical "Kingdom of God". (That phrase evokes a male, anthropomorphic deity.) Milne ranks humans above other animals, nonhuman mammals above birds, birds above reptiles, and reptiles above insects and arachnids. (Even his use of personal names assigns higher and lower status: except when he gives full names, he refers to Peter Singer as "Singer", in keeping with professional courtesy, but refers to me as "Joan".) Milne draws this false analogy: plants differ from animals as insects differ from mammals. Plants and animals differ in a way crucial to the issue of basic rights: animals are sentient; plants aren’t. Insects and mammals differ in ways irrelevant to basic rights: both are sentient. Like mammals and unlike plants, insects should have rights to life and liberty because they can experience life and liberty.

#### Alt cant solve – hierarchies are inevitable – which means that conflict is too – only the aff’s acceptance of agonistic pluralism helps to make that conflict non-violent

**Machan 04** (Tibor, Distinguished Fellow and Prof. @ Leatherby Center for Entrepreneurship & Business Ethics @ Chapman U., “Putting Humans First: Why We Are Nature’s Favorite”, p. 33-35)

In any case, there simply is evidence through the natural world of the existence of beings of greater complexity and of higher value. For example, while it makes no sense to evaluate as good or bad such things as planets or rocks or pebbles— except as they may relate to human or other living beings— when it comes to plants and animals, the process of evaluation commences very naturally indeed. We can speak of better or worse oaks, redwoods, zebras, foxes, or chimps. For such beings, we confine our evaluation to the condition or behavior without any intimation of their responsibility for being better or worse. But when we start discussing human beings, our evaluation assumes a moral component. To the best of our knowledge, it is with human beings that moral responsibility enters the universe. Clearly, a hierarchical structure in nature is thus exhibited. There is evidence throughout the natural world of lesser and greater complexity as well as lesser and greater capacity to value (and, at a certain point in biological development, be appropriately subject to evaluation by other organisms capable of such assessment). Some things—rocks, comets, and minerals—do not invite evaluations at all and have no capability of any kind of "valuing"—a capacity specific to living entities. When we look at the living world, we find, broadly speaking, two kinds of valuing entities. Some organisms—zebras, frogs, and redwoods—pursue goals related to their survival that are wired into their natures and thus invite evaluation as to whether they do well or badly but without any moral or ethical implications. And some organisms—human beings—invite moral evaluation in light of the fact that they exercise choice regarding the good Aid bad things they can do. Normal human life involves moral tasks, and that is why we are more important than other beings in nature. We are subject to moral appraisal; it is largely a matter of our own doing whether we succeed or fail in our lives. Clearly, if we could not make such comparative evaluations rationally, there would be little point to environmental ethics in the first place, a field that presupposes value differentiation throughout the natural world. Now, when it comes to our moral task, namely, to succeed as human beings, we must try to reach sensible conclusions about what we should do. We can fail to do this—and too often do so. But we can also succeed. The process that leads to our success involves learning, among other things, what it is that nature avails us with to achieve our highly varied tasks in life. Clearly, among these highly varied tasks could be some that make judicious use of animals—for example, to find out whether some medicine is safe for human use, we might wish to employ animals. It is rational for us to make the best use possible of nature in order to succeed in living our lives. That does not mean that we can do without guidelines for how we might make use of animals—any more than we can do without guidelines for any aspect of our conduct. Such guidelines are essential in the field of ethics. But they are not the proper subject of politics or law in a free society (except insofar as animals or plants become the subject of contractual agreements and their enforcement).

#### It’s impossible for any organism to live without domination – predation means reducing organisms to ‘prey’ is inevitable – only the AFF solves

**Pollan 6** – Knight Professor of Journalism at UC Berkeley. “An Animal’s Place,” 11-10, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500efd7153ef933a25752c1a9649c8b63&pagewanted=6>.

From the animals' point of view, the bargain with humanity has been a great success, at least until our own time. Cows, pigs, dogs, cats and chickens have thrived, while their wild ancestors have languished. (There are 10,000 wolves in North America, 50,000,000 dogs.) Nor does their loss of autonomy seem to trouble these creatures. It is wrong, the rightists say, to treat animals as ''means'' rather than ''ends,'' yet the happiness of a working animal like the dog consists precisely in serving as a ''means.'' Liberation is the last thing such a creature wants. To say of one of Joel Salatin's caged chickens that ''the life of freedom is to be preferred'' betrays an ignorance about chicken preferences -- which on this farm are heavily focused on not getting their heads bitten off by weasels.  But haven't these chickens simply traded one predator for another -- weasels for humans? True enough, and for the chickens this is probably not a bad deal. For brief as it is, the life expectancy of a farm animal would be considerably briefer in the world beyond the pasture fence or chicken coop. A sheep farmer told me that a bear will eat a lactating ewe alive, starting with her udders. ''As a rule,'' he explained, ''animals don't get 'good deaths' surrounded by their loved ones.''  The very existence of predation -- animals eating animals -- is the cause of much anguished hand-wringing in animal rights circles. ''It must be admitted,'' Singer writes, ''that the existence of carnivorous animals does pose one problem for the ethics of Animal Liberation, and that is whether we should do anything about it.'' Some animal rightists train their dogs and cats to become vegetarians. (Note: cats will require nutritional supplements to stay healthy.) Matthew Scully calls predation ''the intrinsic evil in nature's design . . . among the hardest of all things to fathom.'' Really? A deep Puritan streak pervades animal rights activists, an abiding discomfort not only with our animality, but with the animals' animality too.  However it may appear to us, predation is not a matter of morality or politics; it, also, is a matter of symbiosis. Hard as the wolf may be on the deer he eats, the herd depends on him for its well-being; without predators to cull the herd, deer overrun their habitat and starve. In many places, human hunters have taken over the predator's ecological role. Chickens also depend for their continued well-being on their human predators -- not individual chickens, but chickens as a species. The surest way to achieve the extinction of the chicken would be to grant chickens a ''right to life.''